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This dissertation studies the effect of a transparency reform on legislators’ behavior. 
In order to specify how and why the transparency reform would have an impact, it builds a 
theoretical framework based on a theory of legislative behavior. The expectations are tested 
against the behavior of the Chilean Lower House legislators before and after a transparency 
reform. 
The theoretical expectations derive from a theory of legislative behavior based on 
reelection-oriented legislators organized in parties. This theoretical framework has two 
central features. First, position avoidance is taken explicitly into account. Second, from 
previous work on comparative representation, legislators may establish programmatic and 
non-programmatic linkages with their constituencies.   
In line with the literature, legislators who follow a programmatic linkage strategy are 
expected to adopt positions closer to their electoral constituency. Furthermore, as legislators 
build such positions from their roll call, I expect that legislators, when cross-pressured 
between their party and their constituency, will be more likely to side with their 
constituency.  I argue that cross-pressured legislators may also avoid taking a position, as it 





Thus, reliance on position avoidance introduces a wedge between the public position taken 
by legislators and their effective position which has not been previously studied. 
I tested my hypotheses with observational data of the behavior of the Chilean Lower 
House members as a transparency reform took place in 2004, halfway through the legislative 
term. The case provides additional advantages to empirical assessment of my hypotheses, as 
legislators are allowed to abstain during any vote, and this option is recorded. 
The results provide evidence of the complex impact of transparency reform on 
legislators’ behavior. There is some evidence of a positive impact of transparency as it 
provides incentives for legislators to adopt public positions closer to their electoral 
constituencies. But the results on the use of position avoidance raise concerns as the 
observed moderation may partly be the result of obfuscation rather than of improved 
responsiveness. In particular, the strategic use of abstentions enables legislators to build a 
moderate reputation without having to support their constituencies´ preferences on all 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In developing countries, after the so-called third wave of democratization, the quality 
of democracy is now the central concern. As research ratifies the importance of an informed 
citizenry to ensure better government performance and curb corruption (e.g. Besley and 
Burguess, 2002; Adsera and Boix, 2003; Reinikka, R. and J. Svensson, 2006), transparency 
emerges as a possible solution. By improving electoral accountability, transparency is expected 
to improve the responsiveness of elected representatives and enable voters to select better 
politicians.  
But the positive impact of transparency on improved government performance and 
decreased corruption does not necessarily translate into the legislative arena. Research relying 
on experimental designs provides mixed results regarding voter behavior. Although some 
authors found promising evidence on the effects of information campaigns on voter behavior 
(Ferrez and Finan, 2008; Banerjee et al, 2010), other studies have found they have little impact 
(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012) or even a potential negative effect as increased information 
on corruption may induce voters to withdraw from the political process (Chang et al., 2012).  
Regarding legislators’ behavior, formal models raise serious questions when voters 
select on the basis of actions instead of outcomes. In those cases, transparency of the voting 
records may induce legislators to disregard private signals and select non-optimal policies in 
order to enhance their reputations although doing so may reduce voters’ welfare (Prat, 2005; 
Stasavage, 2007). Research in the U.S. based on observational data from the 1970’s found 




experimental research designs on non-institutionalized party systems found no impact on 
legislators’ behavior that was made public and some evidence of obfuscation by legislators 
(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012). Looking into the effect at the party level, Carey (2007, 
2009) analyzed the impact on vote unity and found that transparency – publicity of the vote – 
decreases vote unity. He interprets it as an increase in individual electoral accountability. 
Considering the consensus regarding the importance of parties for the functioning of 
representative democracy, and the need to strengthen parties in the developing world, it is 
important to understand the effect of transparency reforms on parties and on the links 
between parties, legislators, and voters.  
This dissertation contributes to the debate on transparency by providing theoretical 
hypotheses that explicitly incorporate a theory of legislative politics which takes position 
avoidance into account. Empirical research in representation relies on measures of congruency 
between legislators’ revealed positions, measured through roll call voting, and constituency 
policy preferences. But position avoidance introduces a wedge between the public position 
taken by legislators and their effective positions which has not been previously studied.  
I tested my hypotheses with observational data of the behavior of Chilean Lower House 
members before and after a transparency reform. The reform consisted of the online 
publication of the representatives’ roll call on sponsored and co-sponsored bills as well as 
individual rates of attendance. The transparency reform was not accompanied by an 
information campaign: neither Congress nor the executive government made explicit efforts to 
spread the information further than the press conference held to announce and describe the 




whether there are some intervening factors, such as the role of media or voluntary 
associations. 
1. The argument  
 
The theoretical expectations derive from a theory of legislative behavior based on 
reelection-oriented legislators organized in parties. The reelection goal implies that elections 
discipline behavior. This theoretical framework has two central features. First, position 
avoidance is taken explicitly into account. Second, from previous work on comparative 
representation, legislators may establish programmatic and non-programmatic linkages with 
their constituencies.  
The literature on legislative politics studies the legislator’s choice between voting 
against or along with the party. A key determinant is the electoral cost or benefit of each 
action when party and constituency are in conflict – as the decision is trivial when both 
coincide. As out-of-step legislators are likely to suffer electoral costs, cross-pressured 
legislators are electorally pressured to build a position closer to their district’s preferences and 
vote against their parties. In this dissertation, I propose that cross-pressured legislators may 
instead avoid taking a position, as it does not influence observed party unity and does not 
imply voting against the constituency. 
The use of position avoidance affects the content of representation as it disguises the 
actual position endorsed and implemented by the legislators and their parties. And the same 
factors making abstentions more attractive to cross-pressured legislators increase the wedge 




positions supported by these legislators. Hence, I argue that we must take position avoidance 
into account when studying the effects of transparency reform. Especially since the driving 
force of most movements towards transparency is the promise of improved representation.  
Transparency affects legislators’ behavior insofar it affects the strength of the electoral 
incentive. The expectations regarding the impact of transparency on legislators’ behavior are 
derived from the expected responses of legislators based on the theory of legislative behavior 
presented above. As legislators’ roll call may only have electoral consequences if voters are 
aware of such behavior, the presence of diffusion channels that spread information to voters is 
central to the identification strategy.  
In terms of revealed position through roll call, out-of-step legislators are expected to 
adopt positions closer to their electoral constituencies. These expectations follow the 
prevalent view in the available literature. But I depart from the literature and argue that this 
should not be taken at face value, and instead explore how such a closer position was 
achieved. In particular, I argue that transparency increases the reliance on position avoidance 
strategy.  Position avoidance is a strategy of obfuscation in which legislators avoid acting 
against their constituency, and thus construct a more moderate track record, but do not 
actively pursue the preferences of their constituencies.   
The arguments summarized above imply the following testable hypotheses regarding 
the impact of transparency. First, as the transparency of voting behavior impacts legislators’ 
electoral chances if their relation with voters is based on programmatic linkages, out-of-step 
legislators who follow a programmatic linkage strategy based on spatial competition prior to 




electoral constituency after transparency reform. And looking at the individual decision on 
how to vote, legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy based on spatial 
competition prior to the reform are expected be less likely to vote along with their party after 
the transparency reform when cross-pressured. But I argue that the decrease on party unity is 
not the only effect. Legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy based on spatial 
competition prior to the reform will also be more likely to abstain after transparency reform 
when cross-pressured. 
2. Dissertation outline 
  
The driving force behind transparency reform initiatives is their expected positive effect 
on the quality of representation. But several distinct concepts are involved in this formulation 
and in order to provide an answer as to the actual effects of transparency, it is necessary to 
unravel them by asking why, how, and under which conditions transparency reform 
would have an impact, and what kind of impact. Furthermore, what does an improvement in 
the quality of representation mean, and how can it be measured? Based on theoretical 
hypotheses, this dissertation explores the first question empirically, and from the results of 
this research derives implications on representation.  
Chapter 2 addresses these questions. I briefly review the different conceptualizations of 
representation with a special focus on responsiveness, the concept applied in this dissertation. 
I also discuss what Pitkin (1967) calls writers’ metapolitics as they influence the concept of 
representation applied and are related to the conditions for pandering. Representation 




representation centered on the individual legislator. Through a review of the empirical 
literature on representation, I discuss the challenges involved in its measurement.  
Elections are considered the central institution of representative government. In the 
second section of Chapter 2, I review two mechanisms through which elections work: selection 
and electoral incentives. These mechanisms are studied through political agency models. 
Although the mechanisms work differently, they both depend on electoral accountability.  
Transparency impacts representation through an improvement of the conditions for electoral 
accountability. Despite the optimism among policymakers, the reviewed theoretical works cast 
doubts upon its salutary effect. The benefits of disciplining potentially deviant legislators into 
following constituents’ interests must be balanced with the harmful effect of pandering by 
otherwise responsive legislators. This trade-off depends both on the relative capacities of 
voters and legislators to evaluate the outcomes of policy instruments, and the proportion of 
legislators who will deviate from constituency preferences without electoral pressure. In 
addition, as the change in behavior masks their differences, there is a potential negative 
impact on the ability of voters to distinguish between both types. Although both channels are 
important, this dissertation addresses the impact of transparency on the incentives for 
legislators to change their behavior.1 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework used to derive the expected impact of 
transparency and explains its central features as well as their implications on legislators’ 
behavior. As discussed above, this framework has two central elements: position avoidance 
and different types of programmatic linkages and is grounded on the assumption of reelection-
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oriented legislators organized in parties. As the theoretical expectations are tested against the 
Chilean transparency reform, Chapter 4 discusses key features of Chile which affect the way 
these expectations translate into specific hypotheses and describes the social and political 
context. The party system and the main political divides are discussed in the first sections. 
Empirical tests on the incentives for position-taking require specifying whose position the 
legislators will target. The electoral rules are a central determinant, and thus I discuss the 
effect of Chilean electoral rules on the incentives for position-taking and relation with the 
party system. As the argument of this dissertation is based on the reelection assumption, this 
chapter argues for its validity in the Chilean context. In the last section, I describe the 
transparency reform. 
Chapter 5 presents the data and the operationalization of the variables introduced in 
the theoretical expectations. The challenges and limitations of the data are discussed as well as 
the strategies used to overcome the limitations of the data. Given the available data, the last 
section discusses the empirical strategies used to identify the impact of transparency. The 
main strategy is to rely on the transparency reform as an exogenous shock which permits the 
construction of pre-post behavior for legislators who were in office during the term in which 
the reform took place as the reform was implemented halfway during the term. The strategy 
then uses the variation among districts in the extent of diffusion channels to identify the effect 
of the reform and distinguish it from other unobservable changes in the political environment. 
The final section presents a summary of the hypotheses to be tested in the following chapter. 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical tests and results regarding the impact of transparency on 




ideology as measured through roll call. And the second section tests the effects of the reform 
on legislators’ vote choice, in particular, on the rate of abstention. Chapter 7 concludes and 






CHAPTER 2: DEFINING THE CONCEPTS 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the concepts and models used to build the 
theoretical framework as well as to operationalize the main variables for the empirical analysis. 
The first section addresses the concept of representation – the different understandings as 
well as the different dimensions that it may address, and critically explores the different 
measures used in the empirical literature to assess policy responsiveness. In addition to 
differences in the conceptualization of what representing involves, there are different views 
regarding who should be the agents of the constituents: the individual legislators or the party. I 
discuss the roles of parties in representative democracies, and present the ideal model of 
representation prevalent in political science literature: responsible party government as it 
provides the benchmark for representation through parties.  
Elections play a central role in achieving representation. The second section discusses 
the mechanisms through which elections work - selection and electoral incentives - analyzed 
within the framework of political agency models. These theoretical models provide a unifying 
framework for studying delegation problems, and have been vastly applied. In this section, I 
present the main elements and logic of such models. The last section analyzes in depth the role 
of transparency in electoral accountability, as it is critical to the degree of information available 
to voters. I present the existing theories and evidence regarding the impact of transparency 








The meaning of representation is notoriously contested. Beyond the notion that 
representing implies acting in the interest of the represented, there seems to be little else on 
which theorists agree. 
Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999:2) 
 
The focus of this dissertation is the impact of increased transparency on the policy 
dimension of representation. In particular, the way constituents’ interests are represented 
through votes in the Plenary. Hence, I first address the different ways representation in the 
Assembly has been understood, and present the definition used in this research: 
responsiveness, as defined by Pitkin (19867). The empirical assessment of Pitkin's 
responsiveness involves assumptions regarding the nature of constituents’ interests and the 
constituents’ capacities relative to legislators’ to assess the effects of policies– what Pitkin 
defines as the writers’ metapolitics. Furthermore, responsiveness involves a negative criterion 
that, as discussed below, involves additional empirical challenges. Indeed, the usual measures 
of responsiveness used in related literature – e.g. congruence between public opinion and 
legislators’ roll call - do not necessarily address responsiveness, and may actually indicate 
pandering. For some authors, non-policy factors may also constitute a basis for a democratic 
relation between legislators and their constituents. The second subsection deals with these 
other dimensions of representation and how they relate or not with the policy dimension.  
The previous analyses are based on a dyadic relation between legislators and their 
constituents, but such a model of representation is not the only one. Indeed, representation 




best represented by the American Political Science Association (APSA) call for a responsive 
party government. The last section addresses the importance of parties for representative 
democracy and reviews the conditions for Responsible Party Government. 
 
a) The concept of representation in the Assembly 
Political representation has historically been understood as occurring within the 
Assembly, but the understanding of the exact nature of what constitutes representation has 
varied. The seminal work on representation by Pitkin (1967) seeks to clarify the concept. She 
distinguishes between two main conceptualizations: standing for and acting for. Both are 
discussed in relation to the Assembly. 
In the standing for conceptualization, descriptive representation is the most prevalent. 
As its name implies, representing consists of being and representation is distinct from 
governing. This distinction is most evident when descriptive representation is understood as 
providing information, as in the mirror analogy, or as giving voice to all sectors of society. 
Consistent with this view, early writers gave to the Assembly roles of control and fiscalization, 
but not of governing which was located in the executive2 (e.g. Mill J.S, 2001[1861]). This 
distinction between representation and governing is also present in the view of a modern 
variant of descriptive representation. This conceptualization considers that the activity of 
                                                          
2
 This dual meaning is also present to some extent in empirical political science. On the one hand, representation 
is understood as the activity undertaken by legislators, or in some cases, as the relation between legislators and 
voters. On the other hand, representation is understood as a principle opposite to governing, the need to include 
all voices in the assembly. This view is present in the debates regarding the objectives of the electoral system, e.g. 
Shugart and Carey (1992). Empirically, this representation is what Powell (2004) calls “procedural representation” 




policymaking itself is not representation, but that it is only legitimate if the Assembly is 
representative of the whole, as in the views of radical democrats.3  
The standing for conceptualization is centered on activity, but a “special kind of 
activity,” one where actors and actions fulfill certain requirements. First, the representative is 
independent and the constituents are conceived as capable of action and judgment. Second, 
the actions of the representative must be in his principal’s interest in a manner that is 
responsive to the principal’s wishes (Pitkin, 1967:p. 155).4  Responsiveness then becomes the 
central criterion for evaluating representation. But this responsiveness implies “a kind of 
negative criterion: conflict must be possible and yet nevertheless not occur” (p. 155).  
The negative criterion raises a particular challenge to empirical evaluations of 
representation: it requires assessing the possibilities of an act rather than the act itself, as 
Eulau and Karps argue (1977: 238). In some sense, it is similar to the problem of observational 
equivalence described by Weingast and Moran (1983) when analyzing control of the 
bureaucracy. Recent empirical work has taken a similar approach to assess responsiveness: 
when constituents’ preferences change, do legislators’ actions change? This formulation of the 
question equates constituents’ preferences - measured through public opinion surveys - with 
constituents’ interests.  
A greater challenge which might be present in Pitkin’s concept of representation is the 
so-called mandate-independence controversy: whether the legislators should be responsive to 
constituents’ expressed wishes or act in what legislators consider their constituents’ interests. 
                                                          
3
 Pitkin argues that this idea precedes that school of thought. 
4
 The exact phrasing is: “What the representative does must be in his principal’s interest, but the way he does it 




Pitkin (1967) argues that the formulation of the controversy makes a consistent answer 
impossible since it implies that following one is opposed to following the other. Instead, she 
argues that it is possible to provide a consistent position under the standing for 
conceptualization relying on the commonly held assumption that generally people’s wishes 
coincide with their interests. But Pitkin maintains that this conceptualization defines the outer 
limits of the concept of representation, and that the exact position within this dilemma 
depends on the writer’s metapolitics (p.166-167).  
Therefore, the central elements outlined by Pitkin as metapolitics of the writer are the 
central factors involved in understanding what constitutes representing. These elements are 
reflected in the formal analysis of representation via assumptions and the setting of the game, 
and tacitly underlie the arguments on normative discussions.5 I will briefly discuss three 
features.6 The first important element is the relative capacities of legislators and voters. Those 
who consider that issues debated in Congress are too complex or require expert knowledge 
espouse a conception of representation closer to the trusteeship view, while those who 
consider that voters are capable of understanding and taking positions ascribe to the mandate 
conceptualization. A second important element is the distinction between representing 
objective interests which can be discovered through rational discussion or representing value 
judgments. This distinction is clearly evident in the differences between Burkean and Liberalist 
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 For Pitkin, these different conceptualizations are key. She argues, for example, that substantive representation 
will break down when interests are considered as value judgments and there is a profound disagreement among 
society as to what is in its interest, disagreement that cannot be solved through deliberation and argument. Then, 
one will have to rely on descriptive representation (p. 213).  
6
 Pitkin also discussed the different conceptions of national interest: according to Pitkin, whereas the trustee 
version considers that the national interests will not emerge automatically and must be constructed, the mandate 
writers argue that the sum of constituency interest is the national interest. Although important, I will not address 




views. Third is the question of whether the legislature is a place for constructing agreement – 
where bargaining and negotiation have a central place – or whether it is instead a place where 
legislators present and defend voters’ views, and where compromise between different 
positions is to be avoided.  
In her work regarding presidents’ behavior after their election, Stokes (2001) provides a 
good example of the tension between both comprehensions of voters’ capacities. In her study 
of policy switches – e.g. mandate violations, Stokes argues that in some cases the president 
acts against his electoral promises and the expressed wishes of the electorate, because he 
believes he is acting in the real interests of voters. That is, the wishes of the voters do not 
correspond to their interests since the voters are not evaluating the effects of policies 
correctly. The underlying assumption is that voters derive policy preferences based on their 
beliefs in the effects of those policies on their economic well-being. Therefore, if the 
representative has better information or expertise regarding the link between actions (policy 
implemented) and outcome (economic well-being), he may act against the voters’ expressed 
wishes to further their interests (economic well-being). This discussion lies at the center of the 
debate regarding pandering and the costs of transparency. Although later discussed in greater 
detail, it is worthwhile to note that in this specific case, following the definition of pandering, if 
the representative goes with the popular policy, in spite of having information that an opposite 
policy  is the one that would  further his constituents’ interests, he is pandering.  
Most scholars subscribe to the view of representation as responsiveness.7 But some 
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 Powell (2004) in a thorough review of the literature only addresses policy responsiveness. Indeed, Dahl´s (1977) 
seminal work defined democracies as having the quality of being responsive to all its citizens, hence making 




dissent and argue that representation as responsiveness is not the only, and in some cases, not 
even a valid conceptualization of the actual process of representation. Mansbridge (2003, 
2009) argues that a more appropriate model is one of gyroscopic representation. Gyroscopic 
representatives are not responsive to voters, but self-propelled agents who act to further 
voters’ interests, relying on their own judgments and preferences of what they consider is 
best, independently of voters’ views.8 Hence, the central element to ensure representation is 
not accountability but deep predictability. As Mansbridge argues, “[t]he point for the voter is 
only to place in the system a representative whose self-propelled actions the voter can expect 
to further the voter’s own interests.”  This view of representation considers selection as the 
key mechanism and does not expect a change in behavior due to a change in electoral 
incentives. 
b) Empirical assessments of policy representation 
 
The seminal work of Miller and Stokes (1962) set the groundwork for the empirical 
assessment of representation in the field. The authors sought to assess the degree of 
constituency control over legislators, thus espousing a mandate view of representation. The 
authors used surveys from constituents and legislators, as well as legislators’ roll call data on 
three sets of issues: social welfare, foreign involvement, and civil rights. They focused on the 
dyadic relation between individual legislators and their local constituencies, explicitly 
eschewing the responsible party government paradigm (p. 45). 
Miller and Stokes use congruence to tap to the theoretical concept of responsiveness; 
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and measure the degree of congruence as the degree of correlation in a cross-section of 
legislators and districts. The authors analyzed two paths of constituency control: selecting 
representatives who share their preferences and legislators who act in accordance to 
constituency preferences as expressed in their roll call. For constituency control over 
legislators’ behavior, the relevant variable is the legislators’ perception of their constituencies’ 
preferences.  
Their research motivated a rich empirical body of work, but following Downs (1957), 
researchers have focused on a one-dimensional axis of political competition – the left-right 
scale, contrary to Miller’s and Stokes’ multidimensional approach.9 This research can be 
divided in terms of the path of constituency influence that scholars have analyzed. A strand 
analyzes how well legislators’ preferences mirror those of their constituencies. Congruence 
measures are applied both at the individual legislator-constituency dyad and to assess party-
voters congruence. Powell (2004) follows this view in his cross-country study of congruence 
between parties and national preferences. He provides a review of the congruence literature 
using surveys of reported preferences, both in the US and in comparative perspectives. Recent 
work confirms the use of congruence measures between party elites and citizens’ preferences 
for evaluating the quality of representation both in Europe (Belchior, 2010) and Latin America 
(Luna and Zechmeister, 2005, 2010). 
Other scholars analyze the degree of congruence between legislators’ actions, in 
particular their ideological positions revealed by roll-call data, are voters’ preferences. The 
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evidence comes mostly from the US, as availability of roll call data was until recently scarce 
outside the US. Early work focused mostly on scores by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) such as Americans for Democratic Action (Elling, 1982; Peltzman, 1984) or the 
Conservative Coalition Opposition (Alujha, 1994) based on a few votes of central interest for 
the respective organizations. The groundwork of Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1997) enabled 
researchers to estimate legislators’ ideological positions from all roll call data using 
econometric techniques. Recently, researchers relying on Bayesian methods (Martin and 
Quinn, 2002; Clinton et al., 2004) further popularized the use of roll call to estimate legislators’ 
ideological positions or ideal points.  
Estimation of voters’ preferences has also benefited from the introduction of new 
statistical tools as well as from the increase in the number and availability of surveys. Early 
studies in the US lacking representative samples at the district level relied on socioeconomic 
characteristics and used those to predict voters’ preferences. The availability of public opinion 
survey results has facilitated the estimation of district preferences. Small sample sizes were 
addressed through disaggregation techniques (e.g. Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993). Recent 
research estimates district opinion based on multilevel regression and poststratification 
(Gelman and Little, 1997; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006; Lax and Phillips, 2009).  
But the existence of congruence between legislators and constituents does not 
necessarily imply that legislators are responsive to voters. Responsiveness is a complex 
phenomenon: it requires more than static congruence as it involves a dynamic aspect as well 
as a “negative condition.” Scholars in the US have used changes in constituency preferences – 




analyze whether legislators respond. Bertelli and Carson (2011) analyzed how legislators’ 
ideological voting responded to changes in their district preferences due to redistricting. The 
authors found evidence of legislators adjusting to their new constituencies, giving support for 
the responsiveness of legislators. Kousser, Lewis, and Masket (2007) used a similar strategy 
and also found support for the responsiveness of legislators. They analyzed the impact of an 
exogenous change in perceived constituency preferences signaled by California’s 2003 recall 
election.  
Other scholars have looked at the policies implemented and compared them to 
constituents’ preferences. They moved beyond dyadic and even party representation and 
analyzed what Weissberg (1978) calls collective representation. Erikson, Wright, and McGiver 
(1994) analyzed the responsiveness of state legislatures to their constituents and found some 
positive results. Recently, Lax and Phillips (2012) looked into policy implementation, 
disaggregating issues in specific policy domains and contrasting constituency preference with 
the policy implemented in the US.  Other studies of collective representation relied on 
variation across time and analyzed the relation between public policy preferences and the 
revealed position of legislators using an average of party aggregate ratings; these also found 
evidence of responsiveness (MacKuen et al, 1995, Stimson, 1999). 
Despite the different approaches, all the studies share the same understanding of 
citizens’ interests: the preferences as measured through public opinion surveys.  
c) Representation beyond the Assembly 
Legislators may act on behalf of their voters in other areas than policymaking. Careful 




science on the complex relation between legislators and voters considering both policy and 
non-policy factors as basis for democratic representation. Eulau and Karps (1977) argue for 
considering four components of responsiveness, each of them related to a different target of 
legislators´ actions and citizens’ interests. In addition to policymaking, Eulau and Karps 
consider service responsiveness, which involves particularized benefits, and allocation 
responsiveness related to pork-barrel distribution which are distributions achieved within the 
legislative arena on behalf of a geographic constituency (Stokes, 2009).. Cain et al. (1987) 
grouped both allocation and service responsiveness under constituency service, and also 
considered it as an element of representation. A final dimension in Eulau and Karps (1977) is 
symbolic representation. Symbolic representation does not involve distribution or allocation of 
resources, nor policymaking, but gestures aimed at building a relation of trust and support. 
This dimension of representation might be understood as what Fenno (1978) called 
representation of the self.  
Further work in American politics has analyzed constituency service as another good 
provided by electorally driven legislators, devoid of any normative implications, and usually 
distinct from pork-barrel allocations. Constituency service is mostly considered as a good in 
itself, with different types of voters having different relative preferences for it (e.g. Dixit and 
Londregan, 1996; Herron and Shotts, 2006) although in some analyses, it is assumed that 
voters use it as a signal of the competence of legislators (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 
2006).  There is also a discussion regarding whether constituency service and programmatic 
representation are mutually exclusive or can be achieved simultaneously. In the works cited 




negative externalities of providing one or the other. 
The comparative literature has mostly ignored constituency service as a source of 
democratic responsiveness and has centered on policy responsiveness. When analyzing the 
provision of particularized benefits or allocation of club goods, the emphasis has been on the 
clientelistic nature of such types of linkages (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) 
which is normatively inferior to policy representation. Indeed, there might be a trade-off 
between clientelism and policy linkage strategies, as the use of clientelism has a negative 
electoral impact among middle class voters who favor policy positions (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). 
As many of the activities identified as constituency service can also correspond to clientelism, 
the distinction between both does not depend on the type of goods distributed, but is 
procedural. The key difference lies in the individualized and contingent nature of the 
distribution of the goods in exchange for political support under clientelism (Kitschelt, 2000; 
Hicken, 2011; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Contingent exchange on political support implies some 
essential conditions: first, voters are uncertain about the secrecy of their vote choice; and 
second, voters expect continued interaction (Stokes, 2005, 2009). As Weitz-Shapiro argues 
whereas constituency service seeks to gain votes through persuasion, clientelism involves the 
threat of retaliation. Normatively, the difference between constituency service and clientelism 
is the effect of the latter on the autonomy of the vote, and the consequent undermining of 
democratic accountability. Clientelism breaks it completely whereas constituency service 
provides some scope for legislators to deviate from policy responsiveness, but still retains the 





d) Parties and representation 
 
 
i) Parties and democracy 
 
[T]he political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable 
save in terms of the parties. 
Schattschneider (1942:1) 
 
Political science scholars have long considered parties as essential for the functioning of 
representative democracy.10  Parties aggregate and articulate interests, and provide the 
linkage between citizens and governments, thus enabling citizens to hold government 
accountable (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Stokes (1999), Luna (2007), and Kitschelt et al. 
(2010).  Indeed, parties are considered essential for popular control of government (Webb and 
White, 2007). Reversely, weak linkages between parties and citizens jeopardize both citizens´ 
attachments to democracy and government effectiveness (e.g. Hagopian, 1998; Mainwaring et 
al., 2006).  
Consequently, an institutionalized party system is reputed to be central to the quality 
of democracy. Comparative work on newly democratized countries has defined party systems 
over several interrelated dimensions. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) analyzed different 
outcomes in order to classify Latin American party systems into three categories: 
institutionalized party systems, inchoate party systems, and hegemonic party systems in 
transition. Recent work has looked beyond formal institutionalization and into the nature of 
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the linkage between parties and citizens. For example, Kitschelt et al. (2010) focused on 
programmatic party structuration, which involves programmatic coordination and 
programmatic linkages. They consider it a central precondition for responsible party 
government, the normative benchmark. The authors thus follow a long tradition in political 
science, best exemplified by the 1950 report of the APSA Committee on Political Parties and 
Schattschneider's book. 
One of the most influential works on parties is the widely cited report of the American 
Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties (1950) which advocated for 
responsible party government and praised its advantages in terms of accountability and 
representation. The model has not lost its normative appeal as academics continue to evaluate 
party systems in those terms.11 For example, Kitschelt et al. (1999) argue that cycles of 
responsiveness and accountability are created when the relevant sphere of competition is 
programmatic. And Luna and Zeichmaster (2005) expect more progressive distributive 
outcomes under conditions of responsible party government.   
 Adams (2001: 4) presents three requirements deemed as crucial for responsible party 
government. Policy divergence between parties participating in the election and policy stability 
among parties contesting the election are the first two requirements. When these two 
requirements are satisfied and parties exhibit high vote unity, then the voters’ choice of parties 
gives them control over the actions of individual legislators and of the affairs of government. 
But in order for this control to be exercised, the electorate must vote on the basis of policy.  
Hence, party vote unity is a central component of responsible party government, as it 
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enables representation through parties. The quality of representation is assessed measuring 
issue congruence between parties and the electorate, as well as the cohesion within parties 
and the differences between parties. Kitschelt et al., (2010) empirically assess the quality of 
representation in Latin America along these criteria.  
 
ii) The role of parties 
 
 
The influence of parties on the behavior of legislators and their role in vote unity 
occupies a central place in legislative politics literature.12 The comparative literature on parties 
usually takes them as exogenous institutions which may exert influence on legislators’ 
behavior, but whose strategies cannot be altered by legislators – a one-way relation.13 Several 
scholars view parties as competing principals over legislators, whose primary principals are 
constituencies (e.g. Carey 2007, 2009; Sieberer, 2013; Hix, 2002 on national vs. European 
parties). As the number of principals grows – from a model of party-dominant representation 
where the direct link of voters is with the party, vote unity decreases as the legislators are 
cross-pressured by conflicting principals. This cross-pressure generates a zero-sum game in 
which the legislator cannot please both principals.14 Parties can exert disciplinary measures 
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 There is also a large body of research that analyzes the institutional determinants of vote unity, such as 
electoral rules, federalism, and whether there is parliamentary or presidential form of government (e.g. 
Morgenstern, 2002 and 2004; Desposato, 2004; Carey, 2007; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; and Huber, 1996, 
among others). Since the focus of this research is within country variation, I will not consider those elements but 
construct the expectations grounded on a particular institution setting. In the conclusion, I discuss the limitations 
introduced by this approach and whether the specific institutions affect the results. 
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 In a parliamentary setting with closed lists, the logic is a chain of delegation, in which constituents elect parties, 
and parties select legislators. Therefore, legislators have only their party as their principal. See Strom et al. (2003) 
for a thorough study on accountability and delegation in parliamentary democracies.  
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when they face cross-pressured legislators, e.g. "carrots and sticks." Hazan (2003) provides a 
conceptualization between discipline and cohesion, and describes the different mechanisms of 
party discipline, such as party whip, and in parliamentary settings, the vote of confidence. But 
one of the most common mechanisms is through control over career prospects (also in Carey, 
2009). Parties also influence the level of vote unity, increasing cohesion within the party 
through the screening and selection of candidates with preferences closer to the party’s 
stance. But the argument of competing principals is that electorally induced preferences alter 
the balance, and therefore, cohesion does not provide an insurance against defections from 
the party line.  
Some US Congressional scholars propose a different logic. Parties are endogenous 
institutions created and shaped by ambitious politicians to help them achieve their goals 
(Aldrich, 1995), which are primarily, successful careers (Mayhew, 1974), but may also include 
policy goals and power within Congress (Fenno, 1973).  Parties overcome collective action 
problems as well as avoid cycling in the legislature (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Party labels 
provide information shortcuts for voters (Popkin, 1991, refs) and thus are valuable for 
politicians, especially among risk averse voters. This functionalist view of parties underlies two 
central theories of party influence in Congress: conditional party government or CPG (Aldrich 
and Rohde, 2000, 2001; Rohde, 1991) and cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005).15 
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 See Finocchiaro and Rohde (2002) and Jones and Hwang (2005) for a parallel between both theories. Other 
authors also consider the level of party discipline endogenously determined, for example, Ashworth and Bueno de 
Mesquita (2004) consider a formal model in which party members determine the level of party discipline 





Both views consider that parties have little influence on legislators’ electoral success, and 
legislators delegate powers to party leaders to further their own personal goals. These goals 
are both reelection prospects as well as policy goals under the CPG view whereas cartel theory 
emphasizes only the reelection goal. And CPG relies more strongly on the configuration of 
preferences within Congress. In particular, as homogeneity within parties increases and 
heterogeneity between parties also increases, the conditions for CPG are obtained. Vote unity 
is electorally beneficial as it enhances the value of the party label both by providing clear 
programmatic platforms and helping secure legislative successes. Therefore, legislators have 
an incentive to endow party leaders with the power to achieve high vote unity. Some of these 
greater powers are procedural, in particular those which give agenda-setting power. Cartel 
theory stresses the role of negative agenda-setting which is not conditional on the distribution 
of preferences. CPG argues that positive agenda-setting occurs when there is an agreement 
over what the collective party reputation should be (Finocchiaro and Rohde, 2002: 40), 
agreement which is more likely to be achieved under the conditions for CPG. In addition, CPG 
also considers external pressures, such as punishments and rewards, to induce potentially 
deviant legislators to follow the party line, including committee nominations and campaign 
resources.16 As agenda-setting is controlled by the majority party, leaders will strive to exclude 
issues divisive within their own party and to ideally include those that are divisive for the 
opposing party. This implies that the majority party should exhibit higher voting unity than 
minority parties. 
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Krehbiel’s critique of the independent influence of parties stems from one of the 
conditions for CPG: a high degree of homogeneity within parties (Krehbiel 1993, 1999). Indeed, 
he questions the assertion that parties have an independent effect beyond what is expected 
from the high ideological cohesion of its members. His critiques generated a spirited debate 
with party scholars. The challenges of directly assessing the influence of parties on voting are 
great. First and foremost, without an independent and valid measure of legislators’ personal 
preferences and electoral pressures, it is difficult to ascertain the influence of parties on 
voting. On the other hand, the usual method of estimating a coefficient of party influence on 
voting assumes that the only influence is exerted directly when legislators vote – the discipline 
role of parties, the carrots and stick approach. But agenda-setting implies that most party 
influences are evident in which issues are allowed or not allowed to reach the floor (e.g. 
Sinclair, 2002). Therefore, the actual degree of discipline that parties need to exert on 
potentially deviant legislators is reduced. Finally, measuring discipline implies that legislators 
would have voted against their party without party pressure. But there may be only few 
instances when party and constituency actually diverge. Burden and Frisby (2004: 571) quote 
Kingdom (1989) arguing that “it is rare that the ‘field of forces’ acting on legislator is 
incongruent. On most roll-call votes, one’s own preferences, those of constituents, and 
pressures from other actors (including the administration, interest groups, and even one's own 
party) are in alignment.” 
Despite these challenges, several studies have applied various techniques and found 
evidence of a party effect on voting (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001; Sinclair, 2002; 




Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001) used related literature to identify instances when 
party influence should be stronger, for example: a) on procedural decisions; b) on issues that 
define the party, as parties are electorally useful brand names; and c) on legislators that are in 
the ideological middle for the winning side. Other scholars looked at roll rates of the majority 
and minority party and found evidence of majority party agenda through agenda-setting 
(Finocchiaro and Rohde, 2002; Lawrence, Maltzman and Smith, 2006; Cox and McCubbins,). 
According to Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007), Strategic Party Government builds from 
CPG and cartel theory, in which parties strategically select their level of party unity, weighing 
its costs and benefits. On the one hand, vote unity is necessary to achieve legislative victories, 
and legislative victories are electorally beneficial. But vote unity also imposes electoral costs on 
legislators since partisan voting per se is punished by voters (e.g. Carson, Koger, and Lebo, 
2010). Therefore, party members choose the level of party influence in which the marginal 
benefit of party unity equals the marginal cost. Parties are willing to forgo voting unity among 
legislators who need to build a position closer to their districts’ preferences – i.e. position 
taking.  
 
e) Collective versus individual accountability 
For responsible party government proponents and most democracy scholars, 
representative democracy requires that parties act as the agents of voters, and thus, are the 
ones to be held accountable. However, in the last decades, there has been an increased 
demand for greater accountability at the individual legislator level and greater transparency, 




Carey 2003, 2009).  
The tension between transparency of legislators’ actions and vote unity has been long 
recognized, both by scholars and political actors.17 Indeed, at the core of these arguments lies 
a conception of party and individual accountability as substitutes. Substitution of one for the 
other may be considered a zero sum game, or as Carey (2009) puts it, a maximization problem. 
But in all cases, these different types of accountabilities are implicitly based on the same 
object: legislative voting. But collective accountability is amenable to evaluations upon 
outcomes as individual accountability cannot be. Indeed, the calls for a more responsible party 
system (APSA, 1950) rested primarily on the advantages of party accountability regarding 
representation and accountability based on programs and performance, including economic 
performance.18 As individuals can only be held accountable for their own actions, individual 
accountability can only revolve around position taking.19 As Fox and Shotts (2009) discuss in 
their theoretical work, accountability over actions implies a different conceptualization of 
representation than accountability over outcomes. Therefore, an additional effect of the 
increase in transparency of legislators’ actions might be the effect on the target of 
representation.20 
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 Hellwig and Samuels (2007) as well as Samuels and Shugart (2010) have found that among presidential systems, 
presidents are more likely to be held accountable on economic performance, thus in some sense, freeing the 
legislature to respond to their constituents on other terms. 
19
 Individual accountability can also be evaluated on other terms: the provision of private goods, through 
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2. The role of elections for representation: accountability and selection 
 
Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their constituents. 
Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the cords by which they will be bound to 
fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. 
James Madison, The Federalist, No. 57 (p. 345) 
 
All representative democracies, irrespective of their conceptualization of 
representation, rely on a core set of principles,21 and on election as the central institution 
(Manin, 1997). These core principles are reflected in Dahl’s (1971) theoretical dimensions to 
define regimes: public contestation and inclusiveness as well as on the three necessary 
conditions for democracy. All of these are grounded on the institution of elections.  
Early constitutional theorists, as Madison’s quote suggests, recognized different 
mechanisms through which representatives would cater to constituents’ interests. Throughout 
history, different writers have emphasized some as more important than others. For Bentham, 
ambition was the central motivation, and elections, which introduced the principle of 
dislocability, “make it to [officeholders’] interest to further the voters’ interest” (Pitkin, 167: 
201). On the other hand, JS Mill () considered the natural qualities of the officeholders 
important. These two central mechanisms – duty and ambition, selection and incentives – 
remain as central and discussed as ever. And the jury is still out regarding which of the two, if 
any, is at work in contemporary democracies.22 Irrespective of the mechanism, electoral 
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govern; 4) Public decisions undergo the trial of debate.  
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accountability is a necessary condition, although it has been variously defined in different 
works.23 In this dissertation, the formal interpretation of accountability is used: a 
representative is considered accountable if he will have to answer to the represented, and the 
represented have the power to sanction or reward the representative. This formalist view of 
accountability, or de jure accountability, is distinct, following Besley (2007), from real 
accountability which involves the capacity of voters to discern between representative and 
unrepresentative officeholders and sanction them based on that judgment. Voters’ capacity to 
discern whether legislators are or are not responsive is what distinguishes de jure from real 
accountability.24 Information plays a central role in this capacity and constitutes a necessary 
condition for real accountability. 
In order to understand and make explicit how both mechanisms work, I rely on political 
agency models. These models provide insights into the relation between officeholders and 
voters (Lupia, 2003, Besley, 2007). In particular, they address delegation from principals – in 
this case, citizens – to agents, the representatives. Delegation problems arise because the 
agent has an informational advantage over the principal and may use it to further his own 
interest against the best interest of the principal. The following section briefly reviews the key 
elements of these models.25 
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 For example, Carey (2009: 3) includes in his definition of accountability the desired outcome, that is “legislators 
are responsive to the preferences and demands of their principal(s)” whereas Lupia (2003: 35) adopts a control 
definition of accountability: “[a]n agent is accountable to a principal if the principal can exercise control over the 
agent and delegation is not accountable if the principal is unable to exercise control.” 
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 Although Przeworski et al., (1999) includes the latter condition under a unique definition of accountability, I 
prefer to follow Besley’s definition as it highlights the additional requisites for obtaining real accountability. 
25




a) Political agency models 
 
One of the cornerstones of political agency models is the assumption that actors 
behave rationally and seek to maximize their welfare irrespective of how such welfare is 
conceived. Mayhew’s (1974) claim that legislators are single-minded reelection seekers fits 
well into these models although many models also incorporate policy concerns in addition to 
the benefit of holding office per se. Political agency models analyze two different problems in 
delegation: moral hazard and adverse selection, and elections work through different 
mechanisms to address each of them: disciplining and selection. 
Classical work on the role of elections in controlling moral hazard can be found in Barro 
(1973) and Ferejohn (1986).26 The incumbent exerts costly efforts to generate an outcome, but 
does not have preferences over outcomes, only over reelection utility and the costly effort (see 
also Austin-Smith and Banks, 1992). Further developments complement this approach by 
adding different motivations for moral hazard. In essence, purposeful deviations from 
constituents’ interests may originate from two different sources: policy drift or rent-seeking 
(Muller, Bergman, and Strom, 2003: p. 22). Policy drift may occur because officeholders have 
different policy preferences or because of the undue influence of an interest group. This 
dissertation will focus on the potential of policy drift and the role of elections and information 
on the extent of such drift. 
Pure models of moral hazard assume that incumbents and challengers are identical; 
hence, voters are indifferent between them and no selection issue arises. The incumbent has 
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the choice to conform to an election rule set forth by voters and be reelected or to not 
conform and be ousted from office. The election rule that is obtained in the equilibrium of the 
game is that voters retrospectively evaluate the incumbent’s performance and choose a 
minimum welfare threshold that the incumbent must achieve in order to secure reelection. By 
holding legislators accountable to voters, elections provide incentives for legislators to act on 
behalf of their constituents provided that voters select an appropriate rule – one that makes 
the incumbent better off conforming. 
Electoral accountability thus make an otherwise unrepresentative agent act on the 
voters’ behalf. As Manin argues, it “is the channel through which the will of the governed 
enters into the calculations of those in power” (1997: 178). But some scholars consider the 
restraints provided by elections insufficient (Fearon, 1999; Besley, 2005). Selecting legislators 
that will act on behalf of their constituents on their own is the central mechanism, and the 
problem that needs to be addressed is adverse selection.  
Legislators act on behalf of their constituents because they share their constituents’ 
interests or because they are responsive to their constituents although they do not completely 
share their preferences;  in Madison’s words, they are duty bound. But legislators may also fail 
to act on behalf of their constituents due to a lack of competence. Formal models define 
legislators along these two dimensions, policy preferences and competence, and most models 
differentiate politicians along one of them. 
Pure selection models, such as the one proposed by Fearon (1999) or Besley and Prat 
(2005), assume that politicians differ in their types and do not respond to incentives. Voters 




Voters reelect the incumbent when the probability that he is “good type” is higher than that of 
the challenger. 
Further refinements combine problems of hidden action and adverse selection based 
on policy preferences and provide important insights (Banks and Sundaram, 1993; Besley, 
2007; Humphreys and Weingast, 2007, 2010). The most important is that officeholders 
attempt to signal their type through their observable actions. Bad type incumbents may act on 
behalf of their constituents to increase the probability that voters consider them good type, 
and hence get reelected. And good type legislators may dissemble if the action that enhances 
the voters’ welfare might decrease the probability that voters consider them high quality. As 
shown in the following section, from this result stems the central critique on transparency.  
The distinction between prospective and retrospective voting has been discussed in 
reference to the mechanisms through which elections work, as elections restrain officeholders 
only under retrospective voting, and voters select based on prospective behavior. But as Besley 
argues, when elections work through both selection and incentive-based behavior, “there 
really is no meaningful distinction between prospective and retrospective voting. It is precisely 
because there is information content in past actions about future behavior that retrospective 
voting is rational” (2007: 106). 
b) Empirical evidence on the role of elections 
Elections may play a role through selection and by disciplining those in office, or both. 
This section draws on American politics literature, as empirical work on other presidential 
democracies is still scarce. An important strand of research in American politics assesses 




behavior changes when the strength of the constraint imposed by elections varies. This 
literature presupposes that legislators have different preferences from their voters, and 
therefore, constrained legislators will act on behalf of their voters despite their own 
preferences.  Empirical studies in the US rely on two elements to build the expectation for 
legislators’ ideological position taking. First, legislators are assumed to be ideologically 
extremists; and second, plurality election rules generate incentives to take positions close to 
the median voter. Both elements lead to distinct expectations: in a cross-section, it is expected 
that under strong electoral incentives, legislators from moderate districts will reveal more 
moderate ideological positions than those from more extreme districts; and second, across 
time, an increase in the strength of electoral incentives will make legislators more moderate. 
The most direct test is to compare ‘normal’ behavior with behavior when the reelection 
constraint no longer exists. This is usually done by studying whether legislators shirk in their 
last terms in office. ‘Shirking’ is defined as acting in deviation from constituents’ preferences 
either in ideological terms or by exerting less effort, and can be attributed to changes in 
legislators’ behavior due to pending retirement, assuming that constituencies' preferences do 
not change. This is usually estimated as the coefficient of retirement in a multivariate 
regression, controlling for other factors such as minority party status, gender, and geographical 
location. Evidence for participatory shirking is confirmed in all the reviewed studies; retiring 
legislators exert less effort than non-retiring legislators, measured by attendance during 
sessions (Bender and Lott, 1996 which reviews the early nineties literature; Figlio, 2000; 
Rothenberg and Sander, 2000; Ladewig, 2010).  




results whereas recent work finds support for the negative impact of retirement albeit a small 
effect. The disagreement might partly be attributed to improved methodological strategies to 
identify retiring legislators. If retirement has an effect on shirking, it is due to a change in 
incentives. Thus, failure to identify the timing of retirement will introduce noise in the 
estimation. Figlio (1995) uses the formal announcement of retirement whereas Rothenberg 
and Sander (2000) compare the voting record from the last six months of consecutive electoral 
cycles.  Both studies find a statistically significant impact of retiring on ideological extremism, 
and consistent with the previous literature, they also find evidence of participatory shirking, 
measured by attendance rates. 
Scholars have studied the impact of conditioning factors on the strength of the 
incentive to respond to constituencies. Snyder and Ting (2005) argue that legislators from 
moderate districts are more constrained than those from extremist districts, assuming that 
legislators are extremists. Hence, the impact of retiring will be small or null among legislators 
from extremist districts, which may bias the results. Using ideological extremism as the 
dependent variable, they find that the impact of retiring on legislators from moderate districts, 
proxied by marginal districts, is positive and statistically significant, whereas not statistically 
significant in safe districts.  
Other authors hold that electoral safety attenuates the electoral incentive. For 
example, Ladewig (2010) argues that legislators use their previous vote margin as an indicator 
of their probability of reelection. Those with a higher electoral margin feel electorally secure 
and therefore are less constrained by the threat of the next election. Though the mechanism is 




similar as they both measure electoral security with the same variable used by Snyder and Ting 
to measure district ideology. Results are consistent with the previous findings: legislators’ 
ideological extremism increases the higher their vote share was in the previous election. 
Ladewig also estimates the unconditioned impact of retiring, which is significant as well. 
Lindstatd and Vander Wielan (2011) also find that electoral insulation, either due to retirement 
or safety measured by previous electoral vote share, impacts legislators’ behavior. List and 
Strum (2006) look into environment policies, which they consider a secondary issue policy and 
also find evidence that legislators respond to electoral incentives in these less salient policies.  
Other scholars argue that the sorting model is a more accurate reflection of the role of 
elections since they do not find evidence of the electoral incentive shaping legislators’ 
behavior. For example, Wright (2007) finds that term limits do not affect state legislators’ roll 
call; and Poole (2007) concludes that legislators do not change their ideological positions 
during their time in office by comparing the goodness of fit between single-period rank orders 
and pooled rank orders of legislators among different legislative periods. Wright’s analyses do 
not consider the possibility of both mechanisms working simultaneously, and hence, may 
underestimate the impact of electoral accountability by not distinguishing between freshman 
and non-freshman term legislators. Alt et al. (2007) analyze gubernatorial elections and 
distinguish between freshman and second-term governors. They find that both mechanisms 
have a substantive and similar impact. As regression discontinuity designs (RDD) are closer to 
experimental data, several scholars have applied them to the analysis of House elections, 
arguing that at the margin for  those barely won or barely lost, the outcome would appear as if 




is not an uncontroversial assumption, as Caughey and Sekhon (2011) find that those who 
barely won are different from those who barely lost, invalidating the central assumption in 
RDD.  
There are few studies that directly address the impacts of the selection mechanism at 
the legislative level. Figlio (1995) provides data which includes a number of legislative periods 
served and finds that, on the average, length of tenure has a positive impact on voting 
frequency, which might suggest some selection effect. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Jones (2001) 
find evidence that elections work through both selection and incentives.  
 
c) The flip side of the coin: do voters hold legislators accountable at the polls? 
Both mechanisms discussed above require that voters hold legislators accountable. A 
first strategy is to analyze voters’ observable behavior, which is related to legislators’ vote 
share. Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) analyze the impact of roll call ideology extremity on 
incumbents’ vote share and find a negative impact. They test whether legislators who vote 
with the extreme of their party position receive a smaller vote share than other legislators. 
Several works support their findings (Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Erikson and Wright, 2000; 
Hutchings, 2003; Griffin and Flavin, 2007). Subsequent works also analyze the impact of 
ideological extremism as well as the impact of position taking on salient votes. Bovitz and 
Carson (2006) find that approximately a quarter of the key votes identified by Congressional 
Quarterly influence electoral fates, and that the probability that a vote had an electoral 
consequence depended on the level of conflict and media coverage. Others scholars have 




Carson et al. (2010) go further and argue that voters punished partisan voting rather than 
ideology extremism.  Using an instrumental variable approach, they found support for their 
hypotheses.  
Scholars have recently resorted to surveys to better understand vote choice. Carson et 
al. (2010) also used experimental surveys to address the impact of ideological extremism 
versus partisan vote, and found an negative impact on legislators’ support. Ansolabehere and 
Jones (2010) used national surveys to analyze the impact of ideological distance and found a 
negative impact on vote choice as well as an impact on party agreement. Thus, the evidence 
for the US finds support for legislators being held accountable at the polls for their roll call.  
There is also evidence that voters respond to different dimensions of representation as 
defined by Eulau and Karps (1977). For example, Snyder and Ting (2005) found that legislators 
were more likely to be reelected if they had provided more federal funds to their district. On 
the other hand, more information regarding their work contributed to legislators seeking and 
obtaining more funds for their districts. Thus, it seems that the same mechanisms that come 
into play with respect to policy representation are also at play in other dimensions of 
representation. This work did not empirically analyze the potential trade-off between different 
factors of representation, which have been addressed in clientelism literature.  
As with the impact of ideology, constituents’ preferences may be analyzed through 
surveys. Grant and Rudolph (2004) found that citizens have preferences for different aspects of 
legislators’ activities. The authors analyzed citizens’ preferences for national versus local work 
in the legislature as well as for constituency service and found that citizens evaluate their 




refined them to show that there are differences among ethnic and socioeconomic groups 
regarding preferences for policy dimensions, and thus, the grounds on which they evaluate 
their legislators. They analyzed citizens’ concerns regarding policy representation, constituency 
service, and allocation of federal expenditures. 
 
3. On the impact of transparency 
 
I do really take it a for an indisputable truth, and a truth that is one of the cornerstones 
of political science – the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave. 
Jeremy Bentham ([1797]2001) 
 
Electoral accountability is essential for both selection and incentives to work, and 
information is necessary for real accountability. Thus, the level of transparency influences the 
strength of the electoral incentive. 
Empirical research supports the central role of information as governments at all levels 
are more responsive when information availability is greater. Observational studies use media 
coverage as a proxy for the degree of information within the constituency, assuming that the 
information is publicly available. Analyzing a New Deal relief program, Strömberg (2004) found 
evidence that counties with greater radio coverage received more relief. Besley and Burguess 
(2002) found that Indian states with greater newspaper circulation received more calamity 
relief funds, but the level of political competition also played an important role. Furthermore, 
Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010), looking into Lower House legislative elections in Italy, found a 




coverage of malfeasance charges, and thus argue the critical role of information. At the local 
level, Reinikka and Svensson (2006, 2009) also found evidence that increases in information – 
proxied by distance to a newspaper outlet – decrease corruption and waste. Through that 
channel, an increase in information also improved service delivery, in this case of school 
enrollment and learning outcomes. This evidence is consistent with the disciplining effect of 
increased electoral accountability and the central role played by media in spreading 
information.  
Recent studies have used experimental research design to provide evidence on the 
impact of increased transparency of corruption disclosure on electoral accountability.27 Though 
the evidence is largely positive, some recent work has found some unexpected negative 
impacts of exposure to corruption information. More studies are currently underway and will 
provide additional information. Ferraz and Finan (2008) study the effect of increased 
information in Brazilian local elections. The authors took advantage of a government audit 
program on Brazilian municipalities where the timing of the audit was randomized, enabling a 
comparison of municipalities audited before and after the election. They found evidence that 
corrupt incumbents who experienced an audit were punished by voters at the polls through 
decreased reelection probabilities, with a stronger negative impact on municipalities with local 
media – in the case of Brazil, local radios. Transparency of finance provided by audit reports 
had a positive impact, which was magnified by the existence of local media. But not all results 
are as positive. Chong et al. (2010) analyzed the impact of dissemination campaigns through an 
experimental design in Mexican local elections, where incumbents cannot stand for reelection. 
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They found that information about high levels of corruption decreased voter turnout and the 
incumbent’s party vote share. Nevertheless, information on spending increased both voter 
turnout and incumbent party vote share, although the estimates are less precise. Two central 
differences might partly explain the different results among both studies. First, contrary to 
Mexico, Brazil has mandatory voting. But, perhaps the key difference stems from the different 
sources of information; in Brazil, the audits were led by the government, whereas in Mexico, 
the researchers worked with NGOs to generate and disseminate the information.28 
The trend towards greater transparency has increased to include not only central and 
local government actions and resource management with a focus on corruption, but also the 
legislative arena.29 Many political actors, political activists, and academics share this positive 
view on the impact of transparency, and promote greater openness and transparency. Hood 
(2007:3) argues that the importance and pervasiveness of transparency in debates regarding 
governance and institutional design is such that “[w]e must almost say that ‘more-transparent-
than-thou’ has become the secular equivalent to ‘holier than thou’ in modern debates...” 
Specifically regarding legislative transparency,30 Carey (2009: 69) states that “political theory 
can supply normative arguments against legislative transparency, but [his] book subscribes to 
the belief, mainstream to most modern political theory, that transparency makes 
accountability possible and that accountability of representatives to citizens is desirable.” 
Nevertheless, several scholars do not share this unabashedly positive view and consider 
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 I thank Claudio Ferraz for highlighting these differences at a workshop organized by Centro Políticas Públicas on 
August 1, 2013, Santiago, Chile. 
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 Indeed, as Heald (2007) categorizes, there are many varieties of transparency, involving different dimensions. In 
this dissertation, I focus on transparency of legislators’ action in Congress. This implies not only visible voting, but 
also attendance and draft bill sponsorship.  
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potential negative effects that could actually hurt voters rather than benefit them. The 
following subsection reviews the literature that addresses the potential costs and benefits of 
transparency of legislators’ actions and the key assumptions under which these results hold. 
a) Costs and benefits of transparency of legislators actions 
The debate regarding the costs and benefits of transparency in the legislative arena is 
not new, but dates back at least to the early days of modern representative democracy as the 
disagreement between the views of Bentham and JS Mill attests.31 Bentham argued for the 
importance of publicity, which is a logical step from his principle of dislocability; whereas Mill 
was concerned that representatives would not be free to act on behalf of their constituents 
due to the “yoke of public opinion.” Recently, game theorists have formalized these tensions 
through agency models and analyzed the trade-off between disciplining representatives and 
inducing pandering. A related phenomenon is posturing (Stasavage, 2004: 673), which occurs 
during negotiations. Legislators try to influence their reputation with their constituents by 
adopting uncompromising positions during bargaining, although they know that such a 
position will lead to a breaking of the negotiations, which leaves their constituencies worse off.  
In either situation, the salutary effect of transparency due to enhanced electoral accountability 
on the behavior of potentially deviant legislators must be balanced with the potential changes 
in legislators’ behavior that may hurt overall voters’ welfare relative to a less transparent 
scenario. These concerns arise under conditions of uncertainty in the mapping between action 
to outcome, and when there are informational asymmetries between representatives and 
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voters. A central feature is that negative effect is a result of voters evaluating legislators based 
on actions, not outcomes.  
Holmstrom’s (1979) classic work on agency problems showed that even a noisy signal 
of agent behavior is beneficial for the principal as it reduces moral hazard, disciplining the 
agent. His results echo Ferejohn’s (1986) condition for controlling moral hazard: reduce the 
information advantage of the officeholder. The unambiguous positive results stem from the 
exclusive focus on moral hazard.32 When introducing career concerns or adverse selection 
problems, increases in information on actions may also induce a change in behavior of good 
type legislators detrimental to the principal, as the agent desires to influence the learning 
process (Holmstrom, 1999). 
Formal models differ slightly in their assumptions and the settings of the game, but all 
share key elements that introduce the above stated trade-off.33 First, there are good and bad 
type agents defined along at least one characteristic that voters value: preferences or 
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 Recent formal models that exclude reputation building (or beliefs about incumbent type) have results 
consistent with the aforementioned studies. For example, Snyder and Ting (2005) consider interest group 
pressures in the analysis and find that public roll calls – i.e. greater transparency – may benefit voters, but they 
assume that all legislators are equally likely to be bribed and thus, there is no selection effect. I treat reputation 
building and selection effects as similar in the sense that the essence of selection is the existence of several 
(generally two) types of legislators and voters’ use of information to update their beliefs about legislator types. 
The belief of voters about legislator types can be understood as legislators’ reputations.  
33
 Some models address specifically transparency of legislators’ actions, such as Prat (2005), Fox (2007), Besley 
(2007), and Humphreys and Weinstein (2008). Stasavage (2007) also addressed publicity in the legislative arena, 
but addressed the effect on the bargaining process, thus focusing on polarization and extending his previous work 
on the impacts of transparency on posturing (2004). Many of these models are based on earlier work on the 
effects of career concerns on managerial incentives (Holmstrom, 1999); government bureaucracies (Dewatripont 
et al., 1999); or the incentive to include monitoring technologies at the firm (Cremer, 1995) where principals 
obtain greater effort from their agents under less transparency. Other works address the incentives for political 
correctness among advisors (Morris, 2001) whereas Maskin and Tirole (2004) analyze the costs and benefits of 
different constitutional arrangements, electoral accountability being one of them. They find that in addition to the 
costs of pandering, when minority rights are a concern, electoral accountability may have another negative 




competence. And the agents are strategic as they may alter their behavior to influence voters’ 
beliefs. Second, legislators have better information regarding which is the best policy under 
the circumstances, and such information cannot be credibly transmitted to voters. These 
assumptions are similar to Pitkin’s central features of the writer’s metapolitics, in particular, 
the relative capacities of legislators and constituents to anticipate the impact of specific 
policies. Third, voters do not directly observe legislators’ characteristics, but form beliefs 
regarding their type, which they update using legislators’ behavior.   
Under these assumptions, an increase in transparency of legislators’ actions – i.e. 
visible voting – produces two effects. One increases voters’ welfare as bad type legislators, 
either ideologues or with preferences opposite to their constituencies, are disciplined by 
elections. But an increase in transparency also may decrease voters’ welfare since “good type” 
legislators are more likely to ignore their private signals and pander to public opinion in order 
to signal to their constituents that they are indeed good type legislators. The changes in 
behavior also make screening bad legislators difficult as legislators’ behavior is pooled. The net 
effect depends on model parameters, but at a general level, this implies that the expected cost 
of transparency is more severe when the proportion of good type legislators is higher, and 
reversely, the expected benefit of transparency is greater when the proportion of bad type 
legislators is higher. Through a historical overview of eighteenth century debates regarding 
parliamentary publicity, Stasavage (2004) found support for his arguments about the relation 
between public distrust and demands for transparency. Carey’s (2009) book on legislative 
accountability and transparency echoes Stasavage’s conclusions.  




assuming that legislators are more capable of determining the policy which is in the best 
interest of their constituency – and in that sense, is closer to the trustee view of 
representation. In fact, the cost of representation is that legislators forgo their private signals 
to follow the voters’ prior beliefs regarding the best policy. 
b) Evidence of the impact of transparency on legislators’ actions 
During the 1970s, as recorded votes and publicity on committees began in the US, 
scholars found evidence that the legislative outcome of a vote depended critically on whether 
the vote was public or not (see Snyder and Ting, 2005, for a review of the earlier literature). 
Recent work in the US moved from the study of outcomes to processes and analyzed the 
impact of greater voter information on legislators’ behavior. Uslaner (1991, as quoted in 
Snyder and Ting, 2005) argued that recorded votes increase legislators’ accountability to their 
districts.  
Recent work supports previous findings regarding the impact of publicity on voting 
behavior. Groseclose and Milyo (2000), quoted in Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001: 
536), wrote “legislators will cast votes that fit with their constituents’ preferences when the 
actions are readily observable.” And Crisp and Driscoll (2010) found that the outcome of a vote 
is influenced by the method of voting. Snyder and Stromberg (2010) analyzed the impact of 
press coverage on citizen knowledge and the impact of more informed citizenry on legislator 
behavior. They found that legislators are more likely to act on behalf of their voters – 
measured by witnesses in congressional hearings, to vote against the party line and secure 
federal spending for their areas. These studies highlight the important and complementary 




Recent experimental studies analyzed whether voters respond to information regarding 
legislator behavior. Banerjee et al. (2011) addressed the impact of increased information 
regarding incumbent legislators on the voter behavior of Delhi slum dwellers. Reports cards 
were distributed through newspapers and provided information on the incumbent legislators 
from the district and from a neighboring district as well as information regarding the wealth, 
education, and criminal records of the incumbent and two challengers. They found that 
incumbents who performed relatively worse than the incumbents from the neighboring 
districts, and those who faced better qualified challengers, received fewer votes, and that 
turnout was relatively higher in the areas where the incumbent performed worse.   
Humphreys and Weinstein (2012) analyzed the impact of legislator behavior report 
cards on both legislator and voter behaviors in the 2011 Ugandan election. The report card 
showed the relative position of the district legislator with respect to the whole legislature on 
several domains, including attendance, speeches, and fund use. Regarding the impact on voter 
behavior, measured through electoral outcomes, the authors found a weak relationship with 
greater transparency. The authors argue that these results cannot be attributed to a particular 
dissemination campaign, but rather to the greater information environment due to 
dissemination from all potential channels, including local and national-level media (p. 29).  
Regarding legislator behavior, the authors found some evidence of change in raw attendance 
rates and parliamentary interventions, although the changes were weakly associated with key 
moments in the publicity of the scorecards. The authors also found some evidence suggesting 
an adverse effect of the dissemination campaign on the constituency’s perception of the 




regarding their findings, one of them being that legislators counteract the information on the 




Representation as responsiveness derives from Pitkin’s conceptualization of 
representation. This seemingly simple conceptualization involves several definitions and 
challenges to empirical assessment: first, defining the agent of voters whether it is the 
individual legislator or the political party as in the ideal of responsible party government; 
second, defining the target of representation: actions or outcomes, and if the latter, either 
intermediate outcomes such as the law defining the policy instrument or the policy results. The 
first and second challenges are related, since individuals cannot be held accountable for 
collective agreements – e.g. legislation on policy instruments and the subsequent policy 
outcome. Hence, an important avenue of research is addressing the impact of increased 
transparency on the target of electoral accountability. I plan to complement the work in this 
project, which looks into the behavior of legislators, with research on the target of 
accountability.  
Political scientists have measured responsiveness as congruence between voters’ 
preferences either with legislators’ preferences – called mandate or issue representation – or 
with legislators’ revealed preferences through roll call. I consider that the former underlies 
selection as an important mechanism whereas the latter emphasizes the disciplining role of 
electoral accountability.  As the focus of this dissertation is the effect of transparency on 




Most of the related literature measures congruence as the cross-sectional correlation. 
However, evidence of congruence does not necessarily mean that legislators are responsive. 
Analyzing whether changes in constituencies’ preferences are reflected in legislators’ actions 
provides stronger evidence, and recent studies incorporate such methodologies. This 
dissertation does not measure the degree of congruence, but rather whether a change in 
incentives – due to the transparency reform- affects legislators’ behavior.   The preferences of 
voters are expected to weight more heavily on legislators actions affect the transparency 
reform.  
But there is an additional difficulty in empirically assessing responsiveness in normative 
terms highlighted by the theoretical work on the impact of transparency: whether 
constituents’ public opinion may be considered as their interests when there are important 
information asymmetries between legislators and voters, and responsiveness is measured over 
actions, not outcomes. Pandering is rooted in the assumption that voters’ beliefs regarding the 
best policy are not necessarily correct (e.g. Prat, 2005). From the theoretical work, three 
conditions for pandering are: 1) asymmetric information between legislators and voters in the 
mapping between action and outcome; 2) legislators cannot credibly communicate their 
private signals; 3) voters’ utility depends on the outcome, but such information is not available 
at election time and therefore they evaluate legislators based on the actions that they believe 
lead to their preferred outcome. In Pitkin’s conceptualization, pandering arises in situations 
when voters’ wishes may not correspond with their interests, and thus, may be considered 
under the trustee interpretation. Thus, an important consideration is the target of 




distribution.   
Given the challenges involved in the empirical assessment of pandering, many of them 
involving normative assumptions, I defer it for future work.  Thus, I address another form of 
subversion of the represented preferences: position avoidance strategies which generate a 
wedge between the public position and the policy-relevant position of the legislator as 




CHAPTER 3: THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 
 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework used to derive the hypotheses on the 
effect of transparency. As the focus of the study is legislators’ behavior, I present a theory of 
legislative politics. Based on political agency models, legislators are expected to behave in 
predictable ways once their incentives and constraints are determined, as they engage in 
behavior to maximize their utility. Also following the literature, the reelection goal is 
considered a central motivation (Shepsle et al., 2009; Mayhew, 1974).34 Hence, the main 
mechanism under study is the disciplining role of elections. The object of study is voting during 
the plenary and the ideological position revealed through the roll call. In particular, whether 
legislators engage in position taking and how an increase in transparency affects the incentive 
for such strategy vis-à-vis position avoidance. I argue that position avoidance is a relevant 
strategy and that it has substantive implications for the quality of representation. The 
theoretical framework, as any model, simplifies reality into a few central elements in order to 
provide clear explanations and tractability. Thus, it does not presume to take into account all 
elements of the complex decision making of legislators nor the specific and idiosyncratic 
pressures faced by individual legislators as the objective is to identify general patterns of 
behavior. 
In the first section, I review the literature on legislators’ goals and address how the 
policy preferences of legislators may drive their behaviors. I specify the behavior to be studied 
as well as the concept of position taking based on the literature and argue that many previous 
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models overlook an important alternate behavior to position taking in floor voting: position 
avoidance. I argue that position avoidance matters in substantive terms as it enables legislators 
to obfuscate their policy positions.  
The electoral incentive presumes that legislators expect to be held accountable by 
voters. To hold legislators accountable, voters must be aware of legislators’ actions. As 
discussed above, transparency is a necessary condition for voters’ knowledge, but is not 
sufficient as any new information needs to reach voters. Three potential diffusion channels are 
described as they influence whether the legislator faces an electoral cost or benefit due to his 
vote decision. Even if legislators believe that the new available information can reach voters, 
their expectations regarding the value attached by voters to policy actions affects the 
disciplining role of elections. I argue that these expectations are related to the linkage strategy 
followed by the legislator.  
These factors are analyzed based on a dyadic relation between legislators and their 
constituencies. But legislators are members of parties, and their behavior cannot be 
understood without referring to the latter. I draw on the literature on parties reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Considering party preferences and actions as not exogenous to legislators, but 
jointly determined – as in endogenous party literature, provides implications for legislators’ 
behaviors. In particular, parties and legislators as party members may use position avoidance 
in order to maintain party unity and protect legislators from the electoral costs of voting 
against their constituencies. I derive theoretical expectations regarding the impact of 
transparency on legislators’ behavior from the theory on legislators’ behavior. These are 




1. Legislators’ goals and behaviors  
Mayhew’s (1974) seminal work on the US Congress portrays legislators as “single-
minded reelection seekers.” Political agency models relying on the disciplining role of elections 
assume that reelection is one of a legislator’s primary goals. And the empirical evidence in the 
US consistently supports this; as Shepsle et al. (2009: 343) claim, “the stylized fact of which we 
are the most confident is the centrality of the desire for reelection.” Legislators may also have 
preferences regarding public policy and power within Congress (e.g. Fenno 1978). 
Nevertheless, as reelection is needed to achieve either of them, the reelection goal is central 
even if legislators also care about policy. 
There are different targets of legislators’ actions and citizens’ interests, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The focus of this dissertation is on the policy dimension of legislators’ behavior. 
Other dimensions of representation will be considered as possible alternative linkage 
strategies that diffuse the incentives to respond on policy grounds. Legislators may influence 
policy at several stages of the law making process, such as initial drafting of the law, 
committee work, amendments, and voting. The object of study in this dissertation is voting in 
the plenary due to its centrality in the law making process as all laws and constitutional 
reforms must be voted and approved by the plenary, as well as its use by legislators as a 
position signaling device.   
Mayhew (1974) deduced from the reelection goal that politicians are more interested 
in portraying themselves as close to their constituents than in the actual policy outcome if 
voters evaluate legislators based on policy positions (inputs) rather than outcomes.  The nature 




actions, as a single individual cannot be held accountable for a collective outcome.  In that 
scenario, the legislators’ roll call is aimed at constructing an ideological reputation closer to 
their district preferences, and not on the policy outcome.35 In the context of floor voting, 
legislators build their policy reputations through their vote choices selecting the position 
preferred by voters.   
When analyzing the vote decision, most studies assume that legislators must take a 
position,36 that is, choose between voting against or in favor of the proposal. But legislators 
have a third alternative: position avoidance.  The few studies that address this behavior 
emphasize district characteristics, in particular, instances when legislators represent a district 
with heterogeneous preferences.  The rationale is simple: in districts where constituencies 
have opposing views on an issue it is impossible to avoid an electoral cost when taking a 
position, and thus legislators may prefer to avoid taking a position (Fiorina, 1974).  Cohen and 
Noll (1991) studied the voting behavior on appropriations of a specific issue, and found that 
legislators from district with conflicted opinions were more likely to abstain.37  Jones (2003) 
study of Senators voting behavior also finds support on the impact of ideologically 
heterogeneity on position avoidance.  
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 Roll call is not the only tool for position taking, as speeches and draft bills are also strategically used by 
legislators. Drafting bills offers advantages over votes for position taking as they enable greater flexibility in 
defining the ideological content of the draft bill (Highton, B. and M. S. Rocca, 2005; Koger, 2003). The study of 
position taking through sponsorship exceeds the scope of this study. 
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 Some authors do consider the possibility of avoiding position taking, but do not consider it relevant (e.g. Saiegh, 
2011; Sieberer, 2013) 
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 Cohen and Noll also introduced a third assumption to the analysis of position avoidance when districts have 
heterogeneous preferences: negativity bias on issue salience which they derived from the “ungrateful voter” 
hypothesis as well as from retrospective voting.
 
 This bias implies that a vote is more likely to be salient if the 
outcome of that vote is adverse for the voters. This leads to an asymmetry on the cost-benefit analysis depending 
on whether the legislators are on the majority or minority side of the vote. In their study, they also found support 




The empirical study of position avoidance requires distinguishing within failures to take 
a position due to position avoidance from those due to mere absence. . The US Senate 
provides additional instances for senators to state their position on an issue besides the actual 
vote which help researchers to distinguish between issue avoidance and not voting for other 
reasons.  Thomas (1991) proposed three different theoretical types of failures to vote in the 
context of the US Senate. Proactive avoidance occurs when the legislator decides to miss a 
vote with the express purpose of not taking a position. Reactive avoidance is a consequence of 
an inadvertent non-voting which provides the opportunity to avoid expressing a position. And 
simple oversight is neither a strategic intent to miss the vote nor to avoid taking a position. 
Jones (2003) used this strategy to distinguish between simple oversight and position avoidance 
since without additional information, it is difficult to distinguish between proactive and 
reactive position avoidance.   
Other legislatures permit legislators to abstain during a vote, an alternative that is 
recorded along with the affirmative and negative votes. 38  Abstentions are directly related to 
proactive position avoidance, and thus, enable clear identification of such instances. The effect 
of abstention on the vote outcome depends on the quorum for approval as well as on any 
specific rules on the counting of abstentions. 
The studies discussed above theorize and provide evidence that legislators use position 
avoidance to minimize electoral costs when both options may be electorally costly. I argue that 
it is logical to extend this to conflicts between the legislator’s constituency and the legislator’s 
party since legislators face a similar zero-sum situation. And contrary to the case when the 
                                                          
38




conflict occurs within the district, position avoidance has substantive implications on 
representation.   
 
2. Strength of the electoral incentive faced by legislators 
 
The incentives for position taking and position avoidance depend on the strength of 
electoral incentive.  Several factors condition whether reelection oriented legislators are 
restricted – or disciplined – by elections.  In this section, I review two central conditions: first, 
voters know about legislators’ actions, and second, voters care about legislators’ actions.      
a) Transparency  
 
As argued in the previous chapter, transparency of legislators’ actions in Congress enables 
voters to hold legislators accountable for their actions. Electoral accountability is not 
equivalent to accountability of actions as office holders may also be held accountable for 
outcomes. In fact, early work on electoral accountability by Ferejohn (1986) proposed a 
threshold outcome as the optimum reelection rule. Transparency of legislators’ actions – i.e. 
the publicity of the vote – leads to an increased reliance on individual accountability (Carey, 
2009). Mayhew deduced the incentives for position taking precisely from the visibility of the 
vote in the US.  
Therefore, one would expect that an increase in transparency generates incentives for 
position taking. These incentives depend not only on the availability of information which is 
related to transparency, but also on the expectations of legislators that such information 





The first channel involves no intermediary: voters access directly the information. The 
specific reform under analysis consists of the publication of the votes and attendance of 
legislators on the Lower House website. Therefore, the relevant mechanism is access to the 
information through the internet. The expectation is that the higher the internet penetration 
in a district, the higher the percent of the population which can access the information.   
The second channel works through the media, in particular, the presence of local media 
as it is more likely to provide information on legislators from the district than national media. 
In the US, Snyder and Stromberg (2010) found that the number of media outlets has an 
additional positive effect on the probability that the voters are informed of a legislator’s 
actions. Therefore, legislators who represent districts with local media are more likely to 
expect that voters are informed of their voting behavior.  
Finally, voters may not gather the information themselves, but rather receive the 
information from local leaders, information which is shared within associations. Following 
previous work on mobilization and participation, belonging to non-political associations 
increases the probability of being informed, both by the direct provision and sharing of 
information within voluntary organizations. This is compounded by the fact that individuals 
who belong to an organization are easier to contact by political activists (Verba et al., 1995; 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Hence, the third diffusion channel works through membership 





b) Voters care about legislators’ votes 
 
For elections to influence legislators’ voting behaviors, legislators have to expect that 
their electoral success depends on it. This section addresses the alternative grounds upon 
which constituencies hold them accountable and thus whether the information on voting is 
relevant. These echo the different linkage strategies of officeholders studied in the 
comparative literature (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).39   
Following Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2000), these different strategies may be categorized 
along two dimensions. First, whether the relation is strategic or not. Strategic relations occur 
when the actions of agents and principals are conditional upon each other (Kitschelt and 
Wilkerson 2000; Kitschelt et al., 2009). Non-strategic linkages are based on affective or 
expressive attachments such as the politician’s charisma or descriptive traits. Non-strategic 
linkages are closer to the standing for conceptualization of representation and are not the 
subject of the present analysis.   
The second dimension applies only to strategic linkages and refers to the nature of the 
exchange. In particular, whether the exchange is contingent, and thus requires monitoring and 
enforcement. Programmatic linkages are both strategic and based on non-contingent 
exchanges whereas clientelism is strategic and based on contingent exchanges.  
Kitschelt and Wilkinson further classify programmatic linkages as valence policy 
competition or spatial policy competition. The latter consists of directional and spatial 
competition of programmatic policy packages which target citizens with different policy 
preferences along a dimensional space. The former is based on competition over goods that 
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most voters want – in other words, either collective or club goods with a skewed preference 
distribution in the electoral constituency (see also Kitschelt et al., 2009).40 These are voters 
who care about policy inasmuch as it redistributes towards their own group. It is a form of 
programmatic linkage since it is based on policy; policy benefits are defined over groups; and 
are not contingent on support. But it is different from policy or ideological programmatic 
linkages since preferences over issues do not bundle together following a set of beliefs. 
Following Olson’s seminal work (1966), groups who benefit from a particular policy (e.g. club 
goods) vary in their size and capacity to organize. Some policies benefit organized interest 
groups, such as agricultural tariffs or fishing extraction quotas, whereas others benefit large 
and unorganized interests, such as meant-tested income subsidies or public education 
policies.41 For this discussion, the relevant difference between organized and unorganized 
interests is that organized groups have by definition resources that enable them to find out 
how each legislator voted on the issue of interest regardless of the difficulty of access, whereas 
non-organized interests do not. This implies the channels discussed in the previous section 
matter for non-organized interests, since organized groups can gain access to information by 
using their own resources. Of course, there are other differences between groups, but in terms 
of the analysis of the effect of transparency, this is the main one which affects legislators’ 
behavior.    
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 This competition is not strictly on what scholars usually understand as valence (Stokes, 1963) but as I 
understand it, the implications on behavior are similar as the preferences among the constituency are 
concentrated 
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 Scholars have analyzed the influence of organized and unorganized interests in policy, for example Denzau and 
Munger (1986) and also Bawn and Thies (2003). I depart from these works since I consider that unorganized 
interests have preferences on specific issues and would vote according to the legislators’ behavior on such issues 




Clientelistic relations are defined as an individualized and contingent exchange of votes 
which requires monitoring and external enforcement of the exchange (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 
2007; Hicken, 2011). As argued in Chapter 3, clientelism is distinct from constituency service 
precisely because constituency service is not based on a contingent exchange.  But under both 
type of relations with voters, legislators voting behavior does not affect their reelection 
chances.   
In short, electoral incentives affect legislators’ voting behavior if they follow a policy 
linkage strategy. Programmatic policy linkages imply a consistent voting pattern – overall 
revealed ideology – whereas valence policy linkages, as defined above, imply that the electoral 
incentive is strong on a handful of votes which address the specific policy sector. For the 
purposes of this research, and given the challenging empirical task of distinguishing between 
clientelism, vote buying, and constituency service, the existence of an alternative linkage 
strategy to programmatic appeals is sufficient, either based on clientelism or constituency 
service. The reason is that both dampen in the same direction the disciplining effect of election 
on programmatic voting. 
The factors which determine the existent linkage strategy between legislators and 
voters are complex and dependent on both long-term and short-term factors.42 Following the 
logic of the model presented here, legislators may choose only among feasible linkage 
strategies, and past history and socioeconomic characteristics affect the feasibility of different 
strategies. Poverty increases the marginal value of each dollar spent, and funds availability 
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affects the capacity of legislators to provide material benefits. The magnitude of party 
sanctions and the probability that party and constituency will have opposing preferences over 
an issue also affect the potential costs of following a policy linkage as as do the relative value 
of policy and reelection for the legislators. Furthermore, clientelism in districts with both lower 
and middle income groups may present an electoral trade-off as it has a negative impact 
among middle income groups (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012).  
 For this research, I assume that legislators do not change linkage strategy during their 
careers. This implies that the hypotheses only consider changes in behavior consistent with a 
specific linkage strategy.43 Exclusive linkage strategies are not necessary, although legislators’ 
mixing of programmatic and non-programmatic strategies will result in an attenuation of the 
estimated impacts of the effects of the transparency on voting behavior. But, if the legislators’ 
linkage mix includes programmatic ones, I expect an effect on voting behavior.  
 
c) Other factors that affect the strength of the electoral incentive 
Electoral security, usually measured as the electoral margin, has a negative impact on 
legislators’ attentiveness to district preferences. In the US, Mayhew’s assertion is supported by 
subsequent work that has found greater convergence on competitive races (Elling, 1982; 
Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001; Jones, 2003; Bovitz and Carson, 2006; Ladweig, 
2010). Electoral security also influences the provision of constituency service (Dropp and 
Peskowitz, 2012) and legislative performance (Konisky and Ueda, 2008). Outside of the US, 
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some studies have also found that electoral security influences legislators’ behavior (Ames, 
1995; Crisp et al., 2004). If legislators care about reelection per se and not about their margin 
of victory, then the same electoral cost in terms of vote share poses a greater threat for 
reelection for legislators that won by a small margin. 
Another factor which influences the incentives for strategic voting is the timing of the 
votes as it influences the weight given by voters to votes depending of the time during the 
electoral cycle, as the (in)famous quote of a farmer clearly portrays, “But what in hell have you 
done for me lately?” (Matthews, 1960; as quoted in Shepsle et al., 2009: 345).44 The so called 
recency bias (Weingast et al., 1981; Patty and Weber, 2006) implies that votes cast closer to 
the elections should be more constrained by the reelection incentive. Evidene in the US 
supports this claim. Figlio (2000) found that voters are more likely to punish senators shirking 
in their last two years in office, and conversely, senators are more concerned about their 
behavior in their last years both in roll call voting and the appropriation process. Shepsle et al. 
(2009) also found evidence different behavior during the electoral cycle both among Upper 
and Lower House legislators.45 Lindstadt and Van Wielan (2010) found the same pattern of 
voting behavior among Lower House members. Similarly, they argued that the expected cost of 
deviating from constituents’ preference is inversely related to constituent monitoring. And due 
to variations in constituents’ memory –recency bias – and information costs, there is 
systematic variation in constituent monitoring during the electoral cycle.  
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 Conversely, this quote from Senator Huber H. Humphrey forcefully illustrates the politicians view: “The first two 
years are for God and Country, the last two for the folks back home.” As quoted in Elling, 1982:75.  
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 See also Ahuja, 1994; Warshaw, 2013. Earlier work showed mixed results as some found support for the 
“proximity hypotheses,” such as Amacher and Boyes, 1978, and Thomas, 1985 while other did not, such as 




3. Legislators as party members 
 
The previous discussion viewed legislators as independent actors who will take 
ideological positions in order to maximize their reelection chances. But legislators run for 
election on party slates and organize within Congress along party lines. Their behavior cannot 
be understood without referring to the role of parties.46 Although there is still a debate 
regarding the degree of influence, most scholars agree on the importance of parties in shaping 
behavior. Following the endogenous party literature, party label or party reputation is valuable 
for ambitious politicians. And party unity in Congress is a central factor for party reputation. 
Party leaders and rank and file legislators have thus an incentive to promote to party unity. 
Both cartel theory and conditional party government argue that party leaders are granted 
agenda setting prerogatives – both positive and negative, to shape the agenda and reduce the 
instances of votes in which there is a conflict within the party.  Within party conflict may arise 
due to heterogeneity of legislators’ policy preferences (e.g. legislators’ “true preferences”) or 
due to their electorally induced preferences (Morgenstern, 2002). The latter occurs precisely 
because legislators are discipline by elections. Mechanisms to increase cohesion within parties 
address the first source of conflict.  As last recourse, party leaders may impose costs on 
legislators to make them internalize the costs of voting against the party through discipline 
devices, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
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But parties considered as the “creature of the politicians, the ambitious office seekers 
and officeholders” (e.g. Aldrich, 1995: 4) should incorporate the electoral costs of voting 
against the constituency and develop strategies to address them. Lebo et al. (2007) assuming 
that a trade-off on cross-pressured votes is unavoidable, argue that parties strategically allow 
weak legislators to vote against the party on key issues.  
In this dissertation, I argue that legislators and parties may also cope with this tension 
through a different strategy: position avoidance. Parties – or more precisely, party leaders –
seek to maximize party reputation in order to foster electoral success. From the party leader’s 
perspective, legislative unity is central to their legislative success,47 which in turn enhances the 
party’s reputation, as well as the construction and maintenance of their programmatic 
reputation. But leaders also factor in the potential effect of opposing district preferences on 
the chances of legislator’s reelection as party leaders also value party power within Congress, 
which is related to number of seats held by the party. As the strategic party government 
argues, party leaders and legislators take into account that there is no win-win solution when 
the party and district have opposing preferences, and some legislators vote against the party in 
order to protect their reelection success. Position avoidance provides a “no lose-no lose” 
solution that may be preferable to the alternative: although neither the party nor the district 
are directly favored by the legislator’s vote choice, neither is actively opposed. Position 
avoidance provides legislators and party leaders a way out from direct opposition to party 
leadership or their districts on cross-pressured votes. From the party’s perspective, face-value 
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party unity is maintained, and hence, the programmatic reputation of the party is not 
undermined. 
Several factors may influence the relative value of party unity versus favoring the 
legislator’s district from the party perspective. First, some issues are more relevant than others 
to party reputation or brand name. Hence, party unity is more relevant to issues deemed 
central to the party’s reputation (e.g. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001). Second, 
Congress’ collective decision making implies that the costs in terms of policy outcomes change 
according to the closeness of the vote.  Hence, the relative costs of position taking – e.g voting 
against the party; versus position avoidance change depending on the expected outcome of 
the vote. As Saiegh (2011) argues, when the margin of a vote is high, or the vote is lopsided, 
parties and legislators only consider how their vote choice affects their revealed ideology; that 
is, the vote has only a position taking element. But when the expected margin is close and the 
outcome uncertain, party leaders and legislators must also consider the policy implication of 
their vote  
Furthermore, different rules provide different alternatives for legislators to avoid taking 
a position that have different effects on party reputation. There are two main strategies for 
position avoidance: legislators may miss the vote by leaving the plenary or they may record 
their option as abstaining.48   Although both may be used, missing a vote may hurt both the 
legislators and party reputation for diligence.  
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4. Position avoidance and the electoral incentive 
 
In this section, I discuss legislators’ expectations regarding the electoral costs and 
benefits of position avoidance.  Since the empirical analyses of position avoidance rely on 
recorded abstentions, I will distinguish between the costs of abstentions and of missing a vote, 
which is the other strategy for position avoidance.  
An explicit vote against the constituency is the most electorally harmful of all available 
options, and the reverse is true for votes in favor of the constituency.49 I argue that abstention 
costs lie between those two extremes. In the following paragraphs, I discuss when and why 
abstentions are not perceived by legislators as harmful to their electoral success as voting 
against the constituency. 
 Voters are expected to observe legislators’ behavior and deduce from it whether the 
legislator is or is not acting in their best interest. I argue that position avoidance is used by 
legislators as a pooling strategy: voters are expected to be less likely to discern from an 
abstention whether the legislator is acting against their interest than on a vote against the 
constituency as their selected strategy might also be chosen by legislators that have their true 
interest at heart as the legislator may always be able to justify an abstention in a favorable 
light. For instance, the legislator may bring up nuances in the drafting or argue that the 
proposal actually hurts voters rather than benefits them or that the law initiative was poorly 
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incentives of the Chilean electoral rules).  Hence, it is less likely that this electoralconstituency will contain groups with 




designed and would not have all of the benefits promised. Second, I argue that it is more 
difficult for challengers to rally against an instance of position avoidance than a direct vote 
against the constituency’s preference. The last argument is especially relevant for abstentions 
since missing a vote might easily be construed and denounced as disinterest and lack of effort 
on behalf of the legislator’s constituency.    
The type of programmatic linkage strategy followed by the legislators influence the 
expectations regarding the relative costs of abstaining.50 Legislators who follow a 
programmatic linkage strategy based on spatial competition build their reputation on their 
overall roll-call and thus, abstentions are less costly than for legislators who follow a 
programmatic linkage strategy based on sectoral policy.  And among legislators who follow a 
sectoral policy linkage, the effectiveness of abstentions as a pooling device is higher for those 
representing unorganized interests. Unorganized interests are less likely to fully understand 
the complexities of a vote, and thus, be more easily swayed by justification regarding 
abstentions. Organized interests on the other hand have greater information and 
understanding of the discussed proposal. Therefore, I expect that abstention will be less likely 
among legislators that represent organized interests.  Finally, the cost for the legislator also 
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When the vote is close, abstentions are more likely to affect the winning side than in lopsided votes. Hence, we 
should expect that incentives for abstentions will vary depending on which side the constituency is on and the 
expected outcome for the vote; this is not because of the ungrateful hypothesis, but simply due to how votes are 




depends on electoral vulnerability as the risk of losing his reelection bid is higher for those 
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5. Expectations and hypotheses on the impact of transparency 
The discussion of legislative politics provided above implies changes in behavior due to 
an increase in transparency to the extent that it strengthens the electoral incentive. Thus, a 
central condition is that legislators followed a programmatic linkage strategy prior to the 
reform. Legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy prior to the reform are 
expected to adopt positions closer to their electoral constituency after the transparency 
reform, assuming that legislators were out-of-step from their constituents before the 
transparency reform.   
Legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy based on spatial competition 
prior to the reform are expected to adopt a revealed position (as measured through the roll 
call) closer to the electoral constituency. Under plurality rules, extremist legislators are 
expected to act moderately as they target the median voter. As discussed in the following 
chapter, Chilean Lower House legislators are elected from two-member districts under open-
list proportional rules following d’Hondt’s formula which provides different incentives. For an 
empirical assessment of the hypotheses, I follow Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels (1998) who 
argue that under these rules, legislators will target the position of the median voter on their 
side of the policy space. That is, legislators will target the median voter of the truncated 
distribution. In many instances, as explained in the following chapter,52 prior to the reform, 
legislators were likely to have more extreme positions than the median voter of the truncated 
distribution, and thus are expected to act more moderately after the reform. 
The above discussion implies the following testable hypotheses: 
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H1: Position taking through revealed ideology  
Legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy based on 
spatial competition and had a revealed position (as measured through the roll 
call) more extreme than their electoral constituency prior to the reform will 
moderate their revealed position (also measured through the roll call) after the 
transparency reform. 
 
H2: Conditional effect of linkage strategy 
Legislators who did not follow a programmatic linkage strategy based 
on spatial competition prior to the reform will not alter their revealed position 
(as measured through the roll call) after the transparency reform. 
  
These hypotheses consider the effect of transparency reform on aggregate behavior: 
legislators’ revealed positions as measured through roll call. American politics literature on 
legislative behavior argues that legislators obtain moderate records by voting against their 
parties – assuming the party is more extreme than the legislator’s electoral constituency. 
Following the literature, I expect that legislators will be more likely to vote against their party 
after the transparency reform. In particular, they will be more likely to vote against the party 
when their party and their constituency are in conflict (e.g. when cross-pressured).   
I depart from the literature as I argue that abstentions are also used strategically. Cross-
pressured legislators may choose to abstain and thus avoid two costly options: voting against 




moderate position without incurring the cost of voting against the party. Therefore, on 
aggregate, I expect that both voting against the party and abstentions are more common in 
votes when legislators are cross-pressured after the transparency reform.  
 
The above implies the following testable hypotheses: 
 
H3a. Position taking and decision to vote with the party 
Legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy based on 
spatial competition prior to the reform will be less likely to vote along with 
their party after the transparency reform when cross-pressured. 
 
H3b. Position taking and the decision to vote against the party  
Legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy based on 
spatial competition prior to the reform will be more likely to vote against their 
party after the transparency reform when cross-pressured. 
 
H4. Position avoidance 
Legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy based on 
spatial competition prior to the reform will be more likely to abstain after the 
transparency reform when cross-pressured. 
 
The previous hypotheses address the effect of the transparency reform on legislators 




limitations, I am not able to test expectations regarding the effect on legislators who followed 
a programmatic linkage strategy based on sectoral policy. Nevertheless, I present the general 
expectations in this section as they build from the theoretical model of legislative behavior and 
I plan to address them in future work. As the reform consisted of drastically reducing the costs 
of accessing information, constituents who were able to afford the high costs of information 
previous to the reform and were willing to secure it, were more likely to be informed. 
Organized interest groups by definition meet these requirements. Therefore, the transparency 
reform did not increase the information available to organized groups as they had the 
resources to access such information before.   
Therefore, I expect that legislators who followed a programmatic linkage strategy based 
on sectoral policy benefiting unorganized interest groups will be more likely to side with the 
preferences of unorganized interests against the party line, assuming conflict between district 
and party preferences after the transparency reform. Legislators who followed a programmatic 
linkage strategy based on policies that benefit organized interests groups prior to the reform 
will not exhibit a change in their voting behavior after the transparency reform. Regarding 
abstentions, I expect an increase in the use of abstentions among legislators that represent 
districts with unorganized interests, but no change among those with organized groups.  And 
comparing the rate of abstentions between both, I expect a higher rate of abstentions among 






CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTION AND RELEVANT ELEMENTS FOR THE ANALYSIS 
 
The theoretical expectations presented in the previous chapter are tested against 
Chilean transparency reform. Several features of the Chilean system affect how these 
expectations are translated into specific hypotheses. First, the party system and main political 
cleavages provide the framework of the ideological competition space. I also discuss party 
system institutionalization in light of revisionist literature and its findings regarding non-policy 
linkages. Additionally, I discuss the role of Chilean parties in Congress. As different electoral 
rules provide different incentives to legislators (e.g. Cox, 1997), I review the literature on the 
effects of binominal rules and hypothesize how the incentives generated by the electoral rules 
translate into the expected impact of transparency on the placement of legislators. In the last 
section I describe the transparency reform. Before addressing these features, I present an 
overview of the Chilean political system and discuss the validity of the reelection goal.  
1. The President 
 
Chile is a presidential democracy with a strong president (Mainwaring and Shugart, 
1997; Shugart and Carey, 2003). Indeed, the president holds substantial legislative power and 
has sole control over cabinet formation and dissolution. Toward the legislative powers, the 
president may initiate proposals or executive bills, and has exclusivity in initiation on 
international and budgetary matters, including the creation or modification of taxes and the 
creation of new public agencies.  
  In addition, the president possesses specific tools to speed the lawmaking process 




There are three types of urgency motions: simple motions, which impose a 30-day deadline; 
suma urgency motions which impose a 10-day deadline; and immediate discussion, imposing a 
3-day deadline. These urgency motions may be edited or withdrawn during the lawmaking 
process, and this is usually the case, especially with simple urgencies.53 Therefore, the Chilean 
president clearly holds substantial agenda setting prerogatives, in particular, positive agenda 
setting.  
Furthermore, the presence of a popularly elected executive affects legislators’ 
incentives by providing an additional veto point in the legislative process (e.g. Tsebelis, 2004; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1997). The president may be considered an additional principal to 
members of the governing coalition. The president thus impacts legislator behavior and party 
unity (Carey, 2003, 2009) as well as party organization (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). The ability 
of parties in government to provide government posts for defeated candidates influences the 
stability of coalitions and the electoral success of the governing coalition (Carey and Siavelis, 
2003; Garrido, 2009). In addition, constitutional democracies with an elected president seem 
to provide more tools to voters for economic accountability than parliamentary governments 
(Hellwig and Samuels, 2008).    
Recently, studies have addressed the influence of Latin American presidents over the 
lawmaking process as well as the factors affecting such influence (Calvo, 2007; Aleman and 
Navia, 2009; Aleman and Calvo, 2010). Particularly relevant are the positive impacts of 
honeymoon effects and policy domain in the probability of the success of executive bills. 
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Contrary to the evidence in the US (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi, 2002; Collier and Sullivan, 
1995), Chilean presidents’ popularity does not affect their legislative success. Nevertheless, 
one of the strongest influences stems from the legislative prerogatives that make the president 
an important agenda setter in Congress.  
 
2. The Chilean Congress 
 
The Chilean Congress is composed of two houses. The Lower House or Chamber is 
completely renewed every four years, and the Upper House or Senate is renewed by halves 
every four years, with members holding office for eight years. Elections for the Lower House 
and the open seats for the Upper House are held simultaneously, and since 2005, 
simultaneously with the presidential election. Both houses are elected by the same electoral 
rules: two members selected with open lists using D’Hondt’s rule. There are 19 senatorial 
circumscriptions which elect 38 senators. Since the return of democracy and until 2006, when 
a constitutional reform was passed, the Upper House had 9 non-elected senators, and ex-
presidents held an Upper House seat for life.54 The Lower House elects 120 deputies from 60 
districts. The structure of electoral units is hierarchical: local counties are aggregated into 
electoral districts, and electoral districts are aggregated into senatorial circumscriptions.55  
The lawmaking process requires the concurrence of both chambers. All draft bills are 
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 Some very populous local counties constitute an electoral district, although this is not generally the case. It is 
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reviewed by the relevant committee, and those with fiscal implications must also be passed by 
the Public Finances Committee. Once the committee produces its report, the draft bill is voted 
on in the chamber of origin. The first vote in the plenary is called en general and approves or 
denies the passing of new legislation. If this first vote is rejected, the draft bill is withdrawn. If 
the plenary approves legislating on the subject addressed by the draft bill, but there are 
disagreements over the content of the law, specific articles and their amendments are voted 
on individually. In most instances, the greater disputes are over specific articles, and thus, it is 
important to consider all votes when analyzing legislators’ voting behavior. Every draft bill has 
to be voted on first in the chamber of origin, then in the revising chamber, and then the final 
draft bill as approved in the revising chamber must be ratified in the chamber of origin. When 
there is disagreement between the chambers, the Upper and Lower Houses form a committee, 
which must negotiate a mutually acceptable proposal to be ratified by both chambers.  
Despite the strong legislative prerogatives enjoyed by Chilean president, Congress is far 
from weak56.  Scholars analyzing executive-legislative relations have found Chilean Congress 
plays an active role in policy-making (Siavelis, 2002; Carey 2002; Aleman, 2010). Indeed, 
executive need to negotiate with Congress, including as they proposal are not automatically 
approved (Aleman and Navia, 2009; Toro, 2007).  Furthermore, the majority coalition has 
exerted negative agenda setting power (Aleman, 2009).  
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 Only recently has a growing body of research analyzed Latin American legislatures, as until the late 90s, most 
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2007; Aleman and Calvo, 2010; Aleman and Navia, 2009; Toro, 2007), whereas others have analyzed incentives 
with respect to constituency, for example Crisp et al. (2004) examined strategic co-sponsorship of Chilean Lower 




3. Political cleavages and party system 
 
Since the return to democracy, there have been two major coalitions: the center-left 
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia and the center-right Alianza. In the years under 
study, the Concertación has been composed of four parties: three major parties – Partido 
Socialista (PS, Socialist Party), Partido Democrata Cristiano (DC, Christian Democratic Party), 
and Partido Por la Democracia (PPD, Party for Democracy), and one small party, the Partido 
Radical Social Democrata (PRSD, Radical Social-Democratic Party ). The center-right Alianza is 
composed of two parties – Renovacion Nacional (RN, National Renovation) and Union 
Democrata Independiente (UDI, Independent Democratic Union), although in some elections, 
the electoral pact has also included some minor parties. Other small parties outside the main 
coalitions have not yet achieved parliamentary representation57 largely due to the high 
thresholds imposed by the electoral rules.  
These coalitions emerged from the transition to democracy organized along the support or 
rejection for the salient military regime of Augusto Pinochet. The coalitions have been stable 
over time, and the Chilean party system has been characterized as institutionalized from a 
comparative perspective. Along the three dimensions defined by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) 
to categorize party systems, Chilean parties fare well. The low levels of electoral volatility have 
been considered evidence of the existence of stable roots among voters (Mainwaring and 
Scully, 1995; Coppedge, 1998; Robert and Wibbels, 1999).    
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The continuity of the traditional three thirds division of the Chilean political landscape 
pre-1973 has been challenged by the emergence of a new political division, the authoritarian 
divide, along with the state-market divide.58 Kitschelt et al. (2010) analysis of Latin American 
party systems supports the finding that parties run on clearly identifiable party labels 
associated with position in the left-right spectrum59. The main ideological divide that 
structures party competition is the authoritarian-democratic divide that aligns with the 
economic-distributive state market dimension. The authors also find secondary dimensions 
such as the religious-secular divide.   
The relevance of the different divides has changed over time, specially the 
authoritarian divide. Luna and Altman (2011), using survey data from 1988, 1996, and 2000, 
found a decline in the mapping of the authoritarian divide on the left-right scale, and a small 
but stable correlation between the state-market divide and the left-right scale. These 
correlations vary along age groups and education groups. As the proportion of registered 
voters over the voting age population decreases over time - mostly because new potential 
voters do not register, the differences in ideological consistency among registered and non-
registered voters increases. Chile ranks relatively high on congruence with respect to other 
Latin American countries (Luna and Zeichmaster, 2005, 2010) and some find tentative evidence 
on an increase in congruence between elites and the mass public (Siavellis, 2009).  
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 Several authors have discussed the continuity of the three thirds division in the return of democracy or whether 
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configuration. See for example, Siavelis 1997, 2005; Carey, 2002; Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Montes, Ortega, y 
Mainwaring, 2000; and Mainwaring and Torcal, 2003, regarding a new political landscape. 
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 Bonilla, Carlin, Love and Silva (2011) reach similar conclusions, as well as Montes, Ortega, y Mainwaring (2000); 




Nevertheless, preference congruence is not a sufficient indicator of the types of 
linkages between parties and voters. Indeed, scholars have questioned the quality of the party 
system structure and probed deeper into the types of relations beyond the outcome measures 
defined by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). Low electoral volatility, one of the indicators of party 
system institutionalization is questioned.  Scholars argue it is not result of deep party roots in 
society as previously maintained, but rather sustained by electoral rules as well networks of 
clientelism (Luna, 2008, 2009; Altman and Luna, 2011). Research in Chile has found differences 
both among parties and even within parties in the types of strategies used. Luna’s (2010) 
analysis of the dual representation strategy followed by UDI explains the programmatic 
organization within Congress as well as non-programmatic linkages with voters. The author 
describes three types of districts depending on sociodemographic characteristics and the type 
of linkage.  Further work has analyzed partisan networks nationally and found that although 
practices of handout distribution exist, ideological distance to parties influences voters’ 
expectations.  Calvo and Murillo (2010) find that partisan networks of different parties are 
fairly similar, with small differences in favor of the PS in terms of the number of activists, and 
UDI in terms of the number of handout recipients.   
4. Parties in Congress 
 
Legislators’ behavior is strongly associated to their party membership. Two distinct direct 
mechanisms explain such relation: cohesion and discipline. As Hazan (2003: 3) puts it, 
“discipline starts when cohesion falters.” In addition, agenda setting shapes the choices faced 




both legislators self-selecting into parties closer to their ideological stances and parties’ 
screening devices. In addition, parties may influence legislators’ preferences through 
indoctrination and nominate candidates for Congress with preferences closer to the party line. 
Indeed, control over nominations provides parties with a useful tool to ensure cohesion (Hazan 
and Rahat, 2006) as well as a discipline device on incumbents.   
In Chile, candidates are selected by central committees and national leaderships or 
conventions, rather than open primaries. Indeed, from 1989 to 2005, only one party conducted 
open primaries in one election, and even in that instance, scholars question its openness 
(Navia, 2008; Toro and García, 2008). But it is important to note that incumbents are 
considered as having a prerogative to run for reelection and are hardly if at all denied the 
candidacy. Therefore, one could argue that nomination procedures help party leadership to 
ensure cohesion as they nominate freshman legislators that are closer to the party position 
rather than act as a discipline device. But this is not to say that party leadership within 
Congress is not able to exert any pressure on their legislators once elected. 
The House rules specify that all legislators should be organized in parliamentary 
committees (bancadas) along party lines.60 Independents must also associate within a 
parliamentary committee. The chair of the partisan parliamentary committee represents its 
members in several procedural matters as when they articulate agreements with the chamber 
president or request nominal votes. The agreements are then binding for all  legislators 
associated with the partisan committee. Therefore, only legislators belonging to parliamentary 
committees whose chair has not concurred with an agreement may raise objections during 
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sessions and subject them to a vote by the plenary.61 Chairs of partisan committees also define 
the distribution of the party allotted times to speak in the plenary as well as in the Hora de 
Incidentes. In addition, they have the prerogative to nominate replacements for the standing 
as well as the special committees. As Londregan (2000) for the Senate and Carey (2002) for the 
Chamber argue, standing committees are staffed by party leaders.  
Furthermore, partisan committees within Congress play an important coordinating role. 
Legislators convene weekly to discuss law initiatives, and some distribute memos explaining 
the main themes of a particular draft bill along with the party position.62 Legislators distinguish 
the influence of the partisan committee depending on the issue as some issues are more 
fundamental to the party. Among those relevant, the party committee decides how the 
collective stands and legislators are expected to abide by the decision. Although explicit 
sanctions are extremely rare, deviant legislators face costs. Those that do not follow the 
agreement can expect “not to be favored by party leadership”63 or to have their lives 
“made…difficult.”64 Hence, informal sanctions work as a discipline device for the party 
leadership in Congress.  
Career concerns within Congress also provide party leadership with a disciplining tool 
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 I conducted a series of interviews with legislators from October 2007 through January 2008. Legislators were 
first contacted through a letter which introduced the reason for the interview as well as its use for academic 
purposes. Legislators’ assistants were then contacted by phone to confirm reception of the letter and to ascertain 
whether the legislator could meet, and then to coordinate the interview. Some legislators were not available for 
interviews, and some preferred an interview over the phone rather than in person. In these interviews, several 
legislators from the Concertación and Alianza coalitions mentioned the partisan committee (bancadas) meetings 
as well as the usefulness of party committee memos.  These interviews are consistent with Carey (2002) 
conclusions regarding the coordinating role of committees.  
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 Concertación legislator; phone interview, December 12, 2007.  
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(Carey, 2002). Although as said above, incumbents are given prerogative for reelection, they 
need party endorsement to run for higher office. Furthermore, parties provide an insurance 
from reelection losses as they can further their political careers within the party if they lose. 
This is especially relevant for Concertación legislators, as the coalition controls the executive 
government and thus is able to provide government posts to former incumbents65 (Garrido, 
2009). Thus, the stronger the career concern of legislators and the more dependent they are 
on their party for career advancement, the greater the influence the party can exert on the 
legislator.    
In addition to these direct mechanisms, agenda setting prerogatives enable majority 
coalitions to avoid conflictive issues.  As discussed above, in the years under study, the agenda 
setting prerogatives of the president reinforced the majority coalition control over the agenda.  
 
 
5. The assumption of reelection oriented legislators 
 
Several factors are needed to consider the reelection goal a plausible assumption 
beyond the US case (Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002). First, evidently, whether reelection is 
permitted, and if permitted, whether there are terms limits. Second, whether there is a stable 
party system in which legislators have reasonable expectation of reelection. 
The assumption of reelection-seeking legislators has considerable support in the 
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Chilean Congress, as other scholars have also documented and assumed (Londregan, 2000; 
Carey, 2002; Crisp et al 2004; among others). As in the US Congress, Chilean legislators have no 
restriction on reelection. Lower House members generally construct their careers as 
legislators. In the three periods under analysis, about 80% ran for reelection and an additional 
10% ran for the Upper House.66 Therefore, only 10% of the incumbents did not pursue a 
legislative career after their terms in office. The reelection rate is high with four out of five 
legislators winning the seat. The success of legislators competing for the Upper House is 
smaller and varies among legislative periods although a majority won a seat (about 55%).      
 
6. Voting in Congress 
 
The Lower House rules determine that legislators must cast their votes when they are 
present on the floor, except for the chamber president who may not vote. Legislators may vote 
in favor, against, or abstain. The only exception is when a legislator is paired with another 
legislator.67 The objective of pairing for an absent legislator is to be able to miss a vote and not 
affect its outcome. Pairs must be reported to the Lower House secretary who reads them 
before the first vote of the session and agreed upon by legislators from opposing coalitions.68 
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 For example, from the 38 elected Upper House members who are currently in office from 2010-2014, only 8 
(21%) had not served previously as a Lower House member. After the elections, two senators left to become 
cabinet members, and their replacements were not Lower House members.  
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 In addition, legislators should disqualify themselves from voting if they or their immediate relations are affected 
by the law being voted on. But this has been seldom invoked during a vote.  
68
 Although the rules state that pairs are read before votes are cast, there are many instances in which legislators 
that are not recorded in the Boletin de Sesiones (the session’s record) are paired and recorded as paired on the 




As such, it is an interesting instance of quid pro quo between legislators from opposing 
coalitions.69  
Abstentions are common in Chilean legislatures. During the 2002-2006 term, at least one 
legislator abstained in about 60% of the non-unanimous votes decided by simple majority. 
Disaggregating, one legislator abstained in about 20% of the votes, between two and five 
legislators abstained in 26% of the votes, and in 14% of the votes, more than six legislators 
abstained. It is interesting to note that even on unanimous votes – that is, votes in which all 
legislators that stated an option were either in favor or against the proposal, at least one 
legislator abstained about 30% of the time. And in 12% of those, more than one legislator 
abstained.70  
From the party perspective, abstentions may be used when a legislator disagrees with the 
party committee; as an Alianza legislator stated, the legislator may be given “the option to 
abstain as a way out.”71 When the abstention is made public through the media, legislators 
explain their abstentions usually in terms of concern for their constituents or due to lack of 
sufficient information. Legislators thus argue that the law will have negative impacts, either on 
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 As discussed in the last chapter, I plan to study the institution of pairing as well the response of legislators to 
the transparency reform. 
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 Indeed, in some votes, the majority of one party abstained. This behavior was observed mostly among parties 
from the opposition as there were just a couple of instances in which the position of a party in the government 
coalition was to abstain. Among opposition parties, the position of the party was to abstain in about 5% of the 
non-unanimous votes decided by majority, and in about 3% of those that required special quorum. These patterns 
of behavior are very interesting, and I plan to expand my research project and include the incentives and 
determinants of abstentions as party position.  
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the group that supposedly benefits72 or on a related problem73or that the proposal is 
insufficient74 or will not have the desired effect.75 Other reasons invoked for abstentions on 
government initiatives include the executive not giving enough information and/or needing 
time to study the proposal.76   
 
7. Binominal electoral rules 
 
Chilean Upper and Lower House legislators are elected from two-member districts 
using open-list proportion rules. The seats are assigned following d’Hondt’s formula. The 
formula used to assign the two seats implies that in order to win both seats, a list needs to 
double the vote share of the second majority list. Given the configuration of the Chilean party 
system, with two major coalitions, the expectation in most districts is that one seat is won by a 
candidate of one of the two major coalitions, and the other by a member of the other 
coalition.  These rules provide incentives to cultivate the personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 
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 A PDC legislator justified abstention from voting on sexual harassment arguing that it would actually hurt 
women. El Mercurio, January 23, 2005.  
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 A PDC legislator abstained in a vote to restrict provisional liberties while investigating arguing that it would 
increase the percent of jailed while prosecuted, worsening the jail overpopulation problems. El Mercurio, January 
5, 2000. 
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 A UDI legislator said he abstained from a vote on a public sector wage increase because it upset him that public 
employees were being offered an adjustment that barely covered increases due to inflation. El Mercurio, 
November 21, 2002. 
75
 A PPD legislator explained his abstention as a result of the policy proposed being ineffective. El Mercurio, 
November 7, 2007.  
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 A PDC legislator explained his abstention during the discussion of a mining royalty as a result of not being 
informed about the project and the government’s failure to invite him to any of the informative meetings. El 
Mercurio, March 23, 2005.  A similar argument was made by a senator regarding a law that regulates electric 




1995; Crisp, Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud, 2004, among others).    
These electoral rules have been subject to critiques on several accounts. Scholars argue 
that they limit the competition among coalitions and increase the within-list competition, and 
generate centrifugal incentives (for a review on the literature, see Von Baer and Navarrete, 
2008 as well as Navia, 2005, 2006; and Siavelis 2005).77  
Results from formal theoretical models show that proportional electoral rules provide 
incentives to candidates to move away from the median voter.78 The specific prediction 
depends on the specifics of the PR rules, which involve district magnitude, closed or open lists, 
and whether cumulative vote among the most important.79 Empirical research on the impact 
of small magnitude PR is scarce.80 Several scholars have studied the effect of multi-member 
districts (MMD) using Arizona House elections. Each district elects two representatives per 
district using the bloc with partial abstention system (Adams, 1996; Richardson, Russell, and 
Cooper, 2004; Bertelli and Richardson, 2008) whereas the Senate is elected in single member 
districts (SMD). These studies found evidence that Arizona House legislators were more 
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 The electoral rules are also criticized for their exclusionary logic and for favoring the second majority at the 
expense of the first majority. The latter critique also points out that the system benefits the first two majorities at 
the expense of minority pacts (Zucco, 2007). Also, scholars argue that these electoral rules make insulate 
incumbents from their constituencies’ demands, and thus we should not expect any change in legislators’ 
behavior. It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze the impact of the so-called binominal electoral system, 
although some of its results shed light on some of the critiques.  
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 There is extensive formal literature on the impact of electoral rules building from seminal works on spatial 
models of election by Black (1948) and Downs (1957). Some scholars have addressed specifically the impact of 
proportional electoral rules, see for example Cox (1990a, 1990b, 1997), Myerson (1999).  
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 Although scholars usually focus on district magnitude as they consider the most important determinant of party 
system (see Taagpera and Shugart, 1989). 
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 The US Senate has two member districts, but the elections are staggered and thus, at each election, a single 
legislator is elected.  Therefore, each senator was elected in practice under plurality rules, and thus legislators 




ideologically extreme compared to those in the Arizona Senate. For the Chilean Upper House, 
Dow (1998) constructed maps through voters’ surveys from four senatorial districts in the 
months previous to the first senatorial election after the return to democracy. The placement 
of candidates shows a significant distance between both major coalitions. This evidence is 
suggestive of the centrifugal incentives of binominal rules, but further research is required as 
the data is drawn from voters’ surveys before the first election since the return to democracy 
and only from four senatorial districts. 
Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels (1998) present a formal model which studies the 
Chilean binominal rules. Election of both candidates from the same list is ruled out by the 
game setup. Their main result is that candidates from the same list will place themselves in the 
same off-center position and each coalition at one side of the median voter. This result implies 
that legislators from different parties within the same coalition will present the same 
ideological stance to voters. In a footnote, Magar et al. (1998) argue that “in effect, this 
situation is equivalent to two races under single-member plurality rules, one on each side of 
the median voter. Thus, median voter results hold, but they hold separately on each side of the 
policy space.” Their equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium: no candidate can improve his 
electoral chances given the strategies of the other candidates.  
The assumptions for these results include policy voting on the part of voters, a uniform 
distribution of voters’ preferences as well as complete information regarding legislators’ 
behaviors – that is, complete transparency of legislators’ action. Therefore, in a scenario of 
little information, candidates’ positions may not correspond to their predictions. Furthermore, 




which does not usually follow a uniform distribution. The exact electorally-induced position 
depends on the distribution of preferences within the district – the authors’ clear prediction is 
obtained from a uniform distribution which is rare in the real world. Following the above logic, 
I argue that the electoral constituency and the related, expected target ideological position are 
a function of the proportion of voters that are moderate. Therefore, the effects of 
transparency reform on Chilean legislators given the electoral rules are different depending on 
the legislator’s party and district characteristics.  
I argue that before transparency (i.e. a low information environment); the legislators’ 
position depended on their own preferences and their party preferences.81 Legislators from 
highly cohesive parties or those with strong discipline will probably be closer to the party 
position than those from parties lacking both. Given the discussion regarding the influence of 
parties in the Chilean Congress, I expect that legislators’ positions will be closer to their parties’ 
position. The impact of moving to a high information environment will depend on the 
legislators’ original positions: whether the equilibrium location is more extreme or more 
centrist than the original location. 
For legislators from the extremist party of the coalition, the median voter of the 
truncated distribution is likely to be more moderate. But an additional feature of the party 
system may alter these incentives towards moderation: the presence of an out-of-pact 
extremist party. In Chile, only Concertación incumbents may encounter this situation when 
facing a strong the communist party (PC). The PC vote share is small and hence, has no 
possibility of gaining a seat when running outside one of the major coalitions, but they can pull 
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extremist voters away from the left coalition, in particular, from the candidate of the extremist 
party of the coalition. I argue that this feature of the Chilean political landscape changes the 
incentives for the Concertación extremist parties: their main challenger is still their list 
challenger, but when in the presence of a strong PC, they risk losing votes to the communist 
party if they move too far towards the center. Hence, the presence of a strong out-of-pact 
candidate attenuates the incentives for moderation and the net effect is ambiguous.  
On the other hand, legislators from moderate parties are more likely to be more 
extreme than the median voter of the truncated distribution when the proportion of moderate 
voters in the district is very high as the median voter of the truncated distribution will be closer 
to the center of the overall distribution. On the other hand, when the proportion of moderate 
voters is relatively small, the position of the legislators vis-à-vis the electorally-induced position 
is less predictable.  
But some authors question the preeminent role of institutions in shaping legislators’ 
behavior. Relevant for the effects on ideological placement, Aleman (2009) challenges the 
conventional wisdom regarding the causes of the democratic breakdown. Valenzuela (1978) 
provides an eminently institutional explanation for the congressional polarization that ended in 
the military coup of 1973, which has become the conventional wisdom regarding the causes of 
the breakdown of democracy (e.g. Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). 
Aleman argues that the institutional change did not play such a role, but the cause was the 
polarization of society which in turn was reflected in the polarization of legislative politics.  As 
evidence of his claim, he showed that the patterns of cooperation among legislators – 




“accommodating” Congress. Since the institutional provision and presidential prerogatives are 
features of the present Congress, they cannot be credited for causing polarization. Aleman 
certainly shows that non-institutional factors such as ideology can have an important role in 
explaining legislators’ behavior, but his account perhaps goes too far in excluding institutional 
changes. The present Congress has some important institutional differences that are not taken 
into account in Aleman's explanation. Indeed, Crisp et al. (2004) found that the binominal 
electoral rules – an institutional innovation – provide incentives to build a reputation through 
co-sponsored cooperation among opposing parties. Aleman himself in his co-authored work 
with Calvo (forthcoming) stresses the impact of these rules in generating common interest 
among legislators from opposing coalitions who represent the same districts. In short, electoral 
rules shape incentives, but they are not the only forces which explain legislators’ behavior.82 
8. The transparency reform 
 
Two elements are important to understand and explain the timing of the transparency 
reform. First, technology availability, since without it, the publicity of the vote is a moot point. 
And second, the social and political context.  
In the case of Chile, electronic voting has been available since the return of democracy. 
And as Carey (2009: 60) argues, once such a system is in place, there are pressures to alter 
procedures to facilitate recorded voting as well as the publicity of the records. Indeed, since 
the second legislative period after the return to democracy, 1994 to 1998, legislators have 
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implemented different measures to increase transparency and to share congressional activities 
with the public. In 1994, legislators approved a measure that required that all individual votes 
to be recorded and reported in the Boletín de Sesiones, which was and still is available in hard 
copies at both locations of the Library of National Congress – one in the capital city and one in 
the Congress itself. It is interesting to note that some legislators did not approve of the change 
arguing that it would jeopardize the independence of legislators from external pressures 
(Boletín de Sesiones, Legislature 328, Session 21). Since 1996, the document has also been 
available online (Carey, 2009). As discussed below, a further step in technology was taken with 
a public bid for a project aimed at strengthening the system of control and internal audits 
within Congress. Hence, by 2003, the technology for the transparency reform was already in 
place.  
Parallel to these processes, and as in the rest of the world, transparency was 
increasingly perceived as remedy for corruption and issues of representation. For example, the 
NGO Chile Transparente, founded in 1998 and since 2002 a chapter of Transparency 
International, started actively proposing transparency reforms. Transparency discussions in the 
Upper House had started a few years before, as opposition legislators started to promote 
measures to improve transparency and to “transform legislative policy-making from a black 
box to a crystal box.”83 Amid concerns regarding Congress’ image, this discourse permeated 
the political elites. One of the 2002 Lower House President goals was to improve legislators’ 
images through increased transparency.84 And freshman opposition legislators proposed 
                                                          
83
 Alianza senator, personal interview, Santiago, November 27, 2007. 
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reforms that increased public access to legislative attendance and voting.85  
Transparency initiatives were hastened by a series of political corruption scandals, 
which involved both executive authorities as well as legislators. Misuse of congressional funds 
and legislators accused of extortion and bribery prompted initiatives to repair Congress’ image. 
These initiatives included increased transparency in fund management,86 a public bid to 
implement technology aimed at improving internal control mechanisms,87 as well as other 
measures to speed up the lawmaking process.88 In direct relation to the transparency reform, 
and shortly after the first corruption scandals emerged, opposition legislators presented legal 
initiatives to alter the House rules in early September 2002 to publicize attendance and 
legislative voting.89 And later that month, the Lower House President announced, although it 
was not implemented until the 2004 transparency reform, a new website where citizens would 
be able to access information regarding expenses and as well as legislation on the floor as well 
in the committees.90 Indeed, the Concertación faced one of its worst political crises in late 
2002, which prompted President Lagos to seek a national agreement with the opposition 
which included a series of transparency initiatives as well as civil service reform.91  
Finally, in May 2004, the Chamber President announced through a press conference 
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 El Mercurio, March 18, 2002 
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 Lower House News, May 6, 2002; El Mercurio, May 9, 2002 
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 El Mercurio, September 13 and 14, 2002. 
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 El Mercurio, August 31, 2002; Boletín de Sesiones, September 3, 2002; draft bill Nº2991-6 
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 Boletín de Sesiones, September 10, 2002; draft bill Nº3054-07 
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 Lower House News, September 30, 2002; El Mercurio, September 19, 2002. The announced website was 
www.presidenciadelacamara.cl. As far as I have been able to ascertain, it was not launched, and the information 
was published after the transparency reform on the Lower House website.  
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 Rehren (2008) wrote that these reforms were reactive initiatives to corruption scandals. Regarding the political 




that all individual votes and attendance rates were from that moment available on the 
institutional webpage with the explicit purpose of increasing transparency.92 As argued above, 
the reform was discussed long before 2004. The data regarding attendance and voting became 
available as of March 2002, the beginning of the legislative period during which it was 
implemented. In addition to reporting whether deputies voted in favor, against, or abstained in 
every vote since March 2002, the website also reported whether they did not vote or were 
paired and with whom. Interestingly, a few years later, the category of did not vote was 
dropped from the website, and the information is no longer available even for earlier votes. 
The reform also included the publication of updated attendance rates for all legislators as well 
as information on draft bill sponsorship.  
Hence, the reform drastically diminished the cost of information on attendance, voting, 
and draft bill initiation, and enabled a comparison of legislators’ rates of attendance and voting 
behaviors. The advantage of this case is that although researchers are able to collect the pre-
reform legislative behavior93 which was not easily available before the reform. 
Given the political context and the number of parallel pro-transparency initiatives, 
legislators were aware of the transparency reform at the time, although the transparency 
reforms were not as salient in 2003 as they were in 2002.  Legislators’ perceptions regarding 
the relevance of the reform to voters varied. For legislators that believed that their voters care 
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 “Votaciones de diputados pueden verse desde hoy por Internet,” El Mercurio, May 3, 2004.  
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 Boletín de Sesiones reports each session of the Lower House, including attendance, discussion, and voting, 
among other items. But, the process of acquiring this detailed information is excessively costly: the information is 
only in book bound copies that are solely available at the Congress Library in Valparaiso and the Congress Library 
in Santiago, the capital city. Before the reform, a Word version of the Boletín de Sesiones was available online. But 
it required additional work, especially regarding attendance and comparing voting between legislators and across 




mostly about constituency service, the reform did not have an effect on the degree of 
information available since voters do not pay attention to their voting behaviors.94 Although 
some recognize that voters are now more informed about their legislative actions – voting, 
attendance, and draft bill initiation – they also recognize that the local press plays a larger role 
in spreading information than voters actively seeking information. Indeed, as one legislator 
argued, if he votes against his district preferences, the local media will publish such 
information.95 Legislators are also able to ascertain the issues which are of greater concern to 
their voters, and agree that in those areas, voters are more informed. And those few 
interested are active in seeking information on draft bills, voting, and attendance.96     
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CHAPTER 5: DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
1. Data and Measurement 
 
a) Sources of data 
 
In this section, I first discuss the sources of the data used to construct the variables applied 
in the empirical tests.  
 
 Sessions Report 
Every session is recorded in the Boletin de Sesiones (BS), which is available in hard copy 
at the Library of Congress and recently online. The BS reports the attendance rooster which is 
recorded at the beginning of each session. All discussions and votes are transcribed into the 
BS, including vote outcomes.  The attendance data was collected as part of the UNDP project 
Auditoria de la Democracia (Democracy Audit), from the reports of the sessions, and recorded 
in a dataset.97  
During each session, a specific time is allotted for legislators to make their requests to 
the executive on behalf of their constituencies, as well as offer condolences and and 
congratulations to individuals or groups within their districts, and voice grievances.  This time is 
called Hora de Incidentes.98 As part of the Auditoria de la Democracia project, information 
regarding each request made by each legislator was collected. The dataset includes 
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information on the date the request was voiced, the legislator, and the descriptor of the 
request as reported by the BS. Although it is difficult for researchers to gather and aggregate 
this data for comparison across legislators, legislators have an incentive to communicate such 
efforts on behalf of their constituencies to their voters, and they also request that an official 
report be sent to the community or local institution on whose behalf they speak.   
Most of the time is devoted to expressing and demanding response to local concerns, 
such as roads for specific rural areas or schools in their districts. There is a wide variation in the 
number of issues raised by legislators during the Hora de Incidentes, ranging from none to two-
hundred.   
 
 Lower House webpage (www.camara.cl) 
The transparency reform consisted of the online publication of legislators’ vote choices, 
projects sponsored or co-sponsored as well as their rate of attendance.  
 
 National Library of Congress website (www.bcn.cl) 
The National Library of Congress provides information on each draft bill introduced to 
Congress since 1990 on the Legislative Assistant website which, until a few years ago, was 
linked directly from the webpage. Now it is accessible only directly. In addition to the 
description of the stages of the lawmaking process for each draft bill, it includes information 
on authorship. Information on the classification of all draft bills by the National Library of 
Congress is also available according to subject matter. The National Library of Congress 




 National Survey for Socioeconomic Characterization: (Encuesta de Caracterización 
Socioeconómica Nacional , CASEN) 
The CASEN has been conducted by the Ministry of Social Planning (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Social, formerly Ministerio de Planificación) since 1985; at first, every two years, and 
from 2000 to 2009, every three years. The purpose is to assess both the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the population and subpopulations, and to use the results as input for social 
policy evaluation. The samples are representative both at the regional and provincial level. In 
addition, the design includes representative samples for a majority of the counties, and the 
number of counties represented has increased with each wave of the survey. The proportion 
of counties with representative samples was 84% in the 2000 survey, 88% in the 2006 wave, 
and 97% in the following wave. The few counties which lack of representative samples are 
those of scarcely populated areas, which implies that by CASEN 2000 estimates, 94% of the 
population was sampled from self-represented counties. In addition, the less populated 
counties are included in districts that cover multiple counties and are mostly located in the 
extreme regions in which the district includes the entire region. Therefore, all districts have 
representative samples. 
 
 National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, INE) 
INE provides estimates of population projections at the county level disaggregated into 
the following demographic characteristics: gender, age, and rural or urban zones. In addition, 
through its Redatam service, it provides cross-tables on the 2002 Census data at the county 




 Public opinion surveys 
Centro de Estudios Publicos (CEP) fields public opinion surveys representative at the 
national level. The survey is conducted twice a year except in presidential election years, when 
the survey is carried out three times. The survey is representative of the voting age population 
at the national level, and the sampling procedure is multi-stage, random sampling at every 
level based on face-to-face interviews. The data is publicly available on their website99. 
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)100 
provides an additional source of information. The LAPOP has been conducted every two years 
since 2006. For 2008 and 2010, the survey used a national probability sample design of the 
voting-age population, taking into account stratification and clustering based on face-to-face 
interviews. The technical information does not report the use of gender and age quotas, 
contrary to the 2006 sample design.   
 
 National Electoral Service (Servicio Electoral, SERVEL)  
SERVEL provides official historical information at the district level,101 both on registered 
voters and election results since the 1988 plebiscite. Earlier data is available only at the district 
level whereas newer data is disaggregated at the county level and electoral units within 
counties – these are smaller than counties, and usually, small counties have one whereas 




 I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency 
for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. 
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 The historical data was available only in hard copy. The process of gathering the hard copies and digitalizing 





larger ones may have several. 
 
b) Measuring district characteristics 
 
i)  Electorally induced position 
By definition, legislators who follow a policy programmatic linkage establish a relation 
with their constituents based on ideology. Following the logic of the political agency models 
discussed in Chapter 2, the optimal position or target position at which the legislators aim 
depends, among other factors, on the distribution of voters’ ideological preferences in the 
district.     
Under the binomial electoral rules and multiparty system present in Chile, the position 
of the median voter is not relevant for identifying a legislator’s electoral constituency. In fact, 
theoretical work on proportional rules establishes that candidates aim at different sub-
constituencies along the ideological space. For the case of Chile, I follow the model and results 
presented by Magar et al. (1998) that specify that both candidates from each list will locate in 
the same off-center position. Furthermore, the authors argue that the legislators will target 
the position of the median voter of the truncated distribution of voters’ preferences, which 
excludes the voters from the opposite ideology. But the exact position targeted by legislators 
depends on the distribution of preferences within the district – the authors’ clear prediction is 
obtained from a uniform distribution, not observed in Chile102. Following the above logic, I 
argue that the electoral constituency and the related expected target ideological position are a 
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function of the proportion of voters that are moderate.   
The median voter of the truncated distribution is likely to be more moderate than the 
incumbents from extremist parties within each coalition. One exception is when the legislator 
from the extreme party faces competition both from a moderate within-list challenger and 
from an extremist outside the coalition. In those instances, it is unclear which incentive is 
strongest. Therefore, for those legislators, I do not have a clear predication on the targeted 
voter. Moderate legislators – associated with moderate parties – are more likely to be more 
extreme than the median voter of the truncated distribution when the proportion of moderate 
voters in the district is very high as the median voter of the truncated distribution will be closer 
to the center of the overall distribution. On the other hand, when the proportion of moderate 
voters is relatively small, it is less clear whether the legislator from the moderate party will be 
more extreme or closer to the targeted voter. Therefore, as in the previous case, I do not have 
a clear prediction on the location of the targeted voter vis-à-vis the position of the legislator 
for legislators from moderate parties that represent districts with a low proportion of 
moderate votes.  
In short, legislators from extremist parties that do not face an out-of-pact extremist 
challenger are likely to be more extreme than the median voter of the truncated distribution. 
Legislators from moderate parties that represent moderate districts are also likely to be more 
extreme than the median voter of the truncated distribution. I do not have a clear predication 
for extremist legislators that face a strong out-of-pact extremist challenger or for legislators 
from moderate parties that represent districts with a low proportion of moderate voters. For 




moderate voters above the median and those with a proportion of moderate voters below the 
median.  
In Chile, for the period under study, registration to vote was voluntary, but once 
registered, voting was compulsory.103 Therefore, the relevant measure is the proportion of 
registered voters. The proportion of registered voters reached an historic 88% level for the 
1988 plebiscite.104 For the 1997 election, 82% of the voting age population was registered, and 
the younger portion exhibited lower rates. In December 2001, 76% of the voting age 
population was registered, and in 2005, the percent had fallen to 72% of the voting age 
population.105  As deregistration is not allowed, the fall in the percentage of registered voters 
is due to the fact that the new generations are less likely to register once they reached the 
legal voting age. In addition to different rates of registration by age, lower income groups 
exhibited lower rates than higher income groups. And in terms of attitudes, as could be 
expected, registered voters are more likely to place themselves on an ideological scale.106 
Given these differences, it is important to consider only registered voters.107 
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 The 2012 constitutional reform implemented automatic registration and voluntary vote, and the municipal 
election in that year was the first election under this new registration and voting system. 
104
 The October 5, 1988 plebiscite allowed the citizens to vote either “YES” for a continuation under Augusto 
Pinochet as President or “NO” for holding presidential elections the following year.  
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 Data obtained from the Servel regarding registered voters and INE population statistics.  
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 Del Pozo and Navia, 2012; Lehmann, 1998, among others.  
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 There is an additional complication to the study of district preferences: whether the voters are registered in 
the same districts where they live. The public opinion survey does not identify place of registration, but I do not 
believe that this omission will bias the results, first, because I do not expect a systematic difference between 
those that live but do not vote in their districts and those that live and vote in the same district, and second, 




The estimates are obtained for CEP public opinion surveys. Each wave of surveys 
interviews approximately 1,500 adults, and the survey is taken twice a year, except in 
presidential election years in which it is conducted three times. Therefore, although a single 
survey does not provide sufficient information, it is possible to aggregate surveys to improve 
the estimates.  
I generate estimates using multilevel regression and poststratification or MRP (Gelman 
and Little, 1997; Gelman, 2007; Lax and Phillips, 2009). This technique involves two stages: 
first, the estimation of ideological identification on a multilevel model of demographic 
characteristics with observations nested within districts; then, the estimates of each 
demographic-district combination are weighted – poststratified – by the proportion of the 
population in that specific demographic-district combination.  
For each election year, I aggregate the data of three consecutive surveys. 
Unfortunately, until October 2009, only a few CEP surveys reported an identification number 
for each county surveyed, and even then, the identification was not associated with the name 
of the county,108 but the user manual provided information regarding the number of sampling 
units from each county, as well as the region and rural condition. Although less than perfect, I 
was able to identify the counties by matching them with the information provided for surveys 
conducted December 1997 to January 1998, April 1999, October 1999, and March 2000. Later 
surveys only reported the region until the October 2009 survey which identified each county 
surveyed. Therefore, I was able to obtain data at the district level close to the start of the 
2002-2006 term.   
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As argued above, the relevant measure is the proportion of the registered voters that 
identify themselves with each ideological group. First, I estimate the proportion of registered 
voters in each district. The dependent is dichotomous – whether the respondent is registered 
or not to vote – and is explained by sex, age, education, residence in rural or non-rural areas, 
and district of residence.109 I generate proportions of registered voters for each demographic-
district combination. Second, I estimate the model of identification and apply the same 
procedure to the estimated proportion. I consider four groups: identified with left or center-
left positions, identified with center positions, identified with right and center-right position, 
and not ideologically identified. As the standard packages110 do not include multilevel 
multinomial logit models, I have estimated a series of logit models. 
 
ii) Presence of diffusion channels 
As argued in the theoretical section, transparency may work through three different 
diffusion channels. The first considers that voters access the newly available information and 
thus, the relevant variable is access and use of the internet. To tap to this factor, I rely on data 
from the CASEN survey that inquires directly on access, and main uses. I have constructed a 
variable that indicates the percent of the voting age population that has access to the internet 
and uses it mostly for information and communication.111 The measure of internet use is from 
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 Respondents are grouped into four age categories. Education is divided into four categories following the 
CENSUS categories used to report data, and rurality and sex are dichotomous variables. 
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 I use LMER to estimate the models in R. 
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 Access is a precondition of use, and communication and information are the most common uses. Therefore, 
the percent of the voting age population of the district that has access to the internet is highly correlated (.99) 




the 2003 CASEN survey, a year previous to the reform. The second diffusion channel considers 
the role of voluntary organizations. I also construct the measure with the results of the 2003 
CASEN 2003, includes questions regarding participation in voluntary associations. Given a 
possible difference in the nature of religious associations from other associations within the 
Chilean context, I distinguish them from secular organizations and the variable use is the 
percent associated with non-religious associations.112  
The last diffusion channel follows the literature on the role of media information. I use 
original data regarding newspapers’ dates of circulation and approximate coverage.113 Three 
sources were consulted. The National Library newspaper collection provides information on 
the first and last dates of circulation as well as area of coverage – usually evident from the title, 
and in many cases, recorded in the newspaper. To complement these measures, legislators in 
office at the time of the data gathered were contacted and asked –usually their secretaries 
answered – which newspapers they usually read as well as what radio stations they listened to. 
Those stations were in turn contacted to ask which newspapers they usually reviewed for the 
news, which is a standard practice among radios. Finally, I consulted marketing information on 
regional newspapers that included counties of distribution.  
The newspaper media market in Chile can be classified into three groups: 1) major 
newspapers with national coverage; 2) regional newspapers with regional or subregional 
coverage; 3) minor news outlets with coverage circumscribed to a particular county. The major 
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strength of conservative interests in the district. Given its double meaning, I leave for future research the analysis 
of religious associations. 
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newspapers although national in scope, are overly concentrated on news related to the capital. 
Legislators from non-metropolitan regions are mentioned roughly half as much as legislators 
from the metropolitan region. Hence, for legislators representing non-metropolitan regions, 
regional and local newspapers are more relevant. Therefore, I have constructed a summary 
variable that takes into account two related variables. The first indicates the number of local 
newspapers whose area of coverage maps the district, following the literature on the 
importance of media market congruence with the district (Snyder and Stromberg, 2010). The 
second measure indicates the number of regional newspapers that span the complete region, 
and cover two or more districts within the region. The summary measure is equal to the 
number of local newspapers exclusive to the district, plus the number of regional newspapers 
that cover multiple districts divided by two.  
 
c) Measuring characteristics of the vote 
In order to assess legislators’ behavior, specially, voting behavior, it is important to 
consider the different dimensions along which votes may vary that are relevant to the present 
study114. 
The stages of the lawmaking process also determine differences among votes on the 
same draft bill. Upon first introduction to Congress, and after the report of the committee, the 
legislators from the chamber of origin must first vote the draft bill at a general level – that is 
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 I will address in further research votes regarding specific issues – or sectoral policies as they affect organized or 
unorganized interests.  There are two official sources. The first source of information is the National Library of 
Congress classification. Every draft bill is categorized under a specific subject, and some are categorized under 
several subjects. The second is the standing committee to which a draft bill is sent, as the lawmaking process 
requires that all draft bills are sent to a committee related to the policy area addressed by the law.   I also plan to 
study the effect of the closeness of the vote on abstentions, this information – following the American Politics 




whether they agree or not to legislate on the matters as proposed by the draft bill.  After a 
draft bill is approved for discussion, specific articles and amendments are voted in what is 
called votación en particular. Finally, votes differ in the quorum required for approval.    
Three sources of information are used for the characteristics of the vote: the Boletín de 
Sesiones, the Lower House webpage information on voting, and the website of the National 
Library of Congress for information regarding draft bills.115 For the 1998-2002 term, the 
information is recorded from the BS. For the following terms, information on voting is obtained 
through a Stata routing from the online records from the Lower House official website.116 For 
each vote, official information exists regarding the title of the draft bill under discussion, 
whether the vote was general or in particular, the required quorum for approval, the stage in 
the legislative process, and date of the vote.117   
When a draft bill is introduced to Congress for discussion and approval, it first goes to 
the pertinent permanent committee of the house in which it was introduced. The committee 
reports to the plenary, and the first vote is whether the plenary approves the discussion of the 
law – the idea to legislate – that is, whether the draft bill will be voted on in Congress. After a 
law is approved at this first stage, specific articles, executive amendments, and legislators’ 
proposals are voted on individually in what is called votación en particular. Once approved, 
specific articles and amendments are voted, although in cases when there are no proposed 
amendments or conflicts with specific articles, the draft bill is voted simultaneously in general 
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 The SIL website (“legislative assistant”) provides draft bill information with multiple search options. It was 
linked to the BCN webpage until 2011. Since then, only direct access has been possible. 
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 I thank Ernesto Calvo for his suggestion of extracting votes directly through Stata, and Juan Micozzi for 
generously sharing his do-files on web information extraction and helpful advice. 
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and in particular. In addition, international agreements are subject to a unique vote (votación 
única).  I have included all types of votes, both in general and in particular. 
 Another difference is the status of the law being voted, as constitutional reforms as 
well as changes in several legal bodies which have a constitutional status require 
supermajorities.118 And in some special cases, a specific article within a draft bill approved by 
simple majority requires a special quorum. In this dissertation, I only analyze votes that require 
simple majority to pass which represented the lion’s share of legislative voting: 64% during the 
1998-2002 legislative term and 76% during the following terms as supermajorities imply 
different incentives due to different coalition building efforts.119 
 
d) Measuring legislators’ behavior and characteristics 
 
The database excludes legislators who were divested permanently during office120. This 
information was obtained from official sources from the Lower House Secretary through the 
Auditoria de la Democracia project.  
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 The Chilean law system grants several laws a special constitutional status, which requires higher quorums for 
approval. And in some cases, certain articles within a law require special quorums. See Sierra and McClure (2010) 
for a recent discussion of the history and effects of such quorums as well as a review on the literature.  
119
 I plan to address these types of laws in future research. Some patterns are interesting; for example, the first 
passage votes on constitutional reforms are usually more contested than first passage votes on simple majority 
votes.    
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i) Public ideological position 
The concept of interest is based on public position revealed through roll call, not the 
true preferences of legislators or exogenous primitives (Clinton, 2012, quoting McCarthy and 
Merowitz, 2007). The underlying theory assumes that legislators’ vote choices may be 
attributed to an underlying ideological position, in particular, their desired public positions. 
Assuming Euclidean space; considering only two choices, either against or in favor; and 
probabilistic voting enables estimation of legislators’ revealed ideology or ideal points. Poole 
and Rosenthal’s (1997) seminal work on legislative voting generated estimates of ideal points 
through classical regression analysis. Recent work has applied Item Response Theory (IRT) 
models, common in psychometric tests such as adaptive GRE test from ETS121, to the analysis 
of roll call data. I follow these latter models and estimate legislators’ ideal points based on a 
one-dimensional IRT model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods122 and the R 
package “pscl” (Jackman; 2004; 2011).   
For the estimation, I use all votes which require simple majority, thus following 
previous work in excluding votes which require super majorities to pass. In addition, I only 
consider votes regarding laws, thus excluding elections of Lower House chairs and Lower 
House rules. It is important to note that for the legislative period under analysis, all non-
unanimous votes are recorded with the details of legislators’ vote choices, and hence, there 
are no selection issues regarding the strategic decision for nominal versus recorded votes.   
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 See research papers on measurement issues on http://www.ets.org/gre/research/measurement_issues 
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 This method is now common practice among scholars. Londregan (2000) and Aleman and Saeigh (2007) rely on 
these methods to estimate ideal points for Chilean legislators. For a debate between Bayesian versus classical 




Clinton (2012) highlights the importance of considering how the implications of the 
underlying theoretical model of voting translate into the statistical model. Most of the 
problems raised by Clinton (2012) are relevant when researchers seek to estimate legislators’ 
true preferences or exogenous primitives, which is not the case in this research project.   
Another concern is the potential of strategic position avoidance. In this project, 
strategic position avoidance is part of the model of legislative politics. The logic is that 
legislators take into account the potential impact on their perceived ideological positions when 
deciding whether to vote or not. And legislators act based on the belief that abstentions are 
not attributed an ideological content.123 Hence, legislators expect that the public will not take 
into account the selection problem due to strategic abstention. A greater concern is the effects 
on estimation due to agenda setting as Clinton (2012) shows in his simulations. I do not expect 
changes in agenda setting within legislative terms. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 test the effect of the transparency reform on legislators’ ideological 
positions as measured through roll call. Therefore, they require comparability across measured 
positions. For such comparison, I use a quasi-dynamic approach following Lindstad and Vander 
Wielen (2010) and Lindstadt, Slapin, and Vander Wielan (2010). This approach is more flexible 
than the fully dynamic model (Martin and Quinn, 2002) as it does not specify a functional form 
to the changes across time nor does it impose the same type of change for all legislators – two 
assumptions which are particularly unsuited for this project. I have divided the 2002-2006 
legislative term in two sub-periods of two years each: before and after the transparency 
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reform; the last year excludes the few votes cast after the election.124 Then, I estimate the ideal 
position of each sub-period for the same individual legislator as if they were of two different 
legislators. I hold constant the position of some legislators throughout the legislative periods to 
allow comparability of bill parameters across time. In order to account for possible variations 
of the estimates depending on the identity of the legislators that are held constant, I generated 
different combinations of legislators with assumed fixed ideology.125   
The party’s ideal point was estimated simultaneously based on a one-dimensional 
model, adding a fictitious legislator who represented the vote choice of each party. Votes in 
which there was not a clear position (i.e. legislators were equally divided), I coded as 
missing.126   
To further understand the evolution of ideal points during the term, I also estimated 
ideal positions for sub-periods of approximately four months each.127 Reducing the period of 
analysis does not come without a cost, since the number of available votes to estimate 
legislators’ ideal points is reduced, in some cases, drastically. In fact, the first two sub-periods 
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 In the 1998-2002, only 36 votes were cast after the elections (3% of all votes); in 2002-2006, 66 votes (3% of all 
votes). 
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 Based on substantive knowledge of the case, as a starting point, I have selected five legislators from the 
extreme parties of each coalition usually considered as ideologues. I have also selected five legislators from 
moderate parties on each coalition to check that the results are not driven by assumption of behavior of extreme 
legislators. I generated 150 alternatives: 100 paired from the 10x10 combination, and another 50 alternatives 
combining two legislators from each coalition. Hence, the first hundred assume as constant two legislators, and 
the next 50 held four legislators fixed.  
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 The section on party variables explains in detail how the position of the party was obtained. 
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reduced number of votes given to shorter time periods, I have estimated the ideal points with 50 different 
alternatives of fixed legislators including in each set legislators from the extreme of each coalition. These 50 
alternatives were constructed with legislators that exhibit smaller changes in their ideological position in the 




and the last before the election sum less than thirty votes each.128 These estimates are used 
for illustrative purposes as the accuracy of the estimates is smaller than that of the estimates 
over a two-year period.  
An important assumption of the estimated model is that legislators’ positions are 
explained by a single dimension, shared by the work of Aleman and Saiegh (2007). Research 
using survey questions on a broad range of issues find a main political division among Chilean 
Lower House members along the economic left-right, which also includes the authoritarian 
divide. But surveys uncover a second dimension, the conservative-liberal divide on so-called 
moral issues (Rozas, 2010). Therefore, I have assessed the fit of the one-dimensional model 
following Jackman (2001). Through inspection of the discrimination parameters of the votes, 
more than 85% is distinguishable from zero considering that the fifth and ninety-fifth 
percentile of the posterior for each discrimination parameter lie at the same side of zero. And 
94% are distinguishable from zero if one excludes extremely lopsided votes – those that have 
95% or more on the winning side.129 Consistent with previous work, this data suggests that the 
one-dimensional model provides a reasonable fit. In addition, I compared the estimates for the 
2004-2005 sub-period with the ones estimated by Aleman and Saiegh (2007).130 The rank 
ordering and estimates did not differ significantly.  
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 Appendix 3 provides the start and end date of each sub-period as well as the number of votes used to run the 
models. In addition, I present a summary measure of the standard error of the ideal point estimate (averaged 
over the set of estimates within legislators, and then over all legislators).  
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Lower House legislators may choose to abstain – a vote choice that is officially 
recorded. Abstentions thus are easily measurable. Legislators can also avoid taking a position 
by leaving the plenary at the time of the vote, or at the extreme, missing the session. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify from the data whether a vote was missed in order 
to avoid taking a position or for other reasons including lack of interest in the vote, or other 
pressing business, including meeting with constituencies (Jones, 2003). Therefore, I will only 
consider recorded abstentions as instances of position avoidance, but include missing the 
votes in the denominator used to calculate the proportion of abstentions, and votes against or 
with the party.   
 
iii) Party membership 
Information on party membership was obtained from the Lower House website and 
from the bibliographies of legislators available at the website of the National Library of 
Congress. This information was complemented with newspaper information when necessary. 
Legislators that run as independent within a sub-pact but where later affiliated with a party 
were considered as party members.  
 
iv) Party position 
In order to assess whether the legislator voted in line with the party, it is first necessary 
to identify the party position. Party position was determined following American politics 




analyses, independent legislators are excluded, and those legislators who changed their party 
affiliation during the legislative period are included in the party in which they were registered 
at the time of the vote.131 In addition, the vote choice of the chair of the party committee 
could be considered as the party choice, but there are two concerns. The first is of a practical 
nature. There are periods of time in which there is no information regarding who the chair of 
party committee was. The Lower House Secretary does not possess the information, and in a 
few cases, the BS does not report it either.132 And second, there are several instances when the 
party chair does not vote although present during the session. In those instances, it is not clear 
who takes the chair’s role.  Additionally, I still expect that in some votes, electoral incentives 
will compel the chair to take a different position than the party, or at least abstain or leave the 
floor, thus proving an invalid measure of party position. The data shows that there are few 
instances in which a chair casts a vote against the party; and since it is always possible to 
compute the majority side on each issue, I will use the first option to estimate the party’s 
position. 
 
v) Linkage strategy 
Empirical work on both clientelism and constituency service at the legislator level are 
usually based on extensive fieldwork and observation, thus focusing on a small number of 
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 For the first legislative period, the data was compiled from the BS; I thank Daniela Robledo for the data 
collection. For the following two legislative periods, the information was provided by the secretary of the Office of 
the Secretary of the Lower House and sent via personal communication on 11/9/2009 to Pilar Giannini, 




legislators or districts.133  In order to construct an indicator for all the districts, I rely on other 
sources of information.134 For the theoretical hypotheses, the linkage strategy works as a 
conditioning factor. Therefore, I will construct a proxy for the reliance of non-policy appeals for 
electoral gain. This proxy is related to the chosen linkage strategy, and the expectation is that it 
conditions legislators’ responses to the transparency reform.   
I use the requests made during Hora de Incidentes. As requests can only be made 
during sessions, I correct for differences in attendance by calculating the average number of 
requests made by the legislator per session attended.  I construct an indicator variable for 
reliance on non-policy appeals as the rationale is for a qualitative difference in behavior 
between legislators who do not follow a policy linkage strategy. The thresholds cannot be 
defined ex-ante since there are no precise limits or substantive reason to establish them. 
Therefore, I define groups relative to their pairs, that is, I focus on legislators who are at the 
end of the distribution of requests per session. In particular, legislators in the upper third of 
the distribution are considered as more likely to rely on non-policy appeals.    
 
vi) Retirement 
The decision to retire has an effect on how electoral incentives constrain the legislators. 
Unfortunately, I do not have information regarding the exact timing of the decision135 either by 
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 Including Giannini et al. (2011), research on legislators’ campaigns, though useful, focuses on a few districts 
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strategy of the candidate.  
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 Recent work analyzes correlates, such as trips to their district and district office staff (e.g. Crisp and Desposato, 
2004).   Unfortunately, these are not available for the 2002-2006 term.  
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the legislator or sometimes by the party during coalition negotiations. Thus, the indicator 
variable is a crude measurement and the extent of the measurement error is related to the 
differences in timing between the indicator and the actual decision.   
 
e) The cross-pressured legislator-vote pair 
I follow the spatial voting model assumption that the relevant feature of the legislator’s 
electoral constituency is the position of the voter targeted by the legislator. Hence, votes in 
which legislators are cross-pressured depend both on the vote’s characteristics and the 
legislator’s party position vis-à-vis the legislators’ targeted voter position.  
The relevant vote characteristic is the location of the cut-point between the two 
options of the vote as it separates the preferences over the vote. Legislators located at the cut-
point are indifferent between voting against or in favor whereas voters located at opposite 
sides of the cut-point have opposite preferences. Figure 1 illustrates the logic of this argument. 
The implicit assumption is that only electoral costs associated with voting with the party are 
relevant – this implies that either the party is cohesive and legislators’ policy preferences are 
close to their party or that the legislator does not care for policy per se.    
Figure 1 shows the ideological space is divided in three intervals defined the location of 
the legislator’ party and legislators targeted voter position. There is no conflict between the 
legislator’s party and voters in votes with cut-points located either in the NC-1 interval or NC-2, 
as in those sections both the party and the targeted voter are on the same side of the cut-
                                                                                                                                                                                          
for reelection.  But the decision is usually made before the deadline, and thus, behavior probably alters in 
anticipation. In addition, the timeframe is too small and there aren`t sufficient observations, especially since the 




point.  In votes with cut-points lying in the CP interval, the preferences of the targeted voter 
and the party are at odds as they prefer different outcomes of the vote. Hence, the legislator is 
cross-pressured on votes whose cut-points are in the CP interval. In this figure, the party is 
located to the right of the voter, but the logic is the same if the party is located to the left of 
the voter, as the relevant section CP. 
 





Measures on party position, cut-point, and targeted voter position are needed to 
classify each vote for each legislator as cross-pressured or not. In addition, these measures 
must be in the same scale. The location of the cut-point is obtained from the vote parameters 
of the estimated models. Specifically, the estimated cut-point corresponds in the one-
dimension IRT model to the difficulty parameter over the discrimination parameter (Clinton 
and Jackman, 2009). 136 
                                                          
136
 The model parameters do not vary significantly across the alternative legislators assumed to be fixed. The 
estimated cut-point is obtained from the mean estimates across the 150 alternatives.   
Legislator's                    
party 




Cutpoints to the left 
of both voter's and 
party's position
CP
Cutpoints to the right of 
voter's position and to 
the left of party's.
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Cutpoints to the right 





The measure of the party position is the estimate of the party position prior to the 
transparency reform, when electoral incentives are assumed to be weaker. The position of the 
targeted voter is the most challenging. To attribute a position, I consider three elements: first, 
the expectation from the incentives of the binominal rules that the targeted voter is the 
median voter of the truncated distribution of voter preference in the district; second, the 
percent of centrist registered voters in the district, as it influences the location of the median 
voter of the truncated distribution; and third, as discussed above, whether the legislator is 
likely to face a strong out-of-pact extremist candidate. For measurement purposes, and 
following the logic for the distinction of legislators who are likely to moderate, I divide the 
districts in two groups: districts with a proportion of moderate registered voters higher than 
the median, and those with a proportion of moderate registered voters lower than the 
median. From these three elements, I impute the position of the targeted voter to each 
legislator. Given the arbitrary imputation, I have considered alternative possible thresholds 
and estimate them for each model.137 The main difference between the different imputed 
positions is that CP1 attributes a more extreme electorally induced position than the others,138 
whereas CP2 assumes a greater difference between moderate districts and not moderate 
districts than CP3.   
 
 
                                                          
137
 I plan to estimate the models on a larger set of alternatives of imputed voter position for robustness.  
138
 The first set imputes positions of .8 and .4 for legislators from the rightist coalition, and -.8 and -.4 for those of 
the leftist coalition. Legislators from districts with above the median centrist voters are attributed with the more 




2. Empirical strategy 
This research relies on observational data to analyze the effect of transparency on 
legislators’ voting behavior. The transparency reform under study did not involve campaigns or 
other specific efforts on diffusion. Thus, it is closer to empirical research that uses variation in 
media coverage to identify the effect of greater information on legislators’ behavior. But it 
differs from those designs given the existence of a shock in the information environment: 
transparency reform. This discrete change enables a better identification of the role of 
information as its effects depend on conditioning factors in specific ways which are amenable 
to empirical testing.   
 
a) Identification strategy 
Defining transparency reform as the treatment and following Rubin’s causal model, a 
central challenge is to define legislators serving under no transparency who are similar to 
legislators under transparency, that is, legislators who can be considered as controls for 
legislators after the transparency reform. As the reform was implemented in the middle of the 
2002-2006 legislative term, it is possible to compare the behavior of the same legislators 
before and after the reform and thus control for unobserved characteristics of the legislators. 
But this strategy does not take into account possible unobservable factors that occur 
simultaneously with the transparency reform and may also influence legislators’ behavior. 
Methods used to address this issue such as the differences-in-difference approach are not 





Given these difficulties, I use variance on diffusion channels as an identification 
strategy. The logic is that the effect of transparency is conditional to the spread of the newly 
available information to voters. Therefore, similar legislators who differ only in the presence or 
absence of diffusion channels in their districts should exhibit a different behavior, and that 
difference in behavior should be observed only after the transparency reform.   
Furthermore, the measure of participation in voluntary associations is for the year 
before the transparency reform took place, and it is unlikely that the rate either changes 
dramatically from one year to the next or that the change is influenced by the transparency 
reform. There may be unobserved differences in districts which result in the fact that some of 
them exhibit higher rates of participation in voluntary associations than others. These are 
taken into account by controlling for such factors since the key variable is the interaction 
between the post-reform sub-period and the diffusion channel. The same logic applies to 
internet diffusion.139   
Factors that influence the relevance of the electoral incentive on voting behavior are also 
expected to condition the effect of the transparency reform. First, retiring should dampen the 
effects as the legislators are no longer reelection oriented.  Second, the linkage strategy 
influences the benefits accrued to the legislators by position taking. Indeed, as H2 expects, 
legislators who follow a non-programmatic linkage strategy should not alter their behavior 
since their electoral success does not depend on programmatic responsiveness which is now 
easier to monitor by voters. Second, only out-of-step legislators following a programmatic 
                                                          
139
 The measure of internet penetration is taken from the same survey used to obtain the measure of 
participation. It has the advantage that it incorporates the use of internet and thus, it may not match exactly with 




linkage strategy are expected to alter their voting behavior in response to the transparency 
reform. Third, the transparency reform should alter an individual legislator’s decision to vote 
only when cross-pressured.    
 
b) Statistical models 
i) Outcome variable: position taking 
The legislators’ revealed position is estimated from roll call data. As H1 predicts 
incentives for moderation, I use the absolute value of the estimated ideal point. Hence, a 
negative coefficient of the explanatory variable indicates a moderating effect. For each 
legislator, I have two observations: an estimate for the two years before the reform and an 
estimate for the two years after the reform. I estimate the effect of the reform through OLS 
models with standard errors clustered by legislators for which I include an indicator variable 
for the post-reform sub-period. As explained above, I have constructed 150 estimates relying 
on different combinations of legislators who are assumed to maintain their position during the 
whole term.  Therefore, each of the specifications is estimated using the different alternatives. 
I have estimated the model using the mean of the estimated ideal points over all alternatives.   
I estimate the effect of the reform using different model specifications.  In all of them, I 
include the post-reform indicator variable as well as two controls that may affect legislators’ 
behavior: freshman status and whether the legislator retired after the term. As a key 
identification strategy works through the diffusion channels, I include their interaction with the 
post-reform indicator. The linkage strategy is another factor that conditions the effect of the 




samples, and then complete a model in the full sample.  
ii) Outcome variable: abstain, vote against, or as the party 
Legislators are expected to be less likely to vote as their party and more likely to vote 
against or abstain after the transparency reform. To test the hypotheses, I constructed a 
database at the legislator- vote level, thus the structure of the data is non-hierarchical 
multilevel: observations are nested on legislators and on votes. This structure involves complex 
estimation issues. As the predictions address the propensity to vote against, in favor, or 
abstain, I have created aggregate measures for each legislator: the proportion of votes in 
which the legislators voted as his party, the proportion of votes in which the legislator voted 
against his party, the proportion of votes in which the legislator abstained over the total of 
votes in which the legislators was present.  Each of these was estimated for each sub-period, 
before and after the reform, as well as whether the legislator is or is not cross-pressured. 
Hence, there are four observations per legislator. These simple models are estimated through 




3. Hypotheses summary and empirical expectations 
 
H1: Position taking through revealed ideology 
For out-of-step legislators who follow programmatic linkage strategy based on 
spatial competition: 
i) The coefficient on the post-reform variable is negative. 
ii) The interaction between diffusion channels and the post-reform variable is 
negative. 
 
H2: Conditional effect of linkage strategy   
For legislators who follow non-programmatic linkage strategies: 
i) The coefficient on the post-reform variable does not have a statistically 
significant effect. 
ii) The interaction between diffusion channels and the post-reform variable does 
not have a statistically significant effect.  
 
H3a: Position taking and decision to vote as the party  
For legislators who follow programmatic linkage strategy based on spatial 
competition: 
i) The marginal effect of the post-reform variable on cross-pressured votes is 
negative. 
ii) The marginal effect of the post-reform variable on non-cross-pressured votes 





H3b: Position taking and decision to vote against the party 
For legislators who follow programmatic linkage strategy based on spatial 
competition: 
i) The marginal effect of the post-reform variable on cross-pressured votes is 
positive. 
ii) The marginal effect of the post-reform variable on non-cross-pressured votes 
is not statistically significant.   
 
H4: Position avoidance 
For legislators who follow programmatic linkage strategy based on spatial 
competition: 
i) The marginal effect of the post-reform variable on cross-pressured votes is 
positive. 
ii) The marginal effect of the post-reform variable on non-cross-pressured votes 






CHAPTER 6: POSITION TAKING AND POSITION AVOIDANCE 
 
1. H1 and H2: Effects on revealed ideology as measured through roll call 
 
This section tests hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2), which predict changes in the 
revealed ideological position of legislators due to the transparency reform. H1 expects out-of-
step legislators to moderate their ideological positions after the transparency reform; whereas 
H2 expects that legislators that do not follow a policy linkage strategy will not change their 
voting behavior. Before turning to the results of multivariate analyses, the figures below 
provide a visual assessment of the change in ideological position after the transparency 
reform. Figure 2 shows the distribution of ideal points’ absolute value for each sub-period: 
before and after the transparency reform considering all legislators. Figure 4 presents the 
distribution for each group of legislators.   
 


































































The figures above show patterns consistent with H1 and H2. The median moves 
towards the center after the reform considering all legislators as well as each subgroup of 
legislators. And the change is larger for those legislators that are expected to be most affected 
by the reform as they follow a policy linkage strategy and their electorally induced position is 
expected to be more moderate than their non-electorally induced position. But in order to 
derive casual claims, further analyses are needed.  
Tables 1 through 4 present the results for multivariate regressions as the identification 
strategy relies on a variation of diffusion channels to condition the effect of the transparency 
reform. I have also included as controls retirement and freshman status. The mechanism under 
study is the effect of strengthened electoral incentives, and since retiring legislators are by 
definition not affected, it is necessary to account for these different incentives. As argued in 
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the decision nor selection biases. Nevertheless, as the results below confirm, it conditions 
behavior. Freshman status is included as a control for possible difference due to selection in 
the previous election. The first specification (M1) includes only the post-reform dummy. M2 
includes all explanatory variables without interactions, and M3 through M7 include one 
interaction at a time.   Table 1 presents the results on the complete sample of legislators that 
were in office during the term. Then, as H1 and H2 expect different behaviors depending on 
linkage strategy, I run separate regressions for each legislator group: out-of-step legislators 
who face moderating incentives, legislators who follow non-programmatic linkage strategies, 
and a final group of legislators for whom I do not have clear predictions regarding the direction 







Table 1: Results for all legislators 
  
ALL LEGISLATORS 
DV: absolute value of estimated ideal points 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
Post-reform 
-0.161*** -0.161*** -0.167 -0.153*** -0.149*** -0.166*** -0.167*** 
(-7.314) (-7.233) (-1.438) (-3.115) (-5.386) (-7.070) (-6.079) 
% Civic association 
 
-0.607* -0.614* -0.607* -0.607* -0.607* -0.607* 
 
(-1.905) (-1.698) (-1.901) (-1.901) (-1.901) (-1.901) 
Post-reform * % Civic 
associations   
0.0157 
    
  
(0.0506) 




-0.401 -0.401 -0.376 -0.401 -0.401 -0.401 
 
(-1.536) (-1.533) (-1.105) (-1.533) (-1.533) (-1.533) 
Post-reform * % Internet 
for info. & comm.    
-0.049 
   
   
(-0.203) 
   
Local newspapers 
 
-0.0511 -0.0511 -0.0511 -0.0321 -0.0511 -0.0511 
 
(-1.029) (-1.026) (-1.026) (-0.585) (-1.026) (-1.026) 
Post-reform* Local 
newspapers     
-0.0381 
  
    
(-1.038) 
  
Retiring after the term 
 
-0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.297*** -0.257*** 
 
(-3.141) (-3.134) (-3.134) (-3.134) (-3.293) (-3.134) 
Post-reform* Retiring 
after the term      
0.0803* 
 





0.138** 0.138** 0.138** 0.138** 0.138** 0.129* 
 
(2.304) (2.299) (2.299) (2.299) (2.299) (1.882) 
Post-reform* Freshman  
      
0.018 
      
0.382 
Constant 
1.021*** 1.312*** 1.315*** 1.307*** 1.305*** 1.314*** 1.315*** 
(32.4) (8.395) (7.978) (8.06) (8.348) (8.389) (8.446) 
Number of legislators 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
R-squared 0.06 0.163 0.163 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 
 
Negative coefficient of post-reform is consistent with H1.  
 Identification strategy relying on interaction with diffusion channels is not supported by the results as 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Positive coefficient of interaction term between retirement and post-reform is consistent with a strengthening 
of the electoral incentive post-reform. 
 
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+







The results for all legislators in Table 1 show that the pattern observed in Figure 2 holds 
controlling for the explanatory variables: the post-reform variable has the expected negative 
sign and is statistically significant in all but one of the models. But none of the interactions with 
the diffusion channels are statistically significant. Furthermore, the inclusion of the interaction 
term for the percent in civic associations increases the standard deviation of the post-reform 
coefficient, and thus the coefficient is no longer significant at conventional levels. The 
coefficient on the interaction between retiring and post-reform is consistent with a 
strengthening of electoral incentives toward moderation after the transparency reform.   
presents the results on the sub-sample of out-of-step legislators. The post-reform 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant across all but one specification for out-of-step 
legislators. But as in the complete sample of legislators, the interaction terms between the 
diffusion channels and the post-reform variable are not statistically significant. As the 
identification strategy relied on a variation of diffusion channels, the negative coefficient on 
post-reform does not necessarily imply support for the causal mechanisms. But other findings 
provide some support. The first is the positive coefficient of the interaction between retiring 
legislators and post-reform. Consistent with an increase in the electoral incentives to moderate 








Table 2: Results for out-of-step legislators 
 
  
Out of Step legislators 
DV: absolute value of estimated ideal points 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
Post-reform 
-0.22*** -0.220*** -0.143 -0.209*** -0.213*** -0.228*** -0.222*** 
(-6.186) (-6.041) (-0.847) (-2.851) (-4.743) (-5.863) (-5.096) 
% Civic associations 
 
-0.675 -0.574 -0.675 -0.675 -0.675 -0.675 
 
(-1.631) (-1.219) (-1.623) (-1.623) (-1.623) (-1.623) 
Post-reform * % Civic 
associations 
    -0.202         
 
  (-0.436)         
 % Internet for information 
& communication 
  -0.492 -0.492 -0.464 -0.492 -0.492 -0.492 
  (-1.449) (-1.442) (-1.037) (-1.442) (-1.442) (-1.442) 
Post-reform * % Internet 
for info. & comm.  
    -0.057       
      (-0.174)       
Local newspapers 
 
-0.0825 -0.0825 -0.0825 -0.0713 -0.0825 -0.0825 
 
(-1.217) (-1.212) (-1.212) (-0.988) (-1.212) (-1.212) 
Post-reform* Local 
newspapers 
        -0.0223     
        (-0.421)     
Retiring after the term 
 
-0.292** -0.292** -0.292** -0.292** -0.350*** -0.292** 
 
(-2.328) (-2.317) (-2.317) (-2.317) (-2.743) (-2.317) 
Post-reform* Retiring after 
the term 
          0.116*   
          (1.745)   
Freshman 
 
0.228** 0.228** 0.228** 0.228** 0.228** 0.224** 
 
(2.395) (2.383) (2.383) (2.383) (2.383) (2.071) 
Post-reform* Freshman  
            0.00776 
            (0.097) 
Constant 
1.132*** 1.458*** 1.420*** 1.453*** 1.455*** 1.462*** 1.459*** 
(23.09) (6.862) (6.419) (6.551) (6.823) (6.849) (6.881) 
Number of legislators 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.091 0.261 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.263 0.261 
 
Negative coefficient of post-reform is consistent with H1.  
 Identification strategy relying on interaction with diffusion channels is not supported by the results as 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Positive coefficient of interaction term between retirement and post-reform is consistent with a 
strengthening of the electoral incentive post-reform. 
 
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+






Table 3 presents the results for the subsample of legislators that do not follow a policy 
linkage strategy. 
 
Table 3: Results for legislators that do not follow a policy linkage strategy 
 
 
Legislators who do not follow a policy linkage strategy 
DV: absolute value of estimated ideal points 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
Post-reform 
-0.120*** -0.120*** -0.383* -0.106* -0.0954** -0.125*** -0.129** 
(-3.239) (-3.114) (-1.797) (-1.848) (-2.190) (-3.061) (-2.239) 
% Civic associations 
 
-1.021** -1.346** -1.021** -1.021** -1.021** -1.021** 
 
(-2.534) (-2.504) (-2.514) (-2.514) (-2.514) (-2.514) 
Post-reform * % Civic 
associations 
    0.651         
 
  (1.225)         
% Internet for information 
& communication 
  -0.624* -0.624 -0.584 -0.624 -0.624 -0.624 
  (-1.699) (-1.685) (-1.428) (-1.685) (-1.685) (-1.685) 
Post-reform * % Internet 
for info. & comm.  
    -0.0798       
      (-0.325)       
Local newspapers 
 
-0.062 -0.062 -0.062 -0.0228 -0.062 -0.062 
 
(-0.723) (-0.717) (-0.717) (-0.227) (-0.717) (-0.717) 
Post-reform* Local 
newspapers 
        -0.0786     
        (-1.385)     
Retiring after the term 
 
-0.367*** -0.367*** -0.367*** -0.367*** -0.414*** -0.367*** 
 
(-4.129) (-4.096) (-4.096) (-4.096) (-3.874) (-4.096) 
Post-reform* Retiring after 
the term 
          0.0932*   
          (1.707)   
Freshman 
 
0.0214 0.0214 0.0214 0.0214 0.0214 0.0113 
 
(0.243) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.108) 
Post-reform* Freshman  
            0.0201 
            -0.266 
Constant 
0.971*** 1.519*** 1.651*** 1.512*** 1.507*** 1.522*** 1.524*** 
(18.55) (7.684) (6.969) (7.477) (7.505) (7.62) (7.729) 
Number of legislators 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
R-squared 0.046 0.222 0.229 0.222 0.227 0.223 0.222 
  
The negative coefficient of post-reform is not consistent with H2.  
The smaller post-reform coefficient in this group is consistent with a weaker version of H2. 
The positive coefficient of the interaction term between retirement and post-reform is 
consistent with a strengthening of the electoral incentive post-reform.  
 
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+





By H2, I expect that legislators who did not follow a programmatic linkage strategy did 
not alter their ideological positions after the transparency reform. The coefficient on the post-
reform variable is not consistent with this hypothesis as it is negative and statistically 
significant and substantively relevant. But the coefficient is roughly half the size of the one 
estimated on the group of out-of-step legislators. Hence, the exact predictions of H2 are not 
supported by the data, but the pattern of the results shows that out-of-step legislators exhibit 
a larger response to the post-reform variable. The inclusion of the interaction between post-
reform and voluntary associations has a large effect on the estimated coefficient of the post-
reform variable. Although the interaction term is not statistically significant, the post-reform 
coefficient increases substantively.140 Nevertheless, considering the overall effect of the post-
reform variables at the mean of all the other explanatory variables shows that this effect is not 
substantive as the marginal effect is similar across specifications. The interaction term 
between retirement and post-reform goes in the expected direction if retirement dampens the 
electoral incentive to moderate.  
Table 4 below shows the results for the group of legislators for whom I do not have a 
clear expectation regarding the direction of their electoral incentives as the location of the 
target voters’ position vis-à-vis the legislator’s pre-reform position cannot be unambiguously 
ascertained (as argued in Chapter 5). The variable indicating retirement is not included as there 
are no retiring legislators in this group. The effect of the post-reform variables is smaller, and 
                                                          
140
 I have conducted simple tests and made graphs to understand the underlying reason for this change, but have 




loses statistical significance when including interactions for any of the diffusion channels. The 
change is greater with the inclusion of the civic associations’ diffusion channel.  
 




DV: absolute value of estimated ideal points 
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M7 
Post-reform 
-0.0926** -0.0926** -0.0895 -0.145 -0.0836 -0.100** 
(-2.669) (-2.560) (-0.526) (-1.613) (-1.586) (-2.531) 
% Civic associations 
 
-0.341 -0.337 -0.341 -0.341 -0.341 
 
(-0.560) (-0.621) (-0.554) (-0.554) (-0.554) 
Post-reform * % Civic 
associations 
    -0.00853       
 
  (-0.0199)       
% Internet for information & 
communication 
  0.0918 0.0918 -0.0511 0.0918 0.0918 
  (0.155) (0.153) (-0.0929) (0.153) (0.153) 
Post-reform * % Internet for 
info. & comm.  
    0.286     
      (0.66)     
Local newspapers 
 
0.0558 0.0558 0.0558 0.0681 0.0558 
 
(0.411) (0.406) (0.406) (0.515) (0.406) 
Post-reform* Local 
newspapers 
        -0.0248   
        (-0.295)   
Freshman 
 
0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 0.00152 
 
(0.133) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.0115) 
Post-reform* Freshman  
          0.0328 
          (0.343) 
Constant 
0.854*** 0.939*** 0.937*** 0.965*** 0.934*** 0.943*** 
(18.29) (3.533) (3.831) (3.608) (3.467) (3.521) 
Number of legislators 26 26 26 26 26 26 
R-squared 0.032 0.056 0.056 0.059 0.057 0.057 
 
There are not clear expectations for this group as the location of the targeted voters vis-à-vis 
the legislators’ pre-reform position cannot be unambiguously derived.    
The coefficient of post-reform is not robust with the inclusion of an interaction term with 
diffusion channels.  
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+






The results presented above, both in the complete sample of legislators and in each 
group, do not support the expectations for the identification strategy presented in section 2 of 
Chapter 5 as the interaction term between the post-reform and diffusion channel is not 
statistically significant. In order to derive some conclusions, I draw from other findings that are 
consistent with a strengthening of the electoral incentive due to the transparency reform. 
First, the impact of retiring as shown in Table 1 through Table 3, and the larger effects on out-
of-step legislators than among those that do not follow a policy linkage strategy. In order to 
estimate the magnitude and statistical significance of the differences in the coefficients, I 
estimate M2 in the full sample adding as an explanatory variable the type of legislators and its 
interaction with the post-reform variable. The type of legislator is included as a categorical 
variable with out-of-step legislators as the base category. The results in Table 5 confirm the 
findings discussed above.  The moderating effect of the reform is smaller for legislators who do 















Ambiguous expectations category 
-0.296*** 
(-4.451) 
Post-reform * Non-policy category 
0.100* 
(1.936) 




% Civic associations 
-0.629** 
(-2.164) 
















Number of legislators 115 
R-squared 0.251 
  
Results support H1 & H2:  The moderating effect of the 
post-reform variable is greater for out-of-step legislators – the 
difference is statistically significant at 10% 
   Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
 
But these effects are also consistent with an alternate explanation for the 
strengthening of the electoral incentive in the last two years:  the electoral cycle, and in 
particular, the timing of the vote as discussed in Chapter 3.  As it is difficult to distinguish 
between both in the 2002-2006 term, I estimate the same regressions, but on the legislators 
who were in office during the 1998-2002 term. If the negative effect is due to the so-called 




should also be negative. Table 6 shows the results for M2 estimated on the complete sample of 
legislators in office in the 1998-2002 term as well as for each of the sub-groups.  











0.322*** 0.332*** 0.295*** 0.315*** 
(9.911) (6.042) (5.34) (4.844) 
% Civic associations 
-0.24 -0.704 0.621 0.0411 
(-0.979) (-1.612) -1.572 -0.236 
% Internet for information & 
communication 
0.389 0.259 1.018 -0.072 
(1.065) (0.453) (1.664) (-0.370) 
Local newspapers 
-0.00799 0.0699 0.00533 -0.0855* 
(-0.144) (0.585) (0.0565) (-1.931) 
Retire 
-0.102 -0.0874 -0.125 -0.0122 
(-1.151) (-0.457) (-1.108) (-0.428) 
Freshman 
0.00591 -0.00861 0.0961 -0.0547 
(0.0998) (-0.0731) (1.129) (-1.049) 
Constant 
0.812*** 1.118*** 0.119 0.740*** 
(4.268) (3.698) (0.346) (6.445) 
Number of legislators 118 53 37 28 
R-squared 0.215 0.184 0.32 0.412 
 
Post-reform has the opposite sign than in the reform term: legislators are more 
likely to move towards extreme positions. 
 
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
 
The results for all groups are similar between them and opposite to the ones observed 
for the 2002-2006 term: the estimated coefficients for the last two years are positive and 
statistically significant. Hence, this data does not support the existence of a recency bias in the 





To further understand the evolution of ideal points during the term, I present the 
distributions of ideal points estimated in shorter sub-periods of approximately four months 
each.141 The figures are for illustrative purposes as the standard error of the ideal point’s 
estimates is greater than that of the estimates over a two-year period. Since retirement affects 
incentives, I do not include legislators that retire.  
 
Figure 4: Out-of-step legislators 
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Note: Includes only legislators running for reelection
by 4 month subperiod




Figure 5: Legislators who follow non-policy linkage strategy 
Ideal point distribution by 4-month periods  
 
 
Figure 6: Legislators for whom there are no clear expectations 




















































Note: Includes only legislators running for reelection
by 4 month subperiod

















































by 4 month subperiod




Figure 4 through Figure 6 show a more nuanced picture than the one observe in Figure 3. 
Out-of-step legislator pattern of ideal points is consistent with the conclusions drawn above. 
These legislators moderate their ideological positions in the four-month period that the reform 
was implemented as well as exhibit similar distributions in the following sub-periods. 
Furthermore, the distribution of ideal points shows an additional moderation in the last sub-
period of 2005, the sub-period when the election takes place, which is consisted with electoral 
incentives towards moderation. Non-policy legislators exhibit to-and-fro movements in their 
ideological positions in the period before the reform.  Although they do not exhibit more 
moderate positions in the four-month period of the reform, there distributions of ideal points 
are similar after the reform and lower than in the previous period. Legislators for which I do 
not have clear expectations do not exhibit a clear pattern.  In addition, these figures show that 
all legislators in their first four months in office after election present a more moderate stance 
than during the subsequent sub-periods. And all legislators move towards more extreme 
positions in the second four-month period of 2003. As these movements are robust to 
different sets of legislators held fixed, further work is needed to understand those systematic 






2. H3 and H4: Effects on position avoidance 
 
This section presents the results on the tests for H3 and H4. A central factor is whether 
the legislator is cross-pressured or not on a specific vote: when the legislator’s targeted voter’s 
position and his party’s position are on opposite sides of the vote cut-point, the legislator is 
cross-pressured. As discussed in the measurement section, the identification of cross-
pressured votes relies on the values attributed to the party and targeted voters’ positions. 
Therefore, I run the regression on three different sets of voters’ positions as I attribute the 
party position to its estimated position during the first term.142  
The tables below show the results for regression on three dependent variables: 
proportion of votes in which legislators voted with their party, proportion of votes in which the 
legislators voted against their party, and proportion of votes in which the legislators 
abstained.143 Each of these proportions is estimated for each sub-period – before and after the 
reform – and within the sub-period, for cross-pressured and non-cross-pressured votes.144 
 
Table 7 through Table 9 present the results for the specification that includes all the 
                                                          
142
 I expect that the errors in attribution of the party position run against finding an impact of the transparency 
reform as parties either exhibited a similar position during both terms or adopted more moderate positions after 
the reform. Hence, if I wrongly identified a legislator-vote pair as cross-pressured votes, the effect would be an 
attenuation of the effect of the interaction effect between cross-pressured and the reform.  
143
 I have estimated the regressions on the proportion of missed votes, but do not include them in this section as 
the hypotheses do not directly address them. Nevertheless, I include them in Appendix 2, and expect to expand 
my study to theorize regarding missed votes and the effects of the transparency reform.  
144
 I have thus four observations per legislator, although in a few cases, there are no observations for one of the 




explanatory variables145 plus the interaction between post-reform and cross-pressuring. For 
clarity of presentation, I only present the regression for results for these variables, excluding 
diffusion channels and its interactions as they are not statistically significant, as well as both 
control variables – the complete regression results are in Appendix 2. For the same reason, the 
tables in the text present the results for the complete sample of legislators as well for two of 
the sub-groups: out-of-step legislators and those legislators who do not follow a policy linkage 
strategy.  The results for the category of legislators for whom I do not have clear expectations 
is included in the Appendix 2.  
The interaction effects between post-reform and diffusion channels are not statistically 
significant, except in one instance: the percent of internet users for the proportion of 
abstentions, which will be discussed at the end of this section. Hence, as in the case of the 
previous hypotheses, the lack of statistical significance of the interaction terms required for 
the identification strategy implies that the results for the indicator variables must be taken 
with caution. In addition, as can be seen in Appendix 2, the inclusion of the interaction 
between percent in civic associations and post-reform status leads to a decrease in the 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficient, although the overall effect of the post-
reform indicators remains statistically significant. As discussed below, and following the same 
logic as the one presented in the discussion of the H1 and H2 tests, the conditional effect of 
other variables, such as retirement, and in this case, the cross-pressured indicator point 
towards an increase in electoral incentives. 
                                                          
145
 Post-reform indicator, cross-pressured indicator, percent of members of civic associations within the district, 
percent of internet users for communication and information within the district, local newspapers in the district, 





Table 7: Results of main variables on the proportion of votes with the party 
 
 
PROPORTION OF VOTES AS THE PARTY 
 
ALL LEGISLATORS OUT-OF-STEP NON-POLICY 
 
M2 M2 M2 
 
CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 
Post-reform 







(-3.029) (-2.83) (-2.802) (-2.149) (-1.933) (-1.921) (-1.569) (-1.55) (-1.565) 
Cross-pressured 
-0.224*** -0.125*** -0.138*** -0.209*** -0.144*** -0.112*** -0.266*** -0.129*** -0.149*** 
(-7.079) (-6.8) (-6.346) (-4.451) (-5.121) (-4.594) (-3.987) (-3.856) (-5.033) 
Post-reform * cross-
pressured 
0.0505 -0.0102 -0.0343 0.0164 -0.0109 -0.0432 0.0732 0.00553 -0.0142 
(1.392) (-0.45) (-1.38) (0.322) (-0.333) (-1.51) (0.868) (0.117) (-0.3) 
 
H3a is not supported by the results as the interaction term is not statistically significant. 
Legislators are less likely to support their party in all types of votes after the transparency reform; as well 
on cross-pressured votes.  
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
After the transparency reform, legislators are less likely to vote with their party – and 
the coefficients are similar when considering the complete sample or sub-groups of legislators, 
although the coefficients are statistically significant at 10% for out-of-step legislators, for those 
who do not follow a policy linkage strategy, they are at the 15% level. But the change in 
behavior after the transparency reform is not statistically different between cross-pressured 
and non-cross-pressured votes the post-reform variable does not affect cross-pressured votes. 
The results thus do not support H3a as it implied a negative interaction between the post-






Table 8: Results of main variables on the proportion of votes against the party 
 
 
PROPORTION OF VOTES AGAINST THE PARTY 
 
ALL LEGISLATORS OUT-OF-STEP NON-POLICY 
  M2 M2 M2 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 
Post-reform 




 0.00385 0.0029 0.0038 0.00255 




















(4.912) (5.777) (4.547) (2.464) (3.982) (4.31) (3.507) (3.578) (4.037) 
Post-reform * cross-
pressured 
-0.0183 0.0195 0.0249 0.0363 0.0223 0.0491** -0.0816
+
 -0.0115 0.00385 
(-0.725) (1.207) (1.191) (0.986) (0.947) (2.064) (-1.642) (-0.387) (0.136) 
 
Legislators exhibit a higher proportion of votes against their party when cross-pressured. 
There is only weak support for H3b as only one of the interaction terms reaches statistical significance 
among out-of-step legislators. 
 
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
Although the sign of the post-reform coefficient is in the expected direction, only 
among out-of-step legislators does the post-reform variable have a statistically significant 
effect – although only at 15%. Furthermore, for this group of legislators the interaction effect 
only reaches statistical significance for the last sets of imputed positions (CP3), although their 
coefficient under all sets goes in the expected direction. Hence, these results provide weak 
support for H3b, as well for H2. As expected, both before and after the reform, legislators are 






Table 9: Results of main variables for the proportion of abstentions 
 
 
PROPORTION OF ABSTENTIONS 
 
ALL LEGISLATORS OUT-OF-STEP NON-POLICY 
 
M2 M2 M2 
 
CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 
Post-reform 
0.0052**
* 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.0080** 0.0075** 0.0073** 0.0039 0.00457 0.00448 
(2.713) (2.722) (2.692) (2.352) (2.318) (2.303) (1.279) (1.165) (1.37) 
Cross-pressured 
0.018*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.0131* 0.017*** 0.0117** 0.0326** 0.0127
+
 0.0174** 
(2.827) (4.014) (2.891) (1.767) (2.883) (2.454) (2.072) (1.651) (2.194) 
Post-reform * 
cross-pressured 
0.050*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.059*** 0.043*** 0.034** 0.0629** 0.0095 0.0152 
(3.541) (2.007) (2.852) (2.912) (2.803) (2.657) (2.136) (0.702) (1.093) 
 
There is support for H4 as the interaction term is positive and statistically significant for out-of-step 
legislators. 
There is also some support for H2 as the interaction among non-policy legislators is only statistically 
significant under one CP combination. 
.  
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
Legislators are more likely to abstain after the transparency reform, and consistent with 
H4, more likely on cross-pressured votes after the transparency reform. Among out-of-step 
legislators, the effect is robust across different sets of imputed positions as among all 
legislators. The interaction term is not robust for legislators that do not follow a policy linkage 
strategy, which lends some support for a differential effect among legislators that follow 
different linkage strategies (H2). To better ascertain whether the effect is different depending 
on legislator type, Table 10 presents the results of a model including the categorical variable of 
legislator type, interacting with both post-reform and cross-pressured vote status for each of 





Table 10: Regression including categorical variable of legislator type 
 
 
DV: PROP VOTE AS PARTY DV: PROP VOTE AGAINST PARTY DV: PROP ABSTAINED 
 
CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 
Post-reform 




 0.00385 0.00797** 0.00751** 0.00734** 
(-2.161) (-1.946) (-1.932) (1.593) (1.594) (1.264) (2.365) (2.332) (2.316) 
Cross-pressured 
-0.209*** -0.146*** -0.114*** 0.0781** 0.0560*** 0.0526*** 0.0130* 0.0158*** 0.0114** 





 0.0367 0.0223 0.0491** 0.0598*** 0.0431*** 0.0342*** 






 0.0104** 0.00851* 0.00118 0.000931 -0.000156 
(1.402) (1.253) (1.589) (1.547) (2.213) (1.739) (0.244) (0.227) (-0.0372) 
Ambiguous expectations 
0.0196 0.0177 0.0139 0.0115* 0.0107* 0.0148** -0.00493 -0.00449
+
 -0.00323 
(0.852) (0.726) (0.576) (1.979) (1.705) (2.221) (-1.291) (-1.577) (-1.036) 
Post-reform * Non-policy 
0.000632 -0.00208 -0.00195 -0.00206 -0.000834 -0.00130 -0.00406 -0.00294 -0.00286 
(0.0296) (-0.0980) (-0.0915) (-0.327) (-0.137) (-0.210) (-0.904) (-0.587) (-0.636) 
Post reform * Amb. 
expectations 
-0.000468 -0.00188 0.000573 -0.00803* -0.00885
+
 -0.00955* -0.00695* -0.00560 -0.00652
+
 
(-0.0189) (-0.0761) (0.0237) (-1.840) (-1.568) (-1.742) (-1.682) (-1.415) (-1.644) 
Cross-pressured * Non-
policy 
-0.0597 0.0190 -0.0364 0.0791 0.00317
+
 0.0194 0.0188 -0.00308 0.00580 
(-0.749) (0.457) (-0.976) (1.444) (0.150) (0.931) (1.069) (-0.307) (0.628) 
Cross-pressured * 
Ambiguous expectations 
0.0129 0.0653 -0.0716 0.0370 -0.0196 0.120 -0.00505 0.00865 -0.0122
+
 
(0.184) (1.410) (-0.812) (0.692) (-0.838) (1.433) (-0.446) (0.792) (-1.177) 
Post-reform * cross-
pressured * Non-policy 
0.0571 0.0165 0.0290 -0.118* -0.0338 -0.0452 0.00311 -0.0336* -0.0190 
(0.592) (0.292) (0.535) (-1.948) (-0.907) (-1.244) (0.0887) (-1.662) (-1.017) 
Post-reform * cross-
pressured * Amb expect. 
0.0872 -0.0197 0.00531 -0.100* 0.0344 -0.0662 -0.0519* -0.066*** -0.0264 
(1.223) (-0.363) (0.0613) (-1.769) (0.820) (-0.750) (-1.662) (-3.530) (-1.415) 
 
There is only weak support for H2 as only one interaction term with the non- policy group is statistically 
significant. 




The results on the interaction term with the legislators’ category provide less support 







Another conditioning variable on the strength of the incentive is retirement. As the 
results in the previous section showed an attenuating effect, I present below the result of the 
model specifications that include interaction with the retirement indicator.   
 
Table 11: Results of main variables plus interaction with retirement on the proportion 
of votes with the party 
 
 
PROPORTION OF VOTES AS THE PARTY 
 
ALL LEGISLATORS OUT-OF-STEP NON-POLICY 
 
M6 M6 M6 
 
CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 
Post-reform 







(-3.436) (-3.077) (-3.223) (-2.678) (-2.194) (-2.432) (-1.676) (-1.658) (-1.697) 
Cross-pressured 
-0.22*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.25*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 
(-6.953) (-6.456) (-6.2) (-4.395) (-4.889) (-4.742) (-3.726) (-3.428) (-4.506) 
Post-reform * cross-
pressured 
0.0426 -0.0147 -0.033 0.0179 -0.0191 -0.0375 0.0397 0.00402 -0.0179 
(1.151) (-0.626) (-1.275) (0.337) (-0.558) (-1.271) (0.451) (0.0809) (-0.351) 
Retire 
-0.0705 -0.0508 -0.0638 -0.0507 -0.0458 -0.0516 -0.0909 -0.0535 -0.0653 
(-1.272) (-1.068) (-1.224) (-0.781) (-0.746) (-0.878) (-0.787) (-0.556) (-0.569) 
Post-reform* Retire 
0.0838*** 0.0635*** 0.0851*** 0.0961** 0.0646** 0.0959*** 0.0636*** 0.0634*** 0.0687*** 
(2.576) (2.744) (2.754) (1.971) (1.842) (2.091) (3.422) (3.426) (3.04) 
Cross-pressured * Retire 
0.014 -0.095 0.05 0.12 0.014 0.129** -0.18 -0.28*** -0.098** 
(0.0891) (-1.175) (0.696) (0.809) (0.246) (1.999) (-0.537) (-2.792) (-1.798) 
Post-reform* cross-
pressured*  Retire 
0.0941 0.147*** -0.0258 -0.0333 0.182*** -0.0744 0.401*** 0.0678 0.0434 
(0.562) (3.342) (-0.288) (-0.163) (2.938) (-0.589) (2.337) (1.364) (0.453) 
 
Consistent with the hypotheses that the reform strengthens electoral incentives, non-retiring 
legislators exhibit a lower proportion of votes in line with the party than retiring legislators after the 
transparency reform.  
 
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
The effects of the main variables are similar to the ones presented in Table 6; hence, 
the inclusion of the interaction variables does not affect the results or the conclusions drawn 
above. Retiring legislators do not exhibit a different proportion of votes as the party. The 
interaction effect is not robust to the different imputed values, and indeed it changes its 





Table 12: Results of main variables plus interaction with retirement on the proportion 
of votes against the party 
 
PROPORTION OF VOTES AGAINST THE PARTY 
 
ALL LEGISLATORS OUT-OF-STEP NON-POLICY 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 
Post-reform 
0.00319 0.00259 0.0018 0.00576
+
 0.00477 0.0046 0.00426 0.00471 0.00353 
(1.322) (1.038) (0.715) (1.715) (1.504) (1.399) (0.713) (0.81) (0.603) 
Cross-pressured 
0.105*** 0.0522*** 0.0779*** 0.0863*** 0.0581*** 0.0527*** 0.13*** 0.0546*** 0.0633*** 
(4.861) (5.587) (4.258) (2.41) (3.873) (4.056) (3.784) (3.277) (3.502) 
Retire 
0.0202 0.0155 0.0149 0.00051 0.0049 0.00034 0.0331*** 0.0216 0.0216*** 
(1.511) (1.239) (1.262) (0.0384) (0.363) (0.0327) (3.491) (1.085) (2.426) 
Post-reform* Retire 
-0.013*** -0.0043 -0.01*** -0.0108** -0.0019 -0.01** -0.023*** -0.0155 -0.017*** 
(-2.57) (-0.762) (-2.372) (-1.855) (-0.385) (-1.822) (-3.053) (-1.258) (-2.766) 
Cross-pressured * Retire 
0.0581 0.0157 0.0192 -0.07** -0.0288 -0.0029 0.327 0.0832*** 0.097*** 
(0.41) (0.358) (0.506) (-1.835) (-1.403) (-0.0958) (0.939) (3.316) (3.638) 
Post-reform* cross-
pressured*  Retire 
-0.0276 -0.073*** -0.029 0.0681 -0.059*** 0.015 -0.268 -0.07*** -0.11*** 
(-0.22) (-2.79) (-0.515) (0.785) (-2.182) (0.226) (-1.111) (-2.312) (-3.69) 
 
The inclusion of the interaction with the retirement indicator reduces the statistical significance of the 
post-reform coefficient.  
Retiring legislators are less likely to vote against the party after the reform, irrespective of the type of 
vote.  
 
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
The effect of the transparency reform on the proportion of votes against the party 
weakens with the inclusion of the retirement indicator, and none of the interactions are 
consistent across sets of imputed values. For those statistically significant in two out of the 
three sets, the coefficients are in the expected direction as retiring legislators are less likely to 
vote against their party after the reform.  This effect is similar among cross-pressured and non-





Table 13: Results of main variables plus interaction with retirement on the proportion 
of abstentions 
 
PROPORTION OF ABSTENTIONS 
 
ALL LEGISLATORS OUT-OF-STEP NON-POLICY 
 
CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 
Post-reform 
0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(2.659) (2.69) (2.651) (2.196) (2.178) (2.155) (1.404) (1.264) (1.489) 
Cross-pressured 
0.018*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.012
+
 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.036*** 0.01* 0.019*** 
(2.675) (3.966) (2.84) (1.539) (2.627) (2.241) (2.079) (1.739) (2.284) 
Post-reform * cross-
pressured 
0.05*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.0681*** 0.00937 0.016 
(3.596) (1.97) (2.924) (3.005) (2.777) (2.774) (2.108) (0.655) (1.055) 
Retire 
0.00473 0.00488 0.00562 0.0136 0.0136 0.0126 0.00743 -0.0023 0.00213 
(0.631) (0.733) (0.73) (1.082) (1.019) (0.898) (0.526) (-0.238) (0.257) 
Post-reform* Retire 
-0.0025 -0.0035 -0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.01*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
(-0.447) (-0.624) (-0.552) (-0.0675) (-0.139) (-0.101) (-3.315) (-2.904) (-3.192) 
Cross-pressured * 
Retire 







(-1.005) (-0.807) (-0.673) (0.199) (0.701) (0.423) (-2.755) (-2.418) (-3.531) 
Post-reform* cross-
pressured*  Retire 
-0.0623 -0.0112 -0.0319 -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.052
+
 -0.0614** -0.0024 -0.0093 
(-3.437) (-1.068) (-1.625) (-3.131) (-2.099) (-1.642) (-1.902) (-0.166) (-0.612) 
 
Results consistent with H4 
Retiring out-of-step legislators exhibit lower proportion of abstention than non-retiring legislators 
   
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
The rate of abstentions is higher after the transparency reform for out-of-step 
legislators, and for the complete sample of legislators – an effect which is probably driven by 
the out-of-step legislators. Supporting H4, as the results in Table 8, the interaction term 
between cross-pressured votes and post-reform is positive and statistically significant. 
Furthermore, H2 finds some support as out-of-step retiring legislators are less likely to abstain 
than non-retiring legislators on cross-pressured votes after the reform. Thus, retiring dampens 
the effect of the transparency reform, which is consistent with the hypotheses that the reform 





In the last table of this section, I discuss the results for the proportion of abstentions 
when including an interaction with the internet diffusion channel.  
 
Table 14: Proportion of abstentions:  Results of the main variables plus interaction 
with the percent in district using the internet for communication and information  
 
  PROPORTION OF ABSTENTIONS 
  ALL LEGISLATORS OUT-OF-STEP NON-POLICY 
  M4 M4 M4 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 
Post-reform 
0.00575 0.00512 0.00496 0.00903 0.00721 0.00796 0.00523 0.00693 0.00468 
(1.561) (1.349) (1.407) (1.506) (1.259) (1.439) (0.851) (0.92) (0.723) 
Cross-pressured 
0.0186 0.0214 0.00487 0.00936 0.023 0.016 0.0408 0.0268 -0.0062 
(1.854) (3.104) (0.58) (0.809) (2.574) (1.891) (1.569) (1.46) (-0.359) 
Post-reform * cross-
pressured 
0.078 0.0386 0.0484 0.098 0.077 0.0624 0.104 0.00801 0.0316 
(3.177) (2.328) (3.148) (2.945) (3) (2.711) (1.707) (0.229) (1.098) 
 % Internet for info & 
comm. 
-0.0382 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0296 -0.001 0.00133 -0.063 -0.0253 -0.0374 
(-1.532) (-0.0921) (-0.0825) (-0.9) (-0.0306) (0.0429) (-1.096) (-0.824) (-1.282) 
Post-reform * % Internet 
for info  
-0.0032 0.00127 0.0002 -0.0056 0.00158 -0.0033 -0.0939 -0.062 -0.0995 
(-0.21) (0.0818) (0.0135) (-0.255) (0.0719) (-0.16) (-0.563) -0.412 -0.677 
Cross-pressured * % 
Internet 
-0.0057 -0.0254 0.0357 0.0173 -0.0329 -0.0226 0.425 0.726 0.0465 
(-0.152) (-0.976) (0.769) (0.424) (-1.284) (-0.855) (0.83) (2.148) (0.216) 
Post-reform* cross-
pressured *  % Internet  
-0.15 -0.116 -0.14 -0.195 -0.17 -0.147 -0.688 -0.655 0.305 
(-2.01) (-2.058) (-2.502) (-2.233) (-2.495) (-2.217) (-0.808) (-1.029) (0.722) 
 
The effect of interaction between internet diffusion and post-reform runs counter to 
expectations. 
.  
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
+
 p <0.15 
 
The percent of internet users decreases the proportion of abstentions on cross-
pressured votes after the reform, but the effect is not statistically significant effect before the 
reform. This effect runs counter to expectations. Although the interaction effect is negative, 
the positive effect on the proportion of abstentions after the transparency reform on cross-
pressure votes is maintained. For example, legislators that represent districts in the tenth 




those who represent districts in the ninetieth percentile of internet users increase their 
proportion of abstentions by .05 points. Further research is needed to understand this 
mechanism as there is no clear alternative vote choice and the interaction is not statistically 
significant for the other dependent variables.   
As in the previous section, I show the evolution of the proportion of votes along the 
legislative term, subdivided into periods of approximately four months each.  The figures are 
for illustrative purposes as the number of votes in each category is small.  In this section, I only 
present the graphs for the out-of-step and non-policy legislators.
146 Since retirement affects 
incentives, I do not include retiring legislators.    
The first pattern that emerges looking through all the graphs is that the proportion on 
non-cross-pressured votes is more stable across the term than that of cross-pressured votes. 
The second pattern is consistent with the regression results: the proportion of votes in line 
with the party is higher for non-cross pressured votes, as the proportion of votes against and 
the proportion of abstentions are lower. The proportion of votes – either against or abstention 
– among out-of-step legislators is similar across all CP specifications whereas the proportion 
among non-policy legislators varies depending on the CP although the patterns are similar.   
Figure 7 shows the proportion of abstentions among out-of-step legislators. It is 
possible to observe two peaks: in the third sub-period of 2002 and in the sub-period of the 
reform. As discussed in Chapter 4, during the third sub-period of 2002, the chamber president 
announced a transparency measure – the same that was implemented in 2004; and opposition 
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 Appendix 4 presents the results for the third group of legislators. In addition, I include in the Appendix 4 graphs 




legislators introduced a draft bill with the same intent. Hence, the changes in the rate of 
attendance correspond to announcement and implementation of the transparency measures. 
But their change in behavior was short lived. Further research will uncover whether 
abstentions among all votes showed the same pattern or whether legislators exhibited a more 
lasting change in behavior on issues that their constituents cared about. Hence, the driving 
force behind the results is the substantive increase of abstentions during the semester that the 
reform was implemented.  




The pattern is different among non-policy legislators. Abstentions are greater in the 
first year of the term than in the second, and after the reform, abstentions increased, only to 
drop again in the last year of the term. As the proportion of abstentions in the first year started 
at a higher level and only decreased in the second year, the transparency announcements 
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subsequently after transparency reform may indicate an effect, although it is difficult to 
explain the difference in the duration of the effect compared with the out-of-step legislators. 
 






Figure 9  Figure 10 show the evolution of the proportion of votes in which out-of-step 
and non-policy legislators sided with their parties. Although there is a decrease in the 
proportion of votes during the sub-period of the reform and afterwards, the evolution of the 
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Figure 11 and Figure 12  show the evolution of the proportion of votes in which 
legislators voted against their parties. As discussed above, legislators are more likely to vote 
against their party when cross-pressured. But the trend in the proportion of votes against the 
party echoes the regression results as there does not seem to be an impact due to the 
transparency reform.    
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Comparing the evolution of ideal points distribution and proportion of votes as the 
party, against and abstentions shows that an important element needs to be addressed in 
order to better understand the relation between voters and legislators: party position.  The 
moderation exhibited by out-of-step legislator in the last term office with no increase in 
abstention nor votes against the party and a similar or even higher proportion of votes as the 
party shows that parties is consistent with parties as changing their policy position during the 
term. In addition, abstention at the party level lead to an underestimation of the level of 
conflict and thus, using estimated cut-points to identify cross-pressured votes may introduce 
biases.  Indeed, during the 2002-2006, in at about 15% of unanimous votes the party position 
of a party was abstention. Therefore, as discussed below, I plan to address party behavior in 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This dissertation proposes a theoretical framework to study the impact of transparency 
reforms based on a theory of legislative behavior. The hypotheses were tested against the 
behavior of the Chilean Lower House legislators before and after a transparency reform. 
Although I derive expectations for both types of programmatic linkages, due to data 
limitations, I could only empirically assess the impact on ideological positions.  
Before turning to the results on the impact of transparency, I first discuss the findings 
regarding the model of legislative politics discussed in Chapter 3, in particular, whether the 
hypothesis of the strategic use of abstentions for position avoidance is supported by the data. 
The analysis relies on distinguishing between votes in which legislators were cross-pressured 
from those in which legislators were not. The measurement of cross-pressure is validated with 
findings consistent with the expectation that legislators are less likely to vote with their party, 
and conversely, more likely to vote against their party on cross-pressured votes. The finding 
that abstentions are greater among cross-pressured legislators supports the strategic use of 
abstentions for position avoidance.   
The results presented in the previous chapter provide evidence of the complex impact 
of transparency reform on legislators’ behavior. There is some evidence of a positive impact of 
transparency as it provides incentives for legislators to adopt public positions closer to their 
electoral constituencies’. But the results on the use of position avoidance raise concerns as the 
observed moderation may be partly due to obfuscation rather than to improved 




moderate reputation without having to support their constituencies’ preferences on all issues.   
The normative implications of the result on legislator’s behavior are difficult to draw as 
they depend on whether conditions for pandering do or do not exist. From a mandate view of 
representation, legislators can obfuscate their positions, and hence, the improvement in 
congruence is spurious. Using macroeconomic jargon, it does not have solid fundamentals. But 
when pandering as a potential effect of transparency is a serious concern, position avoidance 
may be seen as a strategy used by responsive legislators to avoid selecting a suboptimal but 
popular policy. Of course, as it may also be used by unresponsive legislators to mask their 
behavior, the net impact is context dependent. 
The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation provides a general model 
which can be applied to the study of the effect of transparency or of other reforms which aim 
to strengthen electoral incentives. Recorded abstentions permit directly identifying instances 
of position avoidance. Hence this research can be readily extended to other countries in which 
congressional or parliamentary rules allow abstentions, such as the EU Parliament. The 
absence of such rules does not preclude its application to other contexts,147 but makes it 
necessary to include additional information in order to distinguish instances of position 
avoidance from failures to take a position for other reasons.  For instance, research on position 
avoidance in the US has relied on rules that enable additional instances for senators to state 
their positions. Although the focus of the research on senators’ position avoidance is conflict at 
the constituency level, I argue that the logic may be extended to conflicts with their parties as 
                                                          
147





the driving forces of the legislators’ behaviors are the same. If this is the case, an interesting 
possibility is that the conservative or liberal bias on state policy uncovered by Lax and Phillips 
(2012) may be partly explained by strategic position avoidance.   
 
Further research 
As discussed above, the theoretical framework expects differences in behavior 
depending on the type of programmatic linkage strategy. Indeed, I argue that it is important to 
distinguish the type of policy reputation that the legislator is building, and in particular, 
whether it is ideological or issue based (e.g. interests). The reason is that ideological 
constituencies give legislators greater flexibility as long as they have an overall track record of 
siding with their position whereas voting against any interest groups normally concentrated on 
a few specific areas would be more costly. But the effect of transparency is not equal across all 
interests groups as it depends on the probability that the electoral constituency had 
information previous to the transparency reform. At this point, the distinction between 
organized and unorganized interests plays a role as organized groups, by definition, have the 
resources to overcome information costs. Therefore, legislators who follow a programmatic 
linkage based on issues benefitting unorganized interests should exhibit a greater change in 
behavior. Thus, I plan to improve the data on specific interests, in particular to be able to 
assign to each legislator/vote pair where the preferences of his constituency and party lie. That 
is, whether the legislators is cross-pressured.  
Furthermore, in this dissertation I have analyzed legislators’ behavior, and consider 




abstentions may also be used as party strategy and taken therefore, as the party position. In 
future research I plan to address both the rationale for abstentions as the party position, and 
also find strategies to address the empirical challenge of identifying cross-pressured votes 
when the level of conflict is underestimated due to strategic avoidance.  
I also intend to explore other forms of position avoidance. In addition to abstention, 
and missing the vote, legislators have a third option: pairing. Although the purpose of the 
institution is to ensure that absent legislators will not affect the outcome of the vote, it seems 
that the transparency reform may have introduced an incentive to use them as position 
avoidance strategies. Indeed, a cursory view of the patterns shows an increase of the instances 
of pairing, even pairing between legislators who were both absent, and thus, de facto paired.   
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A1.1: Number of legislators by category, and within category, retiring after the term and freshman 
 
 
N. of leg. Retire Freshman 
 Out-of-step legislators 55 4 17 
Non-policy linkage 34 2 15 
Ambiguous expectation 26 0 6 
All legislators 115 6 38 
 
  
Table A1.2: Descriptive statistics diffusion channels 
 
  % Civic associations 
% Internet use for information 
and communication 
Locals newspapers 
  P10 P50 P90 Std. dev. P10 P50 P90 Std. dev. P10 P50 P90 Std. dev. 
Out-of-step legislators 0.25 0.37 0.55 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.34 0.13 0 0 1 0.54 
Non-policy linkage 0.28 0.42 0.48 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.28 0.10 0 0 1 0.54 
Ambiguous expectation 0.25 0.37 0.48 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.27 0.09 0 0 1 0.44 





Table A1.3: Distribution of the mean across alternatives of ideal points estimates 
 
 




P10 P50 P90 Std. dev. P10 P50 P90 Std. dev. 
Out-of-step legislators -1.12 0.66 1.56 1.14 -0.98 0.57 1.38 0.95 
Non-policy linkage -1.06 -0.76 1.38 1.03 -1.02 -0.58 1.10 0.90 
Ambiguous expectation -1.17 -0.87 0.62 0.75 -1.11 -0.67 0.55 0.68 
All legislators -1.08 -0.68 1.48 1.08 -1.04 -0.45 1.21 0.92 
 
 









P10 P50 P90 Std. dev. P10 P50 P90 Std. dev. 
Out-of-step legislators 0.64 1.19 1.56 0.36 0.51 0.95 1.38 0.34 
Non-policy linkage 0.62 0.93 1.38 0.30 0.54 0.88 1.10 0.25 
Ambiguous expectation 0.50 0.89 1.17 0.24 0.39 0.71 1.11 0.28 












Appendix 2: H3 & H4: Regression results for all model specifications 
TABLE A2.1: ALL LEGISLATORS: Proportion of votes as the party(Robust t-statistics in parenthesis )
 
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
-0.0278 -0.0259 -0.0256 -0.0278 -0.0259 -0.0256 -0.0249 -0.0256 -0.0237 -0.0378 -0.0332 -0.0346 -0.0211 -0.0203 -0.0191 -0.0323 -0.0292 -0.0301 -0.0199 -0.0155 -0.0164
(-3.048) (-2.849) (-2.819) (-3.029) (-2.83) (-2.802) (-0.644) (-0.674) (-0.609) (-2.159) (-2.07) (-2.02) (-2.048) (-1.992) (-1.866) (-3.436) (-3.077) (-3.223) (-1.709) (-1.374) (-1.432)
-0.225 -0.127 -0.14 -0.224 -0.125 -0.138 -0.159 -0.063 -0.0424 -0.262 -0.168 -0.18 -0.224 -0.137 -0.141 -0.224 -0.122 -0.141 -0.215 -0.119 -0.127
(-7.171) (-7.063) (-6.546) (-7.079) (-6.8) (-6.346) (-1.396) (-0.813) (-0.47) (-4.785) (-6.011) (-5.277) (-6.051) (-6.671) (-6.146) (-6.953) (-6.456) (-6.2) (-5.886) (-5.227) (-5.018)
0.0507 -0.0102 -0.0345 0.0505 -0.0102 -0.0343 -0.19 -0.0924 -0.0403 0.0998 -0.014 -0.0255 0.0451 0.00817 -0.0177 0.0426 -0.0147 -0.033 0.0789 -0.00326 -0.0458
(1.407) (-0.453) (-1.393) (1.392) (-0.45) (-1.38) (-1.442) (-1.028) (-0.386) (1.335) (-0.342) (-0.547) (1.045) (0.329) (-0.671) (1.151) (-0.626) (-1.275) (1.837) (-0.12) (-1.474)
0.073 0.0211 -0.0977 0.0105 0.0449 0.015 0.0731 0.0269 -0.0992 0.0464 -0.0179 -0.107 0.0461 -0.0184 -0.107 0.0363 -0.0149 -0.107
(0.43) (0.172) (-0.724) (0.0916) (0.433) (0.139) (0.429) (0.219) (-0.732) (0.339) (-0.172) (-0.953) (0.337) (-0.176) (-0.954) (0.264) (-0.143) (-0.952)
0.0411 0.0589 0.0145 0.0408 0.0586 0.0136 -0.0198 -0.0645 -0.11
(0.412) (0.841) (0.161) (0.407) (0.83) (0.15) (-0.21) (-0.763) (-1.357)
0.0173 0.0145 0.00388 0.0173 0.0144 0.00389 0.0174 0.0143 0.00399 0.0242 0.0202 0.0231 0.0175 0.0148 0.00381 0.0173 0.0144 0.00375
(0.783) (0.716) (0.171) (0.776) (0.71) (0.172) (0.786) (0.709) (0.176) (1.348) (1.138) (1.359) (0.785) (0.726) (0.167) (0.777) (0.699) (0.164)
-0.00087 -0.0317 -0.00525 -0.00094 -0.0319 -0.00534 -0.00093 -0.0348 -0.00507 0.00173 -0.0266 -0.004 -0.0705 -0.0508 -0.0638 0.00213 -0.027 -0.00405
(-0.0206) (-0.671) (-0.0835) (-0.0222) (-0.674) (-0.0846) (-0.022) (-0.757) (-0.0802) (0.0429) (-0.565) (-0.0655) (-1.272) (-1.068) (-1.224) (0.0518) (-0.575) (-0.0661)
0.00565 0.0249 0.0301 0.00635 0.0251 0.0305 0.00559 0.0267 0.0305 0.00647 0.026 0.0302 0.00618 0.0258 0.0302 0.0509 0.0545 0.0515































0.807 0.806 0.807 0.764 0.776 0.831 0.788 0.767 0.788 0.775 0.796 0.854 0.779 0.799 0.831 0.785 0.802 0.84 0.771 0.791 0.83
(92.06) (88.11) (91.13) (9.612) (13.86) (13.33) (13.09) (15.15) (14.75) (9.662) (13.85) (13.62) (14.15) (19.22) (18.61) (14.2) (19.34) (18.73) (14.27) (18.84) (18.7)
Observations 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414
R-squared 0.215 0.194 0.208 0.218 0.206 0.218 0.227 0.208 0.222 0.22 0.215 0.222 0.218 0.214 0.224 0.224 0.213 0.22 0.233 0.213 0.219
ALL LEGISLATORS : DV: PROPORTION VOTING AS THE PARTY
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7




Cross -pressured * Reti re
Post-reform* cross -
pressured*  Reti re
Post-reform * Freshman
Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Cross-pressured * % 
Internet for info. & comm.
Posterf. * cross -press .*  % 
Internet 
Posterform * Local  
newspapers
Cross -pressured  * Local  
newspapers
Posterform *cross -
pressured * Local  
Post-reform * cross -
pressured * % civic assoc





Posterform * % Internet 
for info. & comm.
Post-reform
Cross-pressured
Post-reform * cross -
pressured
% civic associations
Post-reform * % civic 
assoc














VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
-0.0279 -0.0248 -0.0251 -0.0279 -0.0248 -0.0251 -0.0282 -0.0415 -0.033 -0.0409 -0.0299 -0.036 -0.0192 -0.0168 -0.0162 -0.035 -0.0296 -0.0322 -0.0152 -0.00826 -0.0109
(-2.178) (-1.961) (-1.946) (-2.149) (-1.933) (-1.921) (-0.541) (-0.811) (-0.613) (-1.752) (-1.462) (-1.564) (-1.246) (-1.108) (-1.041) (-2.678) (-2.194) (-2.432) (-0.921) (-0.518) (-0.663)
-0.21 -0.146 -0.115 -0.209 -0.144 -0.112 -0.0367 -0.149 -0.0514 -0.238 -0.187 -0.146 -0.221 -0.153 -0.118 -0.219 -0.146 -0.122 -0.197 -0.122 -0.102
(-4.542) (-5.307) (-4.843) (-4.451) (-5.121) (-4.594) (-0.239) (-1.372) (-0.57) (-3.04) (-4.715) (-4.024) (-4.148) (-4.757) (-4.102) (-4.395) (-4.889) (-4.742) (-3.578) (-3.456) (-3.57)
0.0165 -0.0109 -0.0432 0.0164 -0.0109 -0.0432 -0.379 -0.0207 -0.149 0.0441 -0.0345 -0.0164 0.0443 0.00501 -0.0336 0.0179 -0.0191 -0.0375 0.0401 -0.00417 -0.0415
(0.327) (-0.338) (-1.529) (0.322) (-0.333) (-1.51) (-2.314) (-0.187) (-1.471) (0.447) (-0.648) (-0.302) (0.758) (0.146) (-1.034) (0.337) (-0.558) (-1.271) (0.662) (-0.106) (-1.185)
-0.0267 0.0281 -0.0668 -0.0586 -0.00549 -0.0671 -0.0276 0.0304 -0.0675 -0.0269 0.0288 -0.0668 -0.0264 0.02 -0.0658 -0.04 0.032 -0.0673
(-0.102) (0.163) (-0.378) (-0.352) (-0.0373) (-0.441) (-0.104) (0.176) (-0.379) (-0.102) (0.166) (-0.375) (-0.0999) (0.115) (-0.37) (-0.151) (0.187) (-0.38)
-0.0496 0.0448 -0.0622 -0.0501 0.0453 -0.0622 -0.122 -0.0981 -0.142 -0.048 0.0456 -0.0621 -0.0487 0.0336 -0.0626 -0.0486 0.0486 -0.0613
(-0.356) (0.52) (-0.523) (-0.357) (0.514) (-0.519) (-0.835) (-0.798) (-1.193) (-0.34) (0.524) (-0.519) (-0.346) (0.376) (-0.525) (-0.348) (0.578) (-0.512)
0.0105 0.0157 0.0147 0.0102 0.0158 0.0147 0.0108 0.0165 0.015 0.0306 0.0275 0.0295 0.0103 0.0159 0.0143 0.0101 0.0143 0.0143
(0.358) (0.621) (0.575) (0.344) (0.625) (0.57) (0.362) (0.648) (0.58) (1.321) (1.137) (1.425) (0.349) (0.617) (0.558) (0.347) (0.591) (0.561)
0.0487 0.0205 0.036 0.0487 0.0205 0.036 0.0488 0.0188 0.0363 0.0483 0.0204 0.036 -0.0507 -0.0458 -0.0516 0.0496 0.0157 0.0376
(0.889) (0.574) (0.764) (0.884) (0.568) (0.757) (0.883) (0.557) (0.764) (0.877) (0.568) (0.758) (-0.781) (-0.746) (-0.878) (0.883) (0.483) (0.783)
0.021 0.0216 0.0378 0.0216 0.0215 0.0378 0.0205 0.0217 0.0376 0.02 0.0216 0.0379 0.0205 0.0233 0.0367 0.0806 0.0873 0.0809































0.793 0.793 0.794 0.8 0.761 0.813 0.812 0.774 0.813 0.814 0.788 0.828 0.794 0.758 0.809 0.807 0.771 0.82 0.787 0.741 0.8
(57.04) (54.16) (56.62) (6.779) (10.04) (10.03) (9.487) (11.16) (10.88) (6.766) (10.01) (10.14) (6.695) (9.862) (9.844) (6.782) (10.05) (10.03) (6.703) (9.683) (9.757)
Observations 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202
R-squared 0.209 0.242 0.221 0.215 0.251 0.239 0.245 0.251 0.245 0.216 0.268 0.242 0.226 0.261 0.246 0.222 0.272 0.249 0.234 0.281 0.25
OUT OF STEP LEGISLATORS : DV: PROPORTION VOTING AS THE PARTY




pressured * Local  
Post-reform* Reti re
Cross -pressured * Reti re
Post-reform* cross -
pressured*  Reti re
Post-reform * Freshman
Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Post-reform * cross -
pressured * % civic assoc
Posterform * % Internet 
for info. & comm.
Cross -pressured * % 
Internet for info. & comm.
Posterf. * cross -press .*  % 
Internet 
Posterform * Local  
newspapers
Cross -pressured  * Local  
newspapers





Post-reform * % civic 
assoc




Post-reform * cross -
pressured
% civic associations












VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
-0.0273 -0.0269 -0.0271 -0.0273 -0.0269 -0.0271 -0.0684 -0.0339 -0.0528 -0.0116 -0.0165 -0.0105 -0.0216 -0.0241 -0.0229 -0.031 -0.0306 -0.0311 -0.0176 -0.0181 -0.0177
(-1.604) (-1.585) (-1.598) (-1.569) (-1.55) (-1.565) (-1.045) (-0.508) (-0.814) (-0.375) (-0.565) (-0.368) (-1.272) (-1.418) (-1.364) (-1.676) (-1.658) (-1.697) (-0.679) (-0.709) (-0.685)
-0.269 -0.129 -0.153 -0.266 -0.129 -0.149 -0.344 0.219 -0.0938 -0.344 -0.237 -0.157 -0.251 -0.152 -0.174 -0.251 -0.116 -0.143 -0.264 -0.139 -0.158
(-4.149) (-4.146) (-5.287) (-3.987) (-3.856) (-5.033) (-1.134) (1.497) (-0.471) (-3.018) (-3.979) (-3.13) (-3.146) (-4.038) (-5.795) (-3.726) (-3.428) (-4.506) (-3.062) (-3.112) (-3.78)
0.0732 0.00553 -0.0142 0.0732 0.00553 -0.0142 0.0115 -0.419 -0.107 0.2 0.101 -0.0646 0.0171 0.0409 0.0125 0.0397 0.00402 -0.0179 0.108 0.0305 -0.0229
(0.888) (0.12) (-0.307) (0.868) (0.117) (-0.3) (0.0263) (-1.331) (-0.286) (1.176) (0.887) (-0.73) (0.167) (0.791) (0.268) (0.451) (0.0809) (-0.351) (0.909) (0.485) (-0.335)
0.169 -0.0548 0.0996 0.00168 0.0862 0.0773 0.168 -0.0275 0.0952 0.162 -0.0558 0.1 0.168 -0.0509 0.0983 0.156 -0.0542 0.0917
(0.775) (-0.276) (0.545) (0.00834) (0.406) (0.484) (0.76) (-0.136) (0.513) (0.733) (-0.277) (0.544) (0.76) (-0.255) (0.531) (0.685) (-0.268) (0.493)
0.0383 -0.0326 0.0567 0.0423 -0.0139 0.0563 0.0473 -0.088 0.00685 0.0365 -0.0373 0.0554 0.0384 -0.0136 0.0563 0.04 -0.034 0.053
(0.267) (-0.225) (0.474) (0.294) (-0.0942) (0.464) (0.411) (-0.748) (0.0688) (0.25) (-0.253) (0.456) (0.265) (-0.0942) (0.466) (0.272) (-0.227) (0.44)
0.0322 0.0171 0.0269 0.032 0.0156 0.0269 0.0322 0.0111 0.0266 0.0222 0.0133 0.0164 0.0322 0.0185 0.0269 0.0316 0.0171 0.0269
(0.84) (0.532) (0.754) (0.82) (0.483) (0.745) (0.828) (0.332) (0.737) (0.709) (0.459) (0.552) (0.828) (0.589) (0.748) (0.814) (0.523) (0.752)
-0.0501 -0.106 -0.0692 -0.0514 -0.107 -0.0691 -0.0498 -0.109 -0.0692 -0.0496 -0.106 -0.0692 -0.0909 -0.0535 -0.0653 -0.0511 -0.105 -0.0688
(-1.265) (-1.044) (-0.467) (-1.275) (-1.071) (-0.461) (-1.238) (-1.083) (-0.461) (-1.231) (-1.05) (-0.461) (-0.787) (-0.556) (-0.569) (-1.265) (-1.023) (-0.459)
0.0211 0.0323 0.0503 0.0223 0.0347 0.0503 0.0208 0.0368 0.0502 0.0207 0.0324 0.0505 0.021 0.0338 0.0506 0.0517 0.0442 0.0463































0.824 0.821 0.826 0.733 0.835 0.75 0.8 0.775 0.759 0.732 0.834 0.76 0.74 0.838 0.753 0.736 0.827 0.75 0.725 0.83 0.755
(60.31) (57.81) (60.97) (6.516) (8.128) (8.404) (7.412) (6.94) (9.034) (6.548) (8.385) (8.595) (6.517) (8.059) (8.289) (6.458) (7.988) (8.281) (6.26) (7.852) (8.234)
Observations 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126
R-squared 0.266 0.176 0.24 0.277 0.221 0.283 0.28 0.252 0.285 0.292 0.243 0.289 0.295 0.244 0.301 0.311 0.254 0.291 0.286 0.231 0.286
Non-pol icy : DV: PROPORTION VOTING AS THE PARTY
Constant
Post-reform* Reti re
Cross -pressured * Reti re
Post-reform* cross -
pressured*  Reti re
Post-reform * Freshman
Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Post-reform *  ross -
pressured * Freshman
Posterform * % Internet 
for info. & comm.
Cross -pressured * % 
Internet for info. & comm.
Posterf. * cross -press .*  % 
Internet 
Posterform * Local  
newspapers
Cross -pressured  * Local  
newspapers
Posterform *cross -
pressured * Local  
Loca l  newspapers
Reti re
Freshman
Post-reform * % civic 
assoc
Cross -pressured * % civic 
assoc
Post-reform * cross -
pressured * % civic assoc
Post-reform
Cross-pressured
Post-reform * cross -
pressured
% civic associations
 % Internet for 
information & 













VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
-0.0284 -0.0267 -0.0246 -0.0284 -0.0267 -0.0246 0.0134 0.0178 0.0169 -0.0752 -0.0797 -0.0742 -0.0266 -0.0233 -0.0214 -0.0307 -0.0267 -0.0256
(-1.327) (-1.246) (-1.188) (-1.295) (-1.216) (-1.159) (0.131) (0.176) (0.171) (-1.163) (-1.177) (-1.155) (-0.944) (-0.859) (-0.802) (-1.299) (-1.173) (-1.134)
-0.198 -0.0837 -0.186 -0.197 -0.0776 -0.187 -0.374 -0.019 0.097 -0.232 -0.123 -0.463 -0.194 -0.0646 -0.104 -0.21 -0.0977 -0.151
(-3.763) (-2.244) (-2.167) (-3.659) (-2.055) (-2.227) (-1.674) (-0.153) (0.29) (-1.588) (-1.476) (-2.25) (-2.535) (-1.703) (-0.987) (-3.525) (-2.213) (-1.641)
0.103 -0.0306 -0.0391 0.103 -0.0306 -0.0388 0.196 -0.0314 0.398 -0.0342 -0.0951 -0.0301 0.12 -0.044 -0.0329 0.132 -0.0374 -0.0851
(2.039) (-0.698) (-0.469) (1.989) (-0.681) (-0.467) (1.02) (-0.182) (1.235) (-0.306) (-0.721) (-0.143) (1.922) (-0.814) (-0.325) (2.312) (-0.774) (-0.897)
0.401 0.0838 -0.246 0.298 0.207 0.35 0.445 0.0916 -0.233 0.402 0.0889 -0.168 0.4 0.0938 -0.247
(1.581) (0.38) (-0.755) (1.384) (1.039) (1.598) (1.862) (0.424) (-0.746) (1.556) (0.399) (-0.5) (1.542) (0.431) (-0.746)
0.73 0.461 0.645 0.721 0.468 0.707 0.456 0.19 0.0704 0.733 0.462 0.655 0.722 0.533 0.607
(2.786) (2.53) (2.513) (2.659) (2.539) (2.843) (2.1) (1.396) (0.41) (2.759) (2.51) (2.72) (3.195) (2.883) (1.858)
0.0328 0.0259 -0.0143 0.0354 0.0274 -0.0005 0.0266 0.0264 -0.0108 0.0477 0.0373 0.0788 0.0328 0.0295 -0.0177
(0.639) (0.625) (-0.274) (0.663) (0.667) (-0.0107) (0.505) (0.646) (-0.213) (0.944) (0.741) (1.43) (0.627) (0.757) (-0.328)
-0.081 -0.0219 -0.0837 -0.0851 -0.0218 -0.0827 -0.0623 -0.0163 -0.064 -0.0811 -0.022 -0.0852 -0.0832 -0.0716 -0.0611

























0.812 0.811 0.808 0.536 0.691 0.805 0.576 0.644 0.569 0.568 0.737 0.9 0.53 0.685 0.741 0.539 0.685 0.809
(44.23) (42.69) (42.58) (4.767) (7.448) (5.869) (5.168) (6.651) (5.702) (4.849) (7.703) (6.774) (4.781) (7.288) (5.472) (4.694) (7.414) (5.615)
Observations 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86
R-squared 0.175 0.145 0.192 0.252 0.194 0.278 0.264 0.198 0.377 0.277 0.22 0.329 0.254 0.196 0.328 0.269 0.225 0.298
AMBIGUOUS EXPECTATIONS: PROPORTION VOTING AS THE PARTY
Cross -pressured * Reti re
Post-reform* cross -
pressured*  Reti re
Post-reform * Freshman
Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Post-reform *  ross -
pressured * Freshman
Constant
Cross -pressured * % 
Internet for info. & comm.
Posterf. * cross -press .*  % 
Internet 
Posterform * Local  
newspapers
Cross -pressured  * Local  
newspapers
Posterform *cross -




Post-reform * % civic 
assoc
Cross -pressured * % civic 
assoc
Post-reform * cross -
pressured * % civic assoc
Posterform * % Internet 
for info. & comm.
Post-reform
Cross-pressured
Post-reform * cross -
pressured
% civic associations
 % Internet for 
information & 
Local  newspapers












VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.00251 0.00237 0.00128 0.00251 0.00237 0.00128 -0.0112 -0.0124 -0.0159 0.0053 0.00322 0.00382 0.00345 0.00357 0.00195 0.00319 0.00259 0.0018 0.00514 0.00424 0.00323
(1.096) (1.003) (0.537) (1.089) (0.997) (0.534) (-1.251) (-1.207) (-1.61) (1.243) (0.793) (0.943) (1.34) (1.311) (0.72) (1.322) (1.038) (0.715) (1.684) (1.34) (1.005)
0.108 0.052 0.0786 0.109 0.0527 0.0789 0.0636 0.00775 -0.0074 0.121 0.0595 0.1 0.108 0.063 0.0809 0.105 0.0522 0.0779 0.108 0.0479 0.0724
(4.843) (5.698) (4.609) (4.912) (5.777) (4.547) (0.858) (0.21) (-0.121) (3.151) (3.624) (3.537) (4.075) (5.964) (4.692) (4.861) (5.587) (4.258) (4.015) (4.609) (4.024)
-0.0182 0.0195 0.0249 -0.0183 0.0195 0.0249 0.0391 0.0815 0.115 -0.0525 0.00647 0.00049 -0.028 -0.0086 0.00929 -0.0161 0.0222 0.0265 -0.0431 0.016 0.031
(-0.725) (1.215) (1.193) (-0.725) (1.207) (1.191) (0.415) (1.217) (1.481) (-1.202) (0.257) (0.0145) (-0.912) (-0.513) (0.455) (-0.631) (1.324) (1.206) (-1.648) (0.929) (1.302)
0.0742 0.0632 0.0813 0.0366 0.0283 0.0109 0.0742 0.0631 0.0818 0.0456 0.0331 0.0646 0.0454 0.0325 0.0648 0.0515 0.0306 0.0643
(1.164) (1.507) (1.169) (0.893) (0.847) (0.278) (1.161) (1.501) (1.174) (0.818) (0.914) (1.233) (0.816) (0.898) (1.234) (0.913) (0.861) (1.238)
0.0442 0.0456 0.0251 0.0442 0.0458 0.0258 0.0389 0.0485 0.0555
(0.821) (1.396) (0.52) (0.816) (1.396) (0.53) (1.13) (1.967) (1.689)
0.0102 0.00764 0.0112 0.0102 0.0077 0.0112 0.0102 0.00764 0.0112 0.00306 0.00457 0.00371 0.0102 0.00792 0.0113 0.0104 0.00816 0.0115
(1.125) (1.07) (1.018) (1.123) (1.075) (1.014) (1.119) (1.066) (1.012) (0.764) (1.185) (0.972) (1.115) (1.11) (1.023) (1.12) (1.143) (1.018)
0.033 0.00227 0.0105 0.0329 0.00238 0.0105 0.033 0.00229 0.0104 0.0359 0.00616 0.0118 0.0202 0.0155 0.0149 0.0354 0.00678 0.0119
(0.651) (0.181) (0.667) (0.648) (0.189) (0.667) (0.647) (0.181) (0.659) (0.733) (0.555) (0.697) (1.511) (1.239) (1.262) (0.722) (0.614) (0.706)
0.0133 0.00224 -0.0003 0.0135 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0133 0.00223 -0.0005 0.0143 0.00313 0.00041 0.014 0.00286 0.00018 -0.0005 -0.0029 -0.0017































0.0299 0.0292 0.0297 -0.0159 -0.0066 -0.01 -0.0015 0.0068 0.0169 -0.0149 -0.0071 -0.0157 0.00489 0.0137 0.00296 0.00366 0.0125 0.00043 0.00521 0.0155 0.00133
(16.14) (14.02) (14.76) (-0.506) (-0.325) (-0.277) (-0.0619) (0.385) (0.706) (-0.479) (-0.357) (-0.449) (0.202) (0.908) (0.133) (0.157) (0.832) (0.0176) (0.229) (1.11) (0.062)
Observations 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414
R-squared 0.154 0.189 0.151 0.165 0.198 0.158 0.166 0.202 0.162 0.168 0.199 0.16 0.167 0.243 0.164 0.166 0.2 0.158 0.18 0.2 0.159
M6 M7
ALL LEGISLATORS : DV: PROPORTION VOTING AGAINST THE PARTY
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5








Cross-pressured  * Freshman
Cross-pressured * % Internet 
for info. & comm.
Posterf. * cross-press.*  % 
Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers




Post-reform * cross-pressured 
* % civic assoc










Post-reform * % civic assoc









TABLE A2.6: OUT-OF-STEP: Proportion of votes against the party(Robust t-statistics in parenthesis )  
 
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.00496 0.00464 0.00385 0.00496 0.00464 0.00385 -0.0147 -0.007 -0.0135 0.00806 0.00335 0.00623 0.00674 0.00612 0.00486 0.00576 0.00477 0.0046 0.00654 0.00528 0.00526
(1.605) (1.607) (1.273) (1.584) (1.584) (1.257) (-1.117) (-0.555) (-1.074) (1.23) (0.546) (0.973) (1.715) (1.657) (1.284) (1.715) (1.504) (1.399) (1.782) (1.553) (1.486)
0.0779 0.0555 0.0519 0.0803 0.0563 0.0525 -0.0699 0.0536 1.6E-05 0.0753 0.059 0.0568 0.0793 0.0628 0.0562 0.0863 0.0581 0.0527 0.074 0.0509 0.0552
(2.437) (3.934) (4.341) (2.464) (3.982) (4.31) (-0.927) (1.121) (0.000452) (1.398) (2.371) (2.624) (2.484) (3.887) (4.173) (2.41) (3.873) (4.056) (2.038) (3.258) (4.394)
0.0369 0.0223 0.0491 0.0363 0.0223 0.0491 0.225 0.0115 0.136 0.0229 0.018 0.0181 0.00474 0.00593 0.0439 0.0302 0.0253 0.048 -0.0027 -0.0036 0.0256
(1.018) (0.961) (2.09) (0.986) (0.947) (2.064) (2.171) (0.133) (1.478) (0.359) (0.494) (0.534) (0.122) (0.219) (1.508) (0.755) (1.017) (1.901) (-0.081) (-0.181) (1.044)
0.171 0.0751 0.0994 0.0748 0.0504 0.0644 0.171 0.075 0.099 0.173 0.0758 0.0993 0.171 0.0795 0.0994 0.185 0.0722 0.0997
(2.097) (1.371) (1.816) (1.415) (1.116) (1.618) (2.064) (1.36) (1.791) (2.11) (1.382) (1.803) (2.08) (1.429) (1.802) (2.26) (1.366) (1.819)
0.119 0.0509 0.0826 0.119 0.0514 0.0826 0.0976 0.0488 0.0602 0.122 0.0519 0.0823 0.118 0.0572 0.0826 0.118 0.0482 0.0819
(1.775) (1.136) (2.001) (1.749) (1.136) (1.983) (1.694) (1.183) (1.735) (1.779) (1.156) (1.979) (1.757) (1.256) (1.988) (1.685) (1.02) (1.921)
0.0214 0.00218 -0.0002 0.0218 0.00229 -0.0001 0.0215 0.00218 -4E-05 -0.0016 0.00246 0.00336 0.0215 0.00209 -0.0002 0.0219 0.0032 0.00015
(1.42) (0.255) (-0.0176) (1.434) (0.267) (-0.0136) (1.41) (0.252) (-0.00422) (-0.216) (0.374) (0.666) (1.415) (0.237) (-0.0194) (1.464) (0.432) (0.0143)
-0.0227 -0.0149 -0.0027 -0.0228 -0.0149 -0.0027 -0.0226 -0.0148 -0.0026 -0.0226 -0.0149 -0.0026 0.00051 0.0049 0.00034 -0.0238 -0.0115 -0.004
(-1.152) (-1.921) (-0.218) (-1.148) (-1.906) (-0.211) (-1.139) (-1.843) (-0.206) (-1.147) (-1.925) (-0.21) (0.0384) (0.363) (0.0327) (-1.209) (-1.348) (-0.294)
0.03 0.0192 0.00961 0.031 0.0191 0.00964 0.0296 0.0192 0.00947 0.0309 0.0192 0.00956 0.0301 0.0182 0.00955 -0.0077 -0.0067 -0.0028































0.0249 0.0235 0.0235 -0.0757 -0.0198 -0.0323 -0.0396 -0.0106 -0.0191 -0.0714 -0.0194 -0.0279 -0.0708 -0.0203 -0.0332 -0.0774 -0.0238 -0.0325 -0.0697 -0.0111 -0.0286
(10.61) (9.65) (10.51) (-1.925) (-0.736) (-1.208) (-1.34) (-0.47) (-0.894) (-1.759) (-0.714) (-1.032) (-1.803) (-0.751) (-1.235) (-1.932) (-0.87) (-1.207) (-1.802) (-0.435) (-1.12)
Observations 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202







Cross-pressured  * Freshman
Post-reform *  ross-pressured 
* Freshman
Posterform * % Internet for 
info. & comm.
Cross-pressured * % Internet 
for info. & comm.
Posterf. * cross-press.*  % 
Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers







Post-reform * % civic assoc
Cross-pressured * % civic 
assoc
Post-reform * cross-pressured 





 % Internet for information & 
communication
OUT-OF-STEP LEGISLATORS : DV: PROPORTION VOTING AGAINST THE PARTY








TABLE A2.7: NON POLICY: Proportion of votes against the party (Robust t-statistics in parenthesis )  
 
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.0029 0.0038 0.00255 0.0029 0.0038 0.00255 0.0146 0.00814 0.0083 0.00235 0.00289 0.00029 0.00192 0.00473 0.00255 0.00426 0.00471 0.00353 0.0119 0.0134 0.0107
(0.526) (0.71) (0.473) (0.514) (0.694) (0.464) (0.807) (0.356) (0.458) (0.286) (0.357) (0.0399) (0.368) (0.91) (0.503) (0.713) (0.81) (0.603) (1.284) (1.526) (1.189)
0.157 0.0588 0.0724 0.154 0.0581 0.0699 0.0407 -0.16 -0.0552 0.231 0.0974 0.0659 0.147 0.0758 0.0852 0.13 0.0546 0.0633 0.175 0.0517 0.0678
(3.529) (3.743) (4.244) (3.507) (3.578) (4.037) (0.211) (-2.325) (-0.615) (2.907) (3.03) (2.596) (2.583) (4.219) (4.706) (3.784) (3.277) (3.502) (2.634) (2.672) (2.758)
-0.0816 -0.0115 0.00385 -0.0816 -0.0115 0.00385 0.0378 0.247 0.0999 -0.214 -0.077 0.02 -0.0643 -0.0578 -0.0285 -0.0596 -0.0087 0.0117 -0.0864 0.0105 0.0401
(-1.679) (-0.396) (0.139) (-1.642) (-0.387) (0.136) (0.157) (0.976) (0.43) (-2.613) (-1.106) (0.415) (-0.999) (-2.313) (-1.017) (-1.253) (-0.28) (0.388) (-1.199) (0.245) (1.009)
0.0641 0.168 0.147 0.0208 0.0752 0.0721 0.0647 0.165 0.148 0.0648 0.167 0.147 0.0546 0.168 0.148 0.0526 0.17 0.157
(0.805) (2.545) (2.273) (0.219) (1.069) (1.108) (0.792) (2.59) (2.259) (0.784) (2.512) (2.246) (0.694) (2.516) (2.262) (0.633) (2.577) (2.426)
0.0504 0.0982 0.0883 0.0524 0.0859 0.0914 0.0772 0.105 0.0938 0.0506 0.0938 0.0882 0.052 0.0947 0.0885 0.0519 0.0945 0.0929
(0.874) (1.96) (1.868) (0.916) (1.68) (1.933) (1.043) (2.111) (1.988) (0.871) (1.836) (1.846) (0.902) (1.859) (1.858) (0.882) (1.84) (1.991)
-8E-05 0.013 0.00592 -0.0002 0.0139 0.00621 -7E-05 0.0136 0.00595 0.00036 0.00663 0.00448 -0.0002 0.0127 0.00589 -0.0006 0.0131 0.00588
(-0.00616) (1.159) (0.644) (-0.0114) (1.296) (0.679) (-0.00508) (1.277) (0.642) (0.0337) (0.849) (0.521) (-0.0159) (1.12) (0.636) (-0.0437) (1.161) (0.654)
0.117 0.0291 0.0339 0.116 0.0304 0.0336 0.117 0.0295 0.0339 0.117 0.0283 0.0339 0.0331 0.0216 0.0216 0.116 0.0297 0.0335
(1.014) (4.489) (1.959) (1.001) (4.201) (1.916) (1.001) (4.257) (1.935) (1.001) (4.091) (1.932) (3.491) (1.085) (2.426) (0.996) (4.439) (1.895)
-0.0208 -0.0153 -0.0267 -0.0202 -0.0168 -0.0273 -0.0205 -0.0158 -0.0267 -0.0207 -0.0152 -0.0267 -0.0216 -0.0155 -0.0268 0.00714 0.00057 0.00044































0.0352 0.0349 0.0343 0.00316 -0.0486 -0.032 0.0202 -0.0085 -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0485 -0.0332 0.0027 -0.0455 -0.0316 0.012 -0.0471 -0.0315 -0.0046 -0.0556 -0.0486
(8.673) (8.676) (8.924) (0.0779) (-1.48) (-0.984) (0.487) (-0.232) (-0.0601) (-0.036) (-1.513) (-1.052) (0.0619) (-1.35) (-0.955) (0.299) (-1.422) (-0.963) (-0.108) (-1.684) (-1.527)
Observations 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126




Cross-pressured  * Freshman
Post-reform *  ross-pressured 
* Freshman
Constant
Posterf. * cross-press.*  % 
Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers







Post-reform * % civic assoc
Cross-pressured * % civic 
assoc
Post-reform * cross-pressured 
* % civic assoc
Posterform * % Internet for 
info. & comm.
Cross-pressured * % Internet 





 % Internet for infor & comm
Local newspapers
Retire
NON-POLICY LINKAGE STRATEGY LEGISLATORS : DV: PROPORTION VOTING AGAINST THE PARTY








TABLE A2.8: AMBIGUOUS EXPECTATIONS: Proportion of votes against the party (Robust t-statistics in parenthesis ) 
 
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
-0.0031 -0.0042 -0.0057 -0.0031 -0.0042 -0.0057 -0.018 -0.0358 -0.0347 0.00556 0.0106 0.0074 -0.0015 -0.0044 -0.0057 -0.0039 -0.0065 -0.0078
(-0.992) (-0.861) (-1.235) (-0.968) (-0.84) (-1.204) (-1.543) (-1.521) (-1.56) (0.94) (1.332) (1.059) (-0.338) (-0.564) (-0.768) (-0.962) (-1.027) (-1.278)
0.114 0.0349 0.171 0.118 0.0351 0.171 0.457 0.00761 -0.109 -0.0096 0.0161 0.455 0.143 0.0409 0.122 0.114 0.037 0.132
(2.69) (1.867) (2.02) (2.7) (1.873) (2.054) (2.225) (0.0849) (-0.368) (-0.0838) (0.259) (2.071) (2.006) (1.593) (1.161) (2.313) (1.639) (1.61)
-0.0638 0.0567 -0.0173 -0.0638 0.0567 -0.0163 -0.477 0.103 0.0945 0.199 0.115 -0.103 -0.085 0.0331 -0.0192 -0.0853 0.0587 0.0212
(-1.451) (1.606) (-0.2) (-1.416) (1.567) (-0.186) (-2.526) (1.031) (0.419) (1.663) (1.073) (-0.439) (-1.221) (1.049) (-0.265) (-1.791) (1.514) (0.227)
-0.226 -0.0303 -0.0144 -0.0833 -0.0777 -0.273 -0.227 -0.0314 -0.021 -0.225 -0.0352 -0.0605 -0.208 -0.0316 -0.0106
(-1.815) (-0.326) (-0.0668) (-0.863) (-0.956) (-1.773) (-1.961) (-0.331) (-0.0932) (-1.786) (-0.366) (-0.295) (-1.678) (-0.33) (-0.0475)
-0.253 -0.0456 -0.481 -0.243 -0.0461 -0.505 -0.224 0.0115 -0.0564 -0.249 -0.0465 -0.487 -0.152 -0.0547 -0.421
(-1.957) (-0.529) (-1.594) (-1.892) (-0.52) (-1.686) (-1.909) (0.156) (-0.328) (-1.872) (-0.53) (-1.625) (-1.37) (-0.568) (-1.184)
-0.0285 0.00371 0.0173 -0.0312 0.00361 0.00913 -0.0283 0.00365 0.0136 -0.0108 -0.003 -0.035 -0.0293 0.00327 0.0217
(-1.752) (0.19) (0.378) (-1.82) (0.177) (0.22) (-1.576) (0.184) (0.303) (-0.644) (-0.234) (-1.213) (-1.847) (0.164) (0.436)
0.061 0.00776 0.0714 0.0651 0.00775 0.0709 0.0603 0.00702 0.054 0.0609 0.00783 0.0723 0.0241 0.00911 0.0274

























0.0332 0.0335 0.0364 0.159 0.05 0.107 0.105 0.0676 0.21 0.155 0.0401 0.0371 0.152 0.0544 0.144 0.143 0.052 0.103
(9.503) (6.332) (6.902) (2.686) (1.136) (0.811) (2.012) (1.477) (2.034) (2.484) (0.9) (0.312) (2.637) (1.211) (1.227) (2.439) (1.134) (0.743)
Observations 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86
R-squared 0.19 0.222 0.155 0.261 0.225 0.202 0.411 0.227 0.221 0.35 0.24 0.256 0.273 0.247 0.226 0.33 0.227 0.224
Cross-pressured  * Freshman
Post-reform *  ross-pressured 
* Freshman
Constant









Cross-pressured * % civic 
assoc
Post-reform * cross-pressured 
* % civic assoc
Posterform * % Internet for 
info. & comm.
Cross-pressured * % Internet 
for info. & comm.
Posterf. * cross-press.*  % 
Internet 










Post-reform * % civic assoc
AMBIGUOUS EXPECTATION: DV: PROPORTION VOTING AGAINST THE PARTY








TABLE A2.9: ALL LEGISLATORS: Proportion of votes abstains (Robust t-statistics in parenthesis ) 
  
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.00517 0.00535 0.005 0.00517 0.00535 0.005 -0.0004 0.00271 0.00181 0.00575 0.00512 0.00496 0.00452 0.00521 0.00446 0.0053 0.00554 0.00515 0.00383 0.00395 0.0034
(2.731) (2.74) (2.709) (2.713) (2.722) (2.692) (-0.0597) (0.367) (0.247) (1.561) (1.349) (1.407) (2.194) (2.344) (2.136) (2.659) (2.69) (2.651) (1.646) (1.638) (1.529)
0.0166 0.0165 0.0107 0.0177 0.0168 0.0113 0.0423 0.0228 0.0206 0.0186 0.0214 0.00487 0.0189 0.0165 0.00907 0.0179 0.0173 0.0117 0.0173 0.017 0.00522
(2.674) (3.918) (2.745) (2.827) (4.014) (2.891) (1.78) (1.326) (1.204) (1.854) (3.104) (0.58) (2.584) (3.417) (1.955) (2.675) (3.966) (2.84) (2.326) (3.497) (1.45)
0.05 0.018 0.0231 0.0501 0.018 0.0232 0.0683 -0.0187 -0.0114 0.078 0.0386 0.0484 0.0518 0.014 0.0222 0.0544 0.0184 0.0249 0.0342 0.0112 0.0203
(3.556) (2.02) (2.86) (3.541) (2.007) (2.852) (1.228) (-0.504) (-0.346) (3.177) (2.328) (3.148) (3.134) (1.422) (2.509) (3.596) (1.97) (2.924) (2.107) (1.061) (2.234)
-0.0658 0.00564 0.0162 -0.0325 -0.0118 0.00207 -0.0659 0.0037 0.0163 -0.016 0.0294 0.0279 -0.0158 0.0291 0.0278 -0.0124 0.0281 0.027
(-1.357) (0.138) (0.402) (-1.157) (-0.57) (0.0882) (-1.354) (0.0907) (0.401) (-0.395) (0.822) (0.788) (-0.39) (0.812) (0.787) (-0.305) (0.777) (0.762)
-0.0769 -0.0355 -0.0178 -0.0767 -0.0353 -0.0179 -0.0382 -0.0019 -0.0018
(-2.442) (-1.847) (-0.752) (-2.438) (-1.826) (-0.753) (-1.532) (-0.0921) (-0.0825)
-0.0042 0.00203 0.00202 -0.0042 0.00208 0.00203 -0.0042 0.0021 0.00202 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.003 -0.0044 0.00189 0.00202 -0.0043 0.002 0.00222
(-0.691) (0.359) (0.365) (-0.688) (0.367) (0.366) (-0.7) (0.37) (0.364) (-0.766) (-0.728) (-1.171) (-0.688) (0.324) (0.361) (-0.687) (0.345) (0.401)
-0.0131 0.00133 -0.0052 -0.0131 0.00143 -0.0051 -0.0131 0.00236 -0.0052 -0.0179 -0.002 -0.0064 0.00473 0.00488 0.00562 -0.018 -0.0017 -0.0068
(-0.974) (0.137) (-0.521) (-0.97) (0.148) (-0.516) (-0.959) (0.243) (-0.519) (-1.581) (-0.227) (-0.688) (0.631) (0.733) (0.73) (-1.567) (-0.189) (-0.716)
0.013 0.00528 0.0111 0.0126 0.00515 0.0111 0.013 0.00468 0.0111 0.0114 0.00482 0.0109 0.0116 0.00464 0.0109 -0.002 -0.0019 -0.0027































0.0134 0.013 0.0132 0.0504 0.0149 0.00622 0.0377 0.0216 0.0117 0.0434 0.00965 0.00331 0.0175 0.00083 0.00022 0.0168 -0.0005 -0.002 0.0211 0.00232 0.00336
(9.466) (9.594) (9.626) (2.281) (0.89) (0.365) (2.489) (2.171) (0.986) (1.953) (0.546) (0.187) (1.124) (0.0638) (0.0172) (1.088) (-0.0372) (-0.154) (1.377) (0.172) (0.254)
Observations 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414
R-squared 0.133 0.099 0.091 0.152 0.11 0.107 0.155 0.116 0.112 0.162 0.128 0.122 0.143 0.109 0.109 0.152 0.106 0.112 0.165 0.117 0.124
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
ALL LEGISLATORS : DV: PROPORTION ABSTAIN








Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Cross-pressured * % 
Internet
Posterform * cross-
pressured *  % Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers




Post-reform * cross-pres 
* % civic assoc





Posterform * % Internet 






Post-reform * % civic 
assoc









TABLE A2.10: OUT-OF-STEP: Proportion of votes abstains(Robust t-statistics in parenthesis ) 
 
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.00797 0.00751 0.00734 0.00797 0.00751 0.00734 -0.003 0.00249 -0.0002 0.00903 0.00721 0.00796 0.00574 0.00585 0.00528 0.00801 0.00759 0.00739 0.00651 0.00546 0.00528
(2.384) (2.35) (2.333) (2.352) (2.318) (2.303) (-0.286) (0.242) (-0.018) (1.506) (1.259) (1.439) (1.738) (1.819) (1.648) (2.196) (2.178) (2.155) (1.621) (1.477) (1.464)
0.0121 0.0149 0.0107 0.0131 0.017 0.0117 0.043 0.0178 0.00086 0.00936 0.023 0.016 0.0156 0.0148 0.00782 0.0124 0.0165 0.0115 0.0196 0.0125 0.00636
(1.646) (2.5) (2.241) (1.767) (2.883) (2.454) (1.439) (0.787) (0.0481) (0.809) (2.574) (1.891) (1.693) (2.019) (1.331) (1.539) (2.627) (2.241) (2.004) (2.151) (1.543)
0.0596 0.0431 0.0342 0.0594 0.0431 0.0342 0.0566 -0.0223 0.00678 0.098 0.077 0.0624 0.0471 0.0299 0.0303 0.0669 0.045 0.0375 0.052 0.0433 0.0365
(2.961) (2.843) (2.691) (2.912) (2.803) (2.657) (0.774) (-0.426) (0.153) (2.945) (3) (2.711) (2.251) (1.898) (2.328) (3.005) (2.777) (2.774) (2.037) (2.438) (2.48)
-0.0701 0.00336 0.00954 -0.0485 -0.0401 -0.0323 -0.0692 0.00238 0.0101 -0.0697 0.00756 0.0102 -0.0702 0.00404 0.0093 -0.0717 0.00268 0.0097
(-0.979) (0.0518) (0.15) (-1.253) (-1.303) (-1.084) (-0.958) (0.0366) (0.157) (-0.966) (0.116) (0.159) (-0.973) (0.0614) (0.145) (-0.985) (0.0409) (0.152)
-0.0714 -0.0548 -0.0474 -0.0713 -0.053 -0.0475 -0.0296 -0.001 0.00133 -0.0713 -0.0497 -0.0459 -0.0719 -0.0539 -0.0473 -0.0712 -0.0555 -0.0477
(-1.902) (-2.322) (-1.794) (-1.89) (-2.14) (-1.787) (-0.9) (-0.0306) (0.0429) (-1.875) (-2.101) (-1.72) (-1.895) (-2.226) (-1.77) (-1.886) (-2.329) (-1.77)
0.0104 0.0124 0.00885 0.0103 0.0129 0.00896 0.0102 0.0121 0.00862 0.00061 -0.0028 -0.0038 0.0104 0.0124 0.00894 0.0105 0.0127 0.009
(1.016) (1.543) (0.938) (0.991) (1.635) (0.95) (0.988) (1.487) (0.905) (0.119) (-0.607) (-0.859) (1.007) (1.528) (0.943) (1.028) (1.604) (0.963)
-0.0056 0.0101 0.00341 -0.0056 0.0101 0.0036 -0.0057 0.0109 0.00317 -0.0055 0.00998 0.00294 0.0136 0.0136 0.0126 -0.0055 0.011 0.00285
(-0.311) (0.914) (0.226) (-0.309) (0.915) (0.237) (-0.313) (1.016) (0.207) (-0.301) (0.899) (0.19) (1.082) (1.019) (0.898) (-0.307) (0.996) (0.184)
-0.0017 0.00938 0.0101 -0.0023 0.00929 0.0102 -0.0013 0.00933 0.0103 -0.0013 0.00962 0.0104 -0.0015 0.00924 0.0104 0.00022 -0.0006 -0.0003































0.0134 0.0132 0.0132 0.0514 0.0152 0.0128 0.0434 0.0312 0.0286 0.043 0.00541 0.00336 0.0538 0.017 0.0159 0.05 0.0146 0.0121 0.0513 0.0184 0.0159
(7.026) (6.941) (7.141) (1.621) (0.603) (0.513) (2.05) (2.163) (2.035) (1.331) (0.197) (0.123) (1.67) (0.662) (0.62) (1.568) (0.565) (0.479) (1.617) (0.699) (0.612)
Observations 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202
R-squared 0.152 0.178 0.122 0.169 0.214 0.15 0.172 0.233 0.157 0.188 0.253 0.178 0.183 0.257 0.162 0.184 0.217 0.158 0.174 0.219 0.154
Cross-pressured  * Freshman
Post-reform *  Cross-
pressured * Freshman
Constant
Cross-pressured  * Local 
newspapers







Cross-pressured * % civic 
assoc
Post-reform * cross-pres * % 
civic assoc
Posterform * % Internet for 
info.n & comm.
Cross-pressured * % Internet
Posterform * cross-
pressured *  % Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers
% civic associations










OUT-OF-STEP LEGISLATORS : DV: PROPORTION  ABSTAIN












VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.0039 0.00457 0.00448 0.0039 0.00457 0.00448 -0.0025 -0.0099 -0.0038 0.00523 0.00693 0.00468 0.00522 0.00619 0.00576 0.00456 0.00529 0.00518 0.00011 0.00137 0.00112
(1.308) (1.191) (1.399) (1.279) (1.165) (1.37) (-0.183) (-0.553) (-0.244) (0.851) (0.92) (0.723) (1.456) (1.292) (1.47) (1.404) (1.264) (1.489) (0.0261) (0.225) (0.234)
0.0307 0.0132 0.0166 0.0326 0.0127 0.0174 0.118 0.0215 0.0879 0.0408 0.0268 -0.0062 0.031 0.0117 0.0158 0.0356 0.014 0.0194 0.0232 0.018 0.0133
(1.903) (1.642) (2.102) (2.072) (1.651) (2.194) (1.791) (0.554) (1.674) (1.569) (1.46) (-0.359) (1.798) (1.496) (1.782) (2.079) (1.739) (2.284) (1.069) (1.57) (1.393)
0.0629 0.00951 0.0152 0.0629 0.00951 0.0152 -0.001 0.0524 0.0317 0.104 0.00801 0.0316 0.0826 0.0155 0.0225 0.0681 0.00937 0.016 0.0215 -0.0118 -0.0028
(2.184) (0.718) (1.116) (2.136) (0.702) (1.093) (-0.0095) (0.849) (0.444) (1.707) (0.229) (1.098) (2.324) (0.936) (1.339) (2.108) (0.655) (1.055) (0.713) (-0.74) (-0.173)
-0.165 -0.0875 -0.0864 -0.115 -0.072 -0.0129 -0.163 -0.0936 -0.0885 -0.161 -0.0872 -0.0865 -0.161 -0.0871 -0.087 -0.146 -0.0893 -0.0944
(-1.277) (-1.257) (-1.25) (-1.11) (-1.478) (-0.217) (-1.25) (-1.337) (-1.262) (-1.238) (-1.233) (-1.234) (-1.231) (-1.232) (-1.241) (-1.137) (-1.254) (-1.349)
-0.143 -0.0515 0.00861 -0.145 -0.0474 0.00546 -0.063 -0.0253 -0.0374 -0.142 -0.0499 0.00886 -0.144 -0.0495 0.00843 -0.146 -0.0473 0.00487
(-1.952) (-1.061) (0.205) (-1.942) (-0.937) (0.13) (-1.096) (-0.824) (-1.282) (-1.912) (-1.014) (0.208) (-1.936) (-1.009) (0.198) (-2.011) (-0.969) (0.115)
-0.0152 -0.0086 -0.0112 -0.0151 -0.0089 -0.0115 -0.0152 -0.0073 -0.0113 -0.0012 -0.0031 -0.006 -0.0151 -0.0085 -0.0112 -0.0144 -0.0087 -0.0112
(-1.683) (-1.38) (-1.851) (-1.646) (-1.374) (-1.829) (-1.659) (-1.166) (-1.84) (-0.17) (-0.583) (-1.077) (-1.651) (-1.328) (-1.817) (-1.648) (-1.362) (-1.793)
-0.0371 -0.0172 -0.022 -0.0365 -0.0177 -0.0217 -0.0377 -0.0165 -0.022 -0.0375 -0.0169 -0.022 0.00743 -0.0023 0.00213 -0.0357 -0.0179 -0.0217
(-2.4) (-2.267) (-2.919) (-2.314) (-2.245) (-2.857) (-2.39) (-2.071) (-2.881) (-2.382) (-2.165) (-2.875) (0.526) (-0.238) (0.257) (-2.228) (-2.363) (-2.823)
0.02 -0.0025 0.00495 0.0194 -0.002 0.00553 0.0207 -0.0035 0.00489 0.0202 -0.0025 0.00491 0.0203 -0.0024 0.00508 -0.0138 -0.0118 -0.0135































0.0159 0.0159 0.0154 0.105 0.0647 0.0515 0.0851 0.0576 0.0221 0.0902 0.0628 0.0601 0.0983 0.0626 0.0499 0.1 0.0632 0.0503 0.112 0.0689 0.0635
(4.804) (5.098) (4.85) (1.628) (2.01) (1.582) (1.528) (2.302) (0.772) (1.423) (1.98) (1.855) (1.534) (1.933) (1.52) (1.546) (1.943) (1.529) (1.737) (2.023) (1.883)
Observations 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126







Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Post-reform *  ross-
pressured * Freshman
Posterform * % Internet for 
info.n & comm.
Cross-pressured * % 
Internet for info.n & comm.
Posterform * cross-
pressured *  % Internet for 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers
Cross-pressured  * Local 
newspapers
Posterform *cross-




Post-reform * % civic assoc
Cross-pressured * % civic 
assoc
Post-reform * cross-






 % Internet for information 
& communication
M5 M6 M7M1 M2 M3 M4












VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.00102 0.0019 0.00082 0.00102 0.0019 0.00082 0.00811 0.0129 0.0119 -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0019 0.00046 0.00219 0.00054 0.00227 0.00352 0.00201
(0.42) (0.816) (0.339) (0.41) (0.797) (0.33) (0.6) (1.04) (0.885) (-0.101) (-0.381) (-0.385) (0.12) (0.62) (0.138) (0.714) (1.169) (0.632)
0.00771 0.0243 -0.0013 0.00698 0.0245 -0.0002 -0.022 0.0307 0.0541 0.0435 -0.0044 -0.06 0.0133 0.0313 0.00509 0.01 0.0249 -0.0105
(0.894) (2.651) (-0.135) (0.818) (2.638) (-0.0242) (-0.581) (0.709) (1.005) (1.449) (-0.173) (-1.795) (0.937) (2.511) (0.326) (1.006) (2.351) (-3.482)
0.00787 -0.023 0.00754 0.00787 -0.023 0.0077 0.137 -0.0441 -0.113 -0.0597 0.0168 0.0849 0.0129 -0.0336 -0.0106 0.00773 -0.0261 0.0114
(0.326) (-2.099) (0.547) (0.318) (-2.049) (0.546) (1.03) (-0.961) (-1.919) (-1.695) (0.559) (1.859) (0.308) (-2.373) (-0.676) (0.274) (-2.084) (1.164)
-0.0283 0.0358 0.0394 0.0248 0.0459 0.0404 -0.0295 0.0367 0.037 -0.0278 0.037 0.0367 -0.0317 0.0362 0.0417
(-0.359) (1.259) (1.173) (0.656) (1.932) (1.021) (-0.386) (1.315) (1.118) (-0.35) (1.242) (1.109) (-0.387) (1.267) (1.348)
-0.0109 0.0407 0.0425 -0.0084 0.0402 0.0406 -0.0111 0.0159 0.001 -0.0086 0.0409 0.0415 -0.0305 0.0442 0.0674
(-0.224) (1.154) (0.776) (-0.176) (1.091) (0.708) (-0.192) (0.52) (0.0212) (-0.177) (1.145) (0.738) (-0.503) (1.297) (1.427)
-0.0078 -0.0018 0.00128 -0.0085 -0.0019 0.00182 -0.0076 -0.0018 0.00198 0.00133 0.00019 -0.004 -0.0076 -0.0017 0.00287
(-0.876) (-0.267) (0.165) (-0.881) (-0.274) (0.229) (-0.81) (-0.251) (0.249) (0.184) (0.0406) (-0.653) (-0.856) (-0.234) (0.358)
-0.0061 -0.0038 0.00707 -0.005 -0.0038 0.00708 -0.0066 -0.0032 0.00862 -0.0061 -0.0038 0.00705 0.00349 -0.0027 -0.0071

























0.0102 0.00896 0.0102 0.0269 -0.0102 -0.0143 0.00679 -0.0138 -0.0145 0.0274 -0.0061 -0.0064 0.0229 -0.0114 -0.0111 0.0295 -0.0113 -0.017
(4.7) (4.932) (4.78) (0.72) (-0.764) (-0.725) (0.312) (-1.205) (-0.65) (0.708) (-0.445) (-0.368) (0.657) (-0.809) (-0.558) (0.737) (-0.848) (-0.933)
Observations 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86




Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman




pressured *  % Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers







Post-reform * % civic 
assoc
Cross-pressured * % 
civic assoc
Post-reform * cross-pres 
* % civic assoc
Posterform * % Internet 
for info.n & comm.



















TABLE A2.13: ALL LEGISLATORS: Proportion of missed votes(Robust t-statistics in parenthesis ) 
 
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.0202 0.0181 0.0193 0.0202 0.0181 0.0193 0.0365 0.0352 0.0378 0.0268 0.0249 0.0258 0.0132 0.0115 0.0127 0.0238 0.0211 0.0231 0.0109 0.0073 0.00979
(2.369) (2.131) (2.283) (2.354) (2.117) (2.269) (0.996) (0.971) (1.024) (1.638) (1.664) (1.617) (1.356) (1.181) (1.31) (2.722) (2.372) (2.662) (1.01) (0.687) (0.918)
0.1 0.0585 0.0506 0.098 0.0554 0.0479 0.0536 0.0325 0.0291 0.123 0.087 0.0756 0.098 0.0572 0.0506 0.101 0.0523 0.0512 0.0904 0.0542 0.0498
(4.253) (3.834) (3.259) (4.151) (3.586) (3.065) (0.539) (0.543) (0.455) (2.97) (3.335) (2.906) (3.406) (3.358) (2.918) (4.152) (3.285) (3.167) (3.164) (2.975) (2.594)
-0.0826 -0.0273 -0.0135 -0.0823 -0.0273 -0.0139 0.0822 0.0295 -0.0633 -0.125 -0.0311 -0.0233 -0.0689 -0.0135 -0.0138 -0.0809 -0.0259 -0.0184 -0.07 -0.024 -0.0055
(-2.729) (-1.405) (-0.643) (-2.704) (-1.396) (-0.658) (0.619) (0.375) (-0.694) (-2.058) (-0.839) (-0.589) (-1.827) (-0.607) (-0.584) (-2.549) (-1.273) (-0.842) (-1.884) (-1.099) (-0.221)
-0.0814 -0.0899 0.00017 -0.0146 -0.0614 -0.0279 -0.0814 -0.0938 0.00109 -0.076 -0.0446 0.0147 -0.0757 -0.0432 0.0145 -0.0753 -0.0438 0.0153
(-0.627) (-0.845) (0.00148) (-0.137) (-0.604) (-0.264) (-0.625) (-0.879) (0.00922) (-0.703) (-0.504) (0.152) (-0.7) (-0.487) (0.15) (-0.691) (-0.495) (0.159)
-0.0084 -0.0691 -0.0218 -0.0082 -0.0691 -0.0216 0.019 0.0178 0.0564
(-0.0865) (-0.822) (-0.233) (-0.0838) (-0.82) (-0.229) (0.231) (0.21) (0.719)
-0.0233 -0.0242 -0.0171 -0.0233 -0.0242 -0.0171 -0.0234 -0.024 -0.0172 -0.0251 -0.0231 -0.0238 -0.0233 -0.0247 -0.0172 -0.0234 -0.0245 -0.0175
(-1.097) (-1.288) (-0.893) (-1.09) (-1.283) (-0.892) (-1.095) (-1.282) (-0.895) (-1.582) (-1.439) (-1.534) (-1.092) (-1.306) (-0.892) (-1.095) (-1.298) (-0.911)
-0.019 0.0281 -8E-05 -0.0189 0.0281 -1E-05 -0.019 0.0302 -0.0002 -0.0197 0.0224 -0.0014 0.0456 0.0304 0.0432 -0.0195 0.0219 -0.0011
(-0.352) (0.626) (-0.00124) (-0.349) (0.622) (-0.000237) (-0.35) (0.682) (-0.00312) (-0.371) (0.499) (-0.0228) (0.978) (0.679) (0.953) (-0.368) (0.488) (-0.0184)
-0.032 -0.0325 -0.0409 -0.0324 -0.0324 -0.0411 -0.0319 -0.0336 -0.0412 -0.0322 -0.0339 -0.0415 -0.0319 -0.0333 -0.0412 -0.0484 -0.0497 -0.0472































0.15 0.152 0.15 0.201 0.216 0.173 0.176 0.205 0.184 0.196 0.202 0.158 0.198 0.186 0.166 0.194 0.186 0.161 0.203 0.192 0.165
(18.2) (17.91) (18.13) (3.242) (4.148) (3.017) (3.152) (4.016) (3.374) (3.188) (3.868) (2.807) (4.581) (5.071) (4.238) (4.453) (5.016) (4.129) (4.71) (5.187) (4.214)
Observations 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414 401 390 414
R-squared 0.054 0.035 0.028 0.071 0.067 0.052 0.082 0.069 0.054 0.073 0.072 0.055 0.073 0.069 0.054 0.076 0.071 0.054 0.072 0.067 0.055
M7
ALL LEGISLATORS : DV: PROPORTION MISSED VOTES




Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Post-reform *  Cross-
pressured * Freshman
Constant
Posterform * Local 
newspapers






Post-reform * cross-pres 
* % civic assoc





Posterform * % Internet 
for info.n & comm.
Cross-pressured * % 
Internet
Posterform * cross-
pressured *  % Internet 
% civic associations















TABLE A2.14: OUT-OF-STEP:: Proportion of missed votes(Robust t-statistics in parenthesis ) 
 
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.015 0.0127 0.0139 0.015 0.0127 0.0139 0.0459 0.046 0.0467 0.0238 0.0193 0.0218 0.00675 0.00486 0.0061 0.0213 0.0172 0.0202 0.00219 -0.0025 0.00041
(1.3) (1.118) (1.222) (1.283) (1.102) (1.207) (0.932) (0.962) (0.945) (1.132) (1.066) (1.063) (0.468) (0.342) (0.426) (1.83) (1.442) (1.754) (0.149) (-0.175) (0.0284)
0.12 0.076 0.0528 0.116 0.0707 0.0481 0.0636 0.0776 0.0506 0.154 0.105 0.0728 0.126 0.0758 0.0536 0.12 0.0713 0.0574 0.103 0.0583 0.04
(3.061) (3.29) (2.539) (2.945) (3.033) (2.302) (0.43) (0.889) (0.622) (2.277) (2.833) (2.169) (2.559) (2.668) (2.023) (2.919) (2.881) (2.651) (2.162) (2.206) (1.672)
-0.113 -0.0544 -0.04 -0.112 -0.0544 -0.04 0.0972 0.0316 0.00711 -0.165 -0.0606 -0.0642 -0.0962 -0.0408 -0.0406 -0.115 -0.0512 -0.048 -0.0895 -0.0356 -0.0205
(-2.288) (-1.883) (-1.55) (-2.247) (-1.857) (-1.53) (0.511) (0.275) (0.0652) (-1.789) (-1.269) (-1.371) (-1.554) (-1.151) (-1.222) (-2.177) (-1.648) (-1.786) (-1.488) (-1.141) (-0.733)
-0.0746 -0.106 -0.0421 0.0323 -0.0048 0.0349 -0.0739 -0.108 -0.0417 -0.0769 -0.112 -0.0427 -0.0746 -0.104 -0.043 -0.0737 -0.107 -0.0422
(-0.374) (-0.79) (-0.288) (0.198) (-0.0334) (0.231) (-0.367) (-0.797) (-0.283) (-0.382) (-0.825) (-0.289) (-0.371) (-0.762) (-0.292) (-0.365) (-0.788) (-0.286)
0.00233 -0.0409 0.0269 0.00284 -0.0437 0.0271 0.0535 0.0503 0.0801 -0.0024 -0.0478 0.0257 0.00203 -0.0368 0.0273 0.00214 -0.0413 0.0271
(0.0161) (-0.359) (0.211) (0.0195) (-0.381) (0.21) (0.433) (0.42) (0.715) (-0.0167) (-0.416) (0.199) (0.014) (-0.317) (0.213) (0.0147) (-0.36) (0.21)
-0.0423 -0.0303 -0.0234 -0.0422 -0.031 -0.0235 -0.0425 -0.0308 -0.0236 -0.0296 -0.0271 -0.0291 -0.0423 -0.0304 -0.0231 -0.0425 -0.0302 -0.0235
(-1.663) (-1.604) (-1.283) (-1.652) (-1.618) (-1.276) (-1.658) (-1.619) (-1.284) (-1.533) (-1.423) (-1.642) (-1.65) (-1.588) (-1.26) (-1.66) (-1.585) (-1.274)
-0.0203 -0.0158 -0.0367 -0.0203 -0.0157 -0.0369 -0.0204 -0.0148 -0.0369 -0.0203 -0.0155 -0.0363 0.0367 0.0273 0.0387 -0.0204 -0.0152 -0.0365
(-0.324) (-0.475) (-1.029) (-0.322) (-0.47) (-1.028) (-0.323) (-0.456) (-1.029) (-0.324) (-0.459) (-1.01) (0.808) (0.615) (0.918) (-0.322) (-0.455) (-1.017)
-0.0492 -0.0501 -0.0576 -0.0504 -0.05 -0.0576 -0.0489 -0.0502 -0.0574 -0.0496 -0.0504 -0.0578 -0.0491 -0.0507 -0.0566 -0.0731 -0.0801 -0.0778































0.169 0.17 0.169 0.224 0.243 0.206 0.184 0.205 0.177 0.214 0.226 0.196 0.223 0.246 0.209 0.22 0.238 0.201 0.231 0.252 0.212
(12.73) (12.36) (12.66) (2.393) (3.533) (2.737) (2.175) (2.827) (2.273) (2.298) (3.29) (2.668) (2.356) (3.56) (2.757) (2.337) (3.436) (2.656) (2.452) (3.613) (2.776)
Observations 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202 195 184 202
R-squared 0.071 0.051 0.024 0.107 0.11 0.086 0.128 0.122 0.092 0.112 0.118 0.089 0.117 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.121 0.097 0.11 0.116 0.091
Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Post-reform *  Cross-
pressured * Freshman
Constant









Cross-pressured * % 
civic assoc
Post-reform * cross-pres 
* % civic assoc
Posterform * % Internet 
for info.n & comm.
Cross-pressured * % 
Internet
Posterform * cross-
pressured *  % Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers
% civic associations











M6 M7M1 M2 M3 M4 M5








TABLE A2.15: NON POLICY: Proportion of missed votes(Robust t-statistics in parenthesis ) 
 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.0205 0.0185 0.0201 0.0205 0.0185 0.0201 0.0563 0.0357 0.0483 0.00403 0.00671 0.0055 0.0145 0.0131 0.0146 0.0222 0.0206 0.0224 0.00567 0.00331 0.00584
(1.302) (1.167) (1.275) (1.273) (1.141) (1.249) (0.919) (0.582) (0.793) (0.155) (0.27) (0.222) (0.935) (0.838) (0.943) (1.285) (1.186) (1.306) (0.239) (0.14) (0.247)
0.0807 0.0571 0.0641 0.0792 0.0579 0.062 0.185 -0.0799 0.0612 0.0717 0.113 0.0973 0.0733 0.0647 0.0726 0.0854 0.0475 0.0598 0.0655 0.0696 0.0769
(2.334) (2.622) (2.974) (2.221) (2.498) (2.83) (1.192) (-0.79) (0.51) (1.203) (2.213) (2.34) (1.922) (2.392) (2.999) (2.211) (2.057) (2.576) (1.442) (2.32) (2.598)
-0.0545 -0.0036 -0.0049 -0.0545 -0.0036 -0.0049 -0.0484 0.119 -0.0241 -0.0894 -0.0324 0.0131 -0.0354 0.0013 -0.0065 -0.0482 -0.0047 -0.0098 -0.0434 -0.0291 -0.0144
(-1.12) (-0.121) (-0.164) (-1.095) (-0.118) (-0.161) (-0.173) (0.948) (-0.13) (-0.853) (-0.41) (0.227) (-0.63) (0.0365) (-0.21) (-0.894) (-0.147) (-0.303) (-0.621) (-0.96) (-0.352)
-0.0685 -0.0261 -0.16 0.093 -0.0895 -0.136 -0.0699 -0.0444 -0.154 -0.0667 -0.0245 -0.161 -0.062 -0.0297 -0.159 -0.0634 -0.0264 -0.154
(-0.298) (-0.118) (-0.777) (0.447) (-0.407) (-0.72) (-0.299) (-0.189) (-0.739) (-0.286) (-0.109) (-0.773) (-0.266) (-0.133) (-0.76) (-0.266) (-0.117) (-0.73)
0.0545 -0.014 -0.154 0.0505 -0.0246 -0.153 -0.0615 0.00847 -0.0632 0.055 -0.0066 -0.152 0.0534 -0.0315 -0.153 0.0538 -0.0132 -0.151
(0.327) (-0.0817) (-1.007) (0.301) (-0.143) (-0.989) (-0.559) (0.0617) (-0.629) (0.325) (-0.0381) (-0.987) (0.316) (-0.183) (-0.992) (0.317) (-0.077) (-0.971)
-0.0169 -0.0214 -0.0216 -0.0168 -0.0206 -0.0216 -0.0169 -0.0174 -0.0212 -0.0214 -0.0169 -0.0149 -0.0168 -0.0227 -0.0216 -0.0167 -0.0214 -0.0216
(-0.409) (-0.618) (-0.591) (-0.398) (-0.592) (-0.583) (-0.404) (-0.506) (-0.574) (-0.859) (-0.72) (-0.619) (-0.401) (-0.662) (-0.586) (-0.399) (-0.608) (-0.587)
-0.0296 0.0936 0.0573 -0.0282 0.0947 0.0572 -0.029 0.096 0.0573 -0.0297 0.0951 0.0573 0.0504 0.0342 0.0416 -0.0292 0.0935 0.057
(-0.309) (0.909) (0.362) (-0.291) (0.918) (0.357) (-0.299) (0.928) (0.357) (-0.306) (0.924) (0.357) (0.45) (0.316) (0.361) (-0.3) (0.893) (0.355)
-0.0203 -0.0146 -0.0285 -0.0215 -0.0159 -0.0286 -0.0209 -0.0176 -0.0284 -0.0202 -0.0147 -0.0287 -0.0198 -0.0159 -0.0288 -0.045 -0.0329 -0.0333































0.124 0.128 0.125 0.159 0.148 0.231 0.0947 0.176 0.221 0.179 0.152 0.213 0.159 0.145 0.229 0.152 0.157 0.231 0.168 0.157 0.23
(10.65) (10.44) (10.63) (1.309) (1.307) (2.175) (0.824) (1.549) (2.174) (1.547) (1.367) (2.118) (1.313) (1.269) (2.163) (1.226) (1.372) (2.152) (1.335) (1.301) (2.05)
Observations 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126 118 118 126







Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman
Post-reform *  Cross-
pressured * Freshman
Posterform * % Internet 
for info.n & comm.
Cross-pressured * % 
Internet
Posterform * cross-
pressured *  % Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers







Post-reform * % civic 
assoc
Cross-pressured * % 
civic assoc
Post-reform * cross-pres 






 % Internet for info & 
comm
M5 M6 M7M1 M2 M3 M4








TABLE A2.16: AMBIGUOUS EXPECTATIONS Proportion of missed votes (Robust t-statistics in parenthesis ) 
VARIABLES CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CP1 CP2 CP3
0.0304 0.029 0.0294 0.0304 0.029 0.0294 -0.0035 0.00517 0.00595 0.0701 0.0709 0.0687 0.0276 0.0255 0.0265 0.0324 0.0296 0.0314
(1.453) (1.362) (1.413) (1.418) (1.329) (1.378) (-0.0349) (0.0517) (0.0599) (1.163) (1.15) (1.155) (1.009) (0.919) (0.966) (1.391) (1.265) (1.35)
0.0764 0.0246 0.0163 0.0718 0.018 0.0165 -0.0615 -0.0193 -0.042 0.199 0.111 0.0683 0.0382 -0.0075 -0.0225 0.0862 0.0358 0.0293
(1.772) (0.634) (0.308) (1.678) (0.458) (0.3) (-0.414) (-0.261) (-0.306) (2.109) (1.29) (0.648) (0.747) (-0.286) (-0.455) (1.771) (0.78) (0.446)
-0.0473 -0.003 0.0488 -0.0473 -0.003 0.0474 0.144 -0.0278 -0.38 -0.105 -0.0369 0.0482 -0.0478 0.0445 0.0627 -0.0543 0.00482 0.0525
(-0.879) (-0.0611) (0.623) (-0.858) (-0.0597) (0.611) (0.601) (-0.202) (-1.442) (-0.979) (-0.301) (0.227) (-0.622) (1.002) (0.713) (-0.878) (0.08) (0.589)
-0.148 -0.0892 0.221 -0.24 -0.176 -0.117 -0.189 -0.0968 0.217 -0.149 -0.0906 0.192 -0.16 -0.0984 0.216
(-0.695) (-0.353) (0.621) (-1.145) (-0.904) (-0.53) (-0.892) (-0.392) (0.617) (-0.69) (-0.351) (0.514) (-0.748) (-0.395) (0.603)
-0.467 -0.456 -0.207 -0.469 -0.462 -0.242 -0.221 -0.218 -0.015 -0.475 -0.456 -0.21 -0.539 -0.523 -0.253
(-2.096) (-2.409) (-0.928) (-2.074) (-2.425) (-1.075) (-1.231) (-1.503) (-0.0719) (-2.187) (-2.377) (-0.946) (-2.423) (-2.878) (-1.103)
0.00351 -0.0278 -0.0043 0.00427 -0.029 -0.0104 0.00935 -0.0282 -0.0048 -0.0382 -0.0345 -0.0398 0.00409 -0.0311 -0.0069
(0.0686) (-0.633) (-0.0717) (0.0813) (-0.653) (-0.174) (0.179) (-0.641) (-0.0784) (-0.803) (-0.696) (-0.755) (0.08) (-0.73) (-0.114)
0.0261 0.018 0.00518 0.025 0.0179 0.00469 0.00854 0.0125 0.00141 0.0264 0.018 0.00579 0.0557 0.0652 0.0408

























0.145 0.146 0.145 0.278 0.269 0.102 0.312 0.302 0.235 0.25 0.229 0.069 0.295 0.272 0.126 0.288 0.275 0.105
(8.458) (8.506) (8.484) (2.903) (2.625) (0.743) (3.169) (3.311) (2.21) (2.704) (2.217) (0.47) (3.04) (2.6) (0.856) (2.97) (2.76) (0.762)
Observations 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86 88 88 86




Cross-pressured  * 
Freshman




pressured *  % Internet 
Posterform * Local 
newspapers
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M4 M5 M6M1 M2 M3








Dates of first 
vote 




Average standard error 
All Out-of step Non-Policy 
Ambiguous 
Expectations 
2002/1 19-mar-02 20-jun-02 23 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.42 
2002/2 02-jul-02 16-oct-02 28 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.32 
2002/3 05-nov-02 22jan2003 124 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.14 
2003/1 04-mar-03 18-jun-03 96 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.16 
2003/2 08-jul-03 29-oct-03 74 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.28 
2003/3 04-nov-03 22jan2004 50 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.20 
2004/1 11-mar-04 22-jun-04 95 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 
2004/2 06-jul-04 20-oct-04 106 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.18 
2004/3 03-nov-04 19jan2005 49 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.28 
2005/1 02-mar-05 21-jun-05 72 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 
2005/2 05-jul-05 19-oct-05 45 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.29 









Appendix 4: Legislators without clear expectations. Evolution of proportion of votes 
 
Figure A4.1: Legislators with no clear expectations 





Figure A4.2: Legislators with no clear expectations 


































Not cross-pressured CP1 Cross-pressured CP1
Not cross-pressured CP2 Cross-pressured CP2
Not cross-pressured CP3 Cross-pressured CP3
Note: Includes only legislators running for reelection
by 4-month subperiods







































Not cross-pressured CP1 Cross-pressured CP1
Not cross-pressured CP2 Cross-pressured CP2
Not cross-pressured CP3 Cross-pressured CP3
Note: Includes only legislators running for reelection
by 4-month subperiods







Figure A4.3: Legislators with no clear expectations 



































































Not cross-pressured CP1 Cross-pressured CP1
Not cross-pressured CP2 Cross-pressured CP2
Not cross-pressured CP3 Cross-pressured CP3
Note: Includes only legislators running for reelection
by 4-month subperiods
Ambiguous expect. legislators: Proportion of abstentions
